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Oksana Boyko: Hello and welcome to Worlds Apart. With Russia and the United States at
loggerheads once again, few would remember that this week marks the fifth anniversary
of the reset ceremony during which Russian and American officials pledged to put their
relationship on a new and more constructive footing. Is the latest overcharge a direct
consequence of that reset? Well, to discuss that I am now joined by Angela Stent, director
of the Centre of Eurasian, Russian and East European studies at Georgetown University.
Dr. Stent, thank you very much for taking part in the programme.
Angela Stent: Well, it is good to be on the programme.
OB: Well, here we are again facing one of the biggest crises in bilateral relationships,
this time over Ukraine. In your latest book ìThe Limits of Partnership: US-Russia relations
in XXI centuryî, you make a point that Russia has always be extremely sensitive about the
West and the Unites States in particular, acting in its neighbourhood. Now, we have
never seen such a dramatic reaction from Russia before, and I wonder if this extraordinary
reaction on the part of the Russian president, on the part of Russia, is also in a way a
response to extraordinary actions on the part of the West and the United States in particular.
AS: Well, first of all let me just go back to the five years ago when Secretary Hilary
Clinton met with Foreign Minister Lavrov. She presented him the reset button which said
reset in English and it said ëperegruskaí in Russian. And of course, Mr. Lavrov pointed
out that thatís the wrong word, thatís the word for overload on English, it is ëperezagruskaí,
and then I remember Kommersant had a headline the next day ñ ëClinton and Lavrov push
the wrong buttoní. So in a sense this is relationship that has been overloaded. There
have been so many issues where we have disagreed, there have been other issues where we have
worked together. I see whatís happened recently in Ukraine, obviously on a number of different
levels. What triggered it was the problems within Ukraine itself and the dissatisfaction
of the people with their government, the failure to sign an agreement with the European Union
as a symbol of that, but it goes much deeper than that.
OB: But isnít it also true that United States and the West and Russia, to some extent, were
all too eager to exploit some of the disenchantment that the population, that the people of the
Ukraine felt with their authorities, and when it comes to the West it is true that many
people on Maidan were dissatisfied, but that doesnít mean that democratically elected
government needed to be deposed, especially within a couple of months from the next elections.
AS: Well, I donít think anyone of the West foresaw that there was going to be, what was
going to happen, in November. I mean the EU was offering Ukraine a reasonable package,
obviously not as much as President Putin and Russia offered Mr. Yanukovych later on, but
the United States wasnít really present. The United States basically was allowing or
wanted the Europeans to work out their deal with Ukraine. The U.S. really only stepped
in once all the demonstrations had begun and it was not very clear what was to happen.
Now I understand that the Russian media have portrayed this as a something supported by
the US, by the Europeans and that these are ìfascistî, but you know the situation there
is much more complicated and this is not something that anyone in the West wanted to see - a
breakdown of governmental structures in Ukraine.
OB: Well, Dr. Stent let me take an issue what you have just said about Russian media and
their portrayal of the situation. After everything we saw happening on Maidan, you know, a number
of American officials showing out there with cookies and those intercepted phone conversations,
itís really hard to believe that the United States was this impartial observer but, switching
gears a little bit. On Tuesday, President Putin made his first appearance before Russian
media. He held a news conference which gave him a chance to explain his rational and he
was adamant that the Russiaís actions were, represented a legitimate response to what
he sees as illegitimate seizure of power. Now, in addition to answering questions, he
also posed one and let me play it for you. I would like you to answer what he actually
asked.
Cutaway President Putin: For me thereës a big question,
and neither I nor my colleagues can reply to it. And you know Iíve been discussing
the Ukrainian crisis over the phone with a lot of our Western partners. Why has this
been done?
OB: Dr. Stent, you worked in the State Department, you understand how decision makers in Washington
think. What was the point, as far as American are concerned, of siding with this unconstitutional
government, or endorsing this unconstitutional change of government because I mean elections
are just around the corner and, you know, it is a still an open questions how long that
government will stay in power.
AS: Well let me get you back to February 21st. The agreement was signed between the various
groups and the foreign ministers of Germany and other European countries and, of course,
Mr. Lukin was in the room, although he didnít sign it. Then something happened, right? Yanukovych
left, nobodyís quite clear exactly how and why that happened, but that was not something
that was instigated by any Western country. So than you have to deal with the reality
that Mr. Yanukovych has disappeared, a couple of days. Then of course he went to Russia.
And you have people in Kiev who say ëwell, weíre going to be the interim governmentí.
I mean otherwise it would be a complete breakdown of all governmental structures, all law and
order. So, the U.S. and European countries are now dealing with this interim government,
which of course wasnít elected by anyone, but otherwise thereíd be a power vacuum because
Mr. Yanukovych just disappeared.
OB: Well Dr. Stent, Western powers may have nothing to do with Yanukovych disappearing,
but they may have something to do with emboldening the protestors to the degree that they resorted
to the use of force, because we know that some of the elements within the protest movement
were armed. They used force to occupy government buildings. Mr. Yanukovych in his latest press
conference claimed that he was shot at by protestors, that his convoy was attacked.
So, do you think Western powers share some of the responsibility for the chaos that we
saw on the streets of Ukraine by emboldening protestors, encouraging them to up the ante.
AS: Well, but you know, the shootings first of all, a lot of the shooting were also by
trained snipers who were clearly not protestors but they were, you know, from some different
government structures. I mean, those units have now been disbanded. The West had nothing
to do with arming anyone in the Maidan and so, it doesnít bear responsible for the violence.
Thereís obviously a lot of different stories, but clearly there was violence on both sides.
But of the 80 people who died, most of them were the victims of government related forces
who were trained snipers who were shooting them. So again, I think, you know, one has
to accept that thereís an enormous amount of chaos there but the West not involved in
any violence.
OB: Well, the West, again, certainly was involved in any violence but it sided with the protestors
from the very beginning and that, again, may have created an impression that everything
goes essentially. Now, turning our attention to Russiaís actions, which provoked a lot
of controversy not only in West but also in Russia, this threat of using force to restore
constitutional order in Ukraine. Now, Iím sure you know that Russia has a lot of equity
in Ukraine, a lot at stake in Ukraine and I am talking about the Russian base there,
the possibility for Ukraine joining NATO, not to mention extensive economic, cultural,
historic ties between the two countries. Now, given how much of that was threatened by this
armed seizure of power and by the emergence of this far-right government, the government
that is clearly anti-Russian, is it really surprising that Russia reacted in the way
it did. Did it have any other options of protecting its interests there?
AS: Well, I think we have to be very careful. So, I agree with you that this interim government
immediately trying to pass legislation degrading the Russian language and its use in Ukraine,
that was clearly a mistake, and they shouldnít have done it, and I guess that law is now
no longer operative. I mean, I could, I understand, obviously Russia does have very important
equities, it has the Black Sea base. Of course, it has a lease now until 2042. Itís not clear
to me that, I am not aware of any threats that were made in Kiev that somehow they would
revise the issue of the basing of the Black Sea Fleet there. No one raised that. So the
question is - did Russia, in order to protect its equities there, did it need to have such
a strong showing of force? I think thatís the issue. No one is questioning that Russia
had the right to protect what it has in Crimea, but itís how it did it.
OB: But Dr. Stent, what was Russiaís other option? Because, in the beginning of this
crisis, Russia clearly pursued a diplomatic round. It was, you know, part of the negotiations
that were taking place in Kiev, it was calling for a diplomatic solution and, you know, you
donít need to take my word for it - even some of the foreign diplomats, for example
the Polish Foreign Minister, Radoslaw Sikorski, who is hardly biased towards Russia, said
that when the ousted president Viktor Yanukovych was negotiating a deal with the Opposition,
that he reportedly received a call from Putin encouraging him to make concessions. So, could
it be also the case, that after trying to play nice and civil and abide by the rules,
Moscow simply realised that this strategy was not only na?ve, it was foolish? Because
it essentially led to Russia, you know, potentially endangering all of its interests there, because
the more concessions were made, the more the Opposition upped the ante
AS: But there was no threat to the Black Sea Fleet or to CrimeaÖ
OB: But how do you know?
AS: from this very weak and fragile interim government. I mean, it had only been in power,
if thatís the right way to describe it, for a few days. So, I guess thereís nothing that
precipitated the need for this huge show of force. The issue is, you know, what appears
to be to many people, at least in the West letís say, a disproportionate use of force
and a de facto occupation of Crimea.
OB: Dr. Stent, you just mentioned that there was absolutely nothing that would let us think
that this government was threatening in any way Russiaís long term security interests,
but you also mentioned that the first issue that this government, this interim government,
preoccupied itself with, was the future of the Russian language in Ukraine and thatís
at a time when half of the country is in chaos. So, that sort of show you the trajectory that
government was prepared to take. But the question I would like to pose to you - obviously that
measure was very controversial, I mean, it is still hotly debated within Russia, the
idea of Russian troops being in Ukraine for whatever reason is highly painful for many
Russian people, but leaving the moral aspect of that aside, isnít that also true that
that proved highly effective as well, because, you now, after weeks and months trying to
negotiate with the opposition and trying to persuade the opposition and the West to come
to some sort of compromise, here Russia has everything it ever wanted. I mean, the other
day five former American ambassadors to Ukraine had an open letter published and they list
pretty much everything Russia has requested so, we may not like this military option but
it seems to be, it is highly effective.
AS: I agree with you, that obviously by using the military option, Russia has gained what
it wanted, itís de facto Crimea will be a part of Russia, even if it is not technically
part of the Russian Federation. Itís certainly not going to have the same relationship to
the Ukrainian state. You know, if Russia was wanted before to have Ukraine join the Eurasian
Union, I canít see that happening for at least a very long time. And clearly with all
of the moves being announced by the United States and also by the European Union, it
has cost Russiaís something politically and it certainly cost Russia something economically.
I would say they are costs for Russia. They may well be outweighed from the Kremlinís
point of view by the gains, but this is not without costs as well.
OB: Well, I totally agree with you. The only thing that I would add is that Vladimir Putin
made it clear he is not interested in annexing Crimea. I think it would be an extremely difficult
undertaking for him to do, given the current circumstances. But letís take the short brake
now. When we come back, is the Ukraine standoff a turning point in the US-Russia relationship
or rather, a point of no return. Thatís coming up in
the few moments on Worlds apart.
OB: Welcome back to Worlds Apart where we are discussing the stand off between Russia
and the West over Ukraine with Angela Stent, director of the Centre for Eurasian, Russian
and East European Studies at Georgetown University. Dr. Stent, this week marks the fifth anniversary
of this famous reset, and in your book you make a point that every new American administration
attempted to improve the bilateral ties but I think the feeling here in Moscow is that
what Americans really mean by improving ties is essentially having a more complacent, less
independent and less assertive Russia. Is there any merit to that?
AS: Well, I know thatís definitely how many Russians see that. And weíve obviously heard
that from President Putin a number of times. I donít believe that that was the intention
in the beginning. I would say that the reset of President Obama was a somewhat more realistic
reset, and itís certainly did achieve quite a lot in President Obamaís first term. We
can mention new START nuclear arms control agreement, cooperation with Russia on more
sanctions on Iran, we can mention cooperation now in Afghanistan - looking towards the withdrawal
of forces there, Russian joining the WTO. So, there were achievements there but I think
the relationship became more complicated when Mr. Putin announced his intention to return
to the Kremlin because that reset was very much built on a personal relationship between
President Obama and President Medvedev.
OB: Well, you mentioned some of the strategic achievements of the forth reset lead by President
Obama, President Medvedev, partially President Putin. And all those issues, theyíre dealing
with strategic goals, with global security. I wonder if all of that was worth putting
on hold, which is most likely going to happen the next few months, probably years, for the
sake of endorsing a pro-Western government in one European country.
AS: Well, I would say that the relationship between the U.S. and Russia had really deteriorated
even before these Ukrainian events, and I think from the U.S. point of view, the major
event was the granting of political asylum to the NSA leaker and Edward Snowden. This
was something that the White House argued very strenuously against. President Putin
made the choice. I understand why he did, from his point of view. I am sure it was quite
a rational choice. So the relationship had been on a downward trajectory anyway. But
let me just say that despite all of that, the US and Russia continue, and will continue
to work together on these global issues where they both have an interest, and where Russia
is a very important partner.
OB: But, just of out of curiosity, I mean, you are renowned academic, you were in the
State Department for a pretty long time and I know that this relationship, this partnership
between Russia and the United States has always be pretty challenging and it was always limited.
But when American decision makers are considering their options, considering what position they
should take in any given country, surely they take into account the sensibilities of their
partners, and when you deal with Ukraine, I am sure they knew well in advance how sensitive
that would be for Russia, and completely discounting Russiaís interests, completely discounting
Russiaís fears in seeing some of those far-right organisations, seeing some of those, you know,
radical protestors taking part in those demonstrations, endorsing the unconstitutional change of government.
All of that, from the Russian point of view, itís simply very difficult to understand
why would, you know, endorsing, you know this government be outweighing much more and much
more important strategic issues that you mentioned earlier?
AS: If indeed what we see in Ukraine as a result of all of this is Crimea in a similar
status to say Transnistria or Abkhazia or South Ossetia, in other words, a region of
a country where it functions as a quasi state itself and isnít under the control of the
central government, and that really then makes the entire post-Cold War order there, more
fragile. So, I think that partly has played into this. Now, you could go back and say
maybe it shouldnít have been cast as the European Union vs. the Eurasian Union, but
thatís how it came to be cast. And so I think the question is are we now seeing the break
down of what we thought had been achieved in Europe after the end of the Cold war.
OB: Dr. Sent, you just mentioned the issue of annexing or partitioning, annexing Crimea
or partitioning Ukraine, giving Crimea some special status, and in your own book you describe
Russia as a status quo power, and Russia was pretty content with the way things were going
in Ukraine. Whether there was a pro-Western government of Victor Yushchenko and Yulia
Tymoshenko, whether there was the government of Victor Yanukovych, though I wouldnít describe
it as pro-Russian because I think Victor Yanukovich was really trying to, you know, play both
sides of the isle, but Russia was pretty content with the status quo and what Russia was really
defending was the status quo, whereas, in fact, it was the United States which decided
to revision, in a way, what was happening in Ukraine and again with endorsing this unconstitutional
change of government.
AS: Well then I think weíd have to go into a discussion about what the status quo is.
Well I think from the Russian point of view, the status quo it wants to defend is a Ukraine
that doesnít a) choose to go with the European Union and b) hopefully, from the Russian point
of view, would join the Eurasian Union, or at least if not that, remain strictly neutral
in a sense of not being in either of those economic bodies. And I think both sides now,
you know, understand that the status quo we had in Ukraine prior to, you know, February
21st doesnít exist anymore.
OB: Now, US Secretary of State John Kerry warned that there will be costs for Russiaís
military presence in Ukraine. You also lauded to costs in the first of the part of the program,
and whatís interesting is that Vladimir Putin as well said today that if indeed there will
be costs, there will affect not only Russia but also the United States. How far do you
think both administrations, both the Obama administration and the Putin administration
are willing to go in punishing each other?
AS: Well, I think there is a limit to how much they can punish each other. First of
all, in the US-Russian case, we donít have much of an economic relationship, weíre not
like the Europeans, and therefore, you know, now I think our administration is talking
about freezing the potential trade and investment treaty which we might have signed during the
G8 summit. And theyíre talking about, you know, not pushing ahead with some business
deals - we were supposed to have a delegation of Russian officials including the Energy
Minister in Washington this week talking about energy deals. So, you know, you can suspend
those, but that doesnít, I donít think it imposes a huge cost on Russia, because as
I say, we donít have much of an economic relationship. So I think that the U.S. has
limited leverage.
OB: Speaking about the costs, it is clear that a move like that certainly has reputational
costs for Putin personally and for Russia as a country and, you know, invoking the use
of force may be fine for the United States, it does it pretty regularly, but the thing
is, it is an extraordinary thing for Russia both domestically and internationally, and
I think it had, you know, the decision to even threaten the use of force was extremely
difficult for the Russian president, and to that effect I want to play something that
he said just before this recent crises broke out. Letís listen.
Cutaway President Putin: The Olympics are very important
for us, because I believe, and I would like it to be so, that the Games opened the door
not only to Russia, but also to the Russianís soul, the hearts of our people. Others could
look and see that thereís nothing to fear.
OB: Now he said that just a, you now, days before the events in Crimea, immediately after
the Olympics and I wonder how do you reconcile the two - his desire to show Russia as modern,
welcoming nation on one hand, and on the other hand, giving orders that will clearly give
plenty of ammunition to Russiaís haters in the United States and in the West.
AS: Well, I ask myself the same question and so do many of my colleagues here, because,
in fact, the Sochi Olympics were very successful. I know that there was excessive criticism
before the Games began in the West about a whole range of things, but you know, the evaluation
of the Olympics at the end, was really pretty positive, including in, really, all of our
media here. The athletes had a very good experience. So then the question is why, just so shortly
after showing that Russia can host a very successful Olympic games, why then we have
this militarily incursion and I mean, one can only say that, presumably, it was more
important to do this militarily and to show, you know, the strong fist, than it was to
continue this, you know, showing the face of Russia that everyone responded very positively
to. So in some sense, a lot of the good will that was built up in Sochi has now dissipated
because of whatís happened in Crimea.
OB: Well Dr. Sent letís not overestimate the amount of good will that was created by
the Olympics in the West. I think that looking at the coverage in the Western media, it was
pretty meagre, but what I want to add is that the fact of incursion is still highly disputed
by Russia. Russia does not recognise Western allegations of the incursion of its troops
into the Ukrainian territory, but coming back to the sound bite that we just played, given
how much Vladimir Putin was personally invested into the Olympics and how strongly he feels
about, you know, showing the new face of Russia, doesnít it ultimately suggest that he was
cornered? That the West essentially left him with no other options? Isnít that ultimately
at the core of the question of why these resets never work - that Russia is always sort of
pushed into the corner, you know, itís interests are always betrayed or neglected when the
United States or the West in general sees something of benefit for itself.
AS: I understand that that is how many Russians see the problem with the resets, that Russiaís
interests are betrayed. And so I think the conclusion one draw from this is that, again,
the U.S. and Russia have very different views of what drives the world and really how to
evaluate the nature of the relationship. Now I think that you can certainly criticise United
States, and I do it in my book, for not spending enough time and effort to understand the Russian
perspective, and understanding that after the collapse of the Soviet Union, this was
a very difficult period. Russia is a great power and it has been defining its new role
in the world. And there shouldíve been more, you know, understanding of that. But having
said that, thereës obviously clearly a very different view of when itís legitimate, for
instance, to use militarily force in the situation as we have it in Ukraine.
OB: Well, Dr. Stent, let me just, we ran out of time, but let me just say that no military
force was used as of yet, you know. Speaking of democracy, I think there is no other party
whose interest would be served better than Russia by democracy being exercised because
having the east and the south of Ukraine vote at elections would guarantee Russiaís interest
the best. But unfortunately we have to leave it here. Thank you very much for your time
and to our viewers keep the conversation going on our Twitter, YouTube and Facebook pages
and hope to see you again, same place, same time, here on Worlds Apart.