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Since 1944 many publications have treated
the subject regarding the decisions made by
Admiral Carlo Bergamini on the 7th, 8th and 9th
of september 1943. He, at the time of the armistice
was the commander-in-chief of the naval battle force.
Often these publications still contain
some inaccuracies.
Commander Pier Paolo Bergamini has kindly
put his documents at our disposal
and he has been a fundamental
source four our research.
We have consulted many well known
publications regarding this subject.
From this survey, significant factors have resulted
some already well known and others that we've discovered
that have allowed us to reconstruct, with upmost precision
as possible, what happened in those days.
In this part of italian history, some men in particular
were the protagonists.
Among these, one of the most authoritative and patriotic
was Admiral Carlo Bergamini, whose history has been
told to us by his son, Commander Pier Paolo Bergamini.
My father was born in San Felice sul Panaro,
15 km from Modena. It was one of the most
distant point from the sea in Italy.
Once, I asked my father:
"why did you join the navy?" and he answered:
"when I was at college, your grandfather was transferred
from S.Felice sul Panaro to Bari as a revenuer officer.
Here I became passionate about sea and ships".
In the 1905, Carlo Bergamini entered in the Navy Accademy
of Livorno and became midshipman on the 10th of december 1908.
My father dedicated
all of his life
to the Navy,
but we always felt his love
close to us even though
he was always at sea.
The lively intelligence, the particular disposition
for mathematics, a large culture, the marked
qualities of an organizer and planner, the accomplishments
of command at sea, the ability to undertake quick decisions
mostly in hard and serious situations and complete
devotion to the Navy, allowed him to cover
a brilliant career.
Among the most important things my father achieved
in the Navy, was the shooting centre. In 1925 Marinarmi,
was the general base for the army and navy armaments
placed in the Navy Ministry direction
Marinarmi decided to make an italian shooting centre.
My father at that moment was assigned to Marinarmi
and the then Commander Cambardella entrusted
the task to my father.
After 6 months my father sent a memorandum
that explained which were the mechanisms
that had been carried out to make the centre work.
Marinarmi approved immediately my father's project
that was well planed, clear and concise,
and ordered to the Society Galileo in Florence
to make the prototype of the centre.
Marinarmi entrusted my father with the task of constantly,
overlook the construction of the central.
When this prototype was made, the command of
torpedo-boat Carini was assigned to my father.
The results obtained were excellent e
and the first shooting centr was called
Galileo-Bergamini to link together the name
of the Galileo to my father's name.
One of the things most recalled regarding my father in
the Navy is his influence over the personnel. He treated
his dependents and sailors like his sons
My sister and I have never been jealous,
on the contrary we were happy with the relationship
he had with his crew. In those times, this was
beyond principles, because, when my father
already showed this peculiarity as a young officer
the life on board was regulated by strict discipline.
Instead my father replaced very strict discipline with
positive influence over his personnel.
Everyone knew him for this peculiarity
and the importance of his influence for the life
for the men on board.
Superiors, same ranks, subordinates
everyone knew his character.
Also Admiral Iachino, who was
for many years the navy team Commander
acknowledged
my father's peculiarities were
useful either in peace or war.
Admiral Iachino said
that my father was
the only Officer Admiral
that could replace him.
On the 5th of April 1943 Admiral Carlo Bergamini
was designated naval battle force commander-in-chief
moving on the battleship Littorio, Vittorio Veneto and Roma,
according to the operative necessities.
The fall of fascism on the 25th of july 1943 was the logic
consequence that it was impossible for italian government
to support a war that was
coming to its sad epilogue.
In the meanwhile Italy was griped in a vice.
Allied forces landed in Sicily and a lot of german
forces came in Italy from Brennero.
New government leader, marshal Badoglio,
even if he had declared "the war go on",
took secret contacts with allies
since the early of august 1943 to reach
an agreement for an honourable armistice.
The 7th, 8th and 9th of september 1943 were the most
important days regarding armistice for my father.
On the 7th of september my father was called at the Ministry,
in Rome, with Commander Admiral of the Navy
with Commander Admiral of the Navy.
The meeting, that was made by Admiral De Courten
was at 16,00 of 7th of september.
My father was called at 9,00 of 7th of september
to examinate the efficiency of Naval
Battle Force to face the enemy in the last battle
because there was an elevated superiority
of air-naval force on the enemy side.
Admiral Bergamini declared the full and explicit
guarantee that the navy was ready to sail
and fight its last battle
in the waters of Southern Tirreno.
He said " Commanders and Officers knew perfectly
which were the odds that they were about to face,
but everyone had the firm resolve to fight
until the extreme possibility".
Crews were full of faith.
For the Naval Forces to obtain a
positive result with their attack ,it was necessary
to intervene at dawn on the 9th, at the same time
Anglo-Americans started the landing in the Gulf of Salerno
It was a critical moment because large convoys
had started to move away from Algiers, Gibraltar and Malta,
going towards Central Italy.
This event predicted that within a few days
the allied landing-force would attack
in the area of Gulf of Salerno.
It was decided that my father had to set sail
at hrs 14,00 of the 8th to reach Salerno at dawn on the 9th.
At hrs 10,00, at the end of this meeting
with Admiral De Courten,
my father went
to Admiral Massimo Girosi
who was the head
of office operations at Maristat
and compiled the orders of operations.
These orders of operations were very complicated,
and the ones for the departure of Navy-Force
at hrs 14,00 of the 8th of september from La Spezia
were examined by my father with Girosi.
These orders were put to the attention of Admiral
De Courten and Admiral Sansonetti, who was
the under chief of staff, and these orders were approved.
In a letter, dated early august and sent to
Maristat, Supermarina and Marina La Spezia,
Admiral Bergamini restated
the question about repair works for the,
bombardment which happened on the 6th of june
in La Spezia, that damaged the battle ship Roma
most of all. At that time repairs were expected
to finish on the first of september.
At the end of this letter Bergamini emphasized that,
on the first of september, the command-in-chief
would be transfered to the battle ship Roma, because
her bridge of admirals was more able for a battle
against an anglo-american naval fleet.
The date of the first of september wasn't respected because
the repairs weren't finished, especially the quarters
of Command-in-Chief Officers
of the Navy.
So my father at hrs 11,00, believing that Naval Force
must sail on the day 8th at 14,00
to face Anglo-Americans, called Admiral Caraciotti
and ordered to transfer Command-in-Chief of the Navy
from the battle ship Roma to the battle ship Italia.
The problem regarding quarters was solved transferring
some officers from the Roma to the Italia,
and on the 8th at 12,00 the Command-in-Chief
of the Navy was already transfered on Roma.
At hrs 16,00 my father, after the conversation,
with Admiral Caraciotti, partecipated in the meeting
notified by Admiral De Courten, to illustrate
headquarters' number one memorandum.
Admiral De Courten read and commented on headquarters'
memorandum number one and explained to the people
present the actions to undertake.
He deemed not appropriate to give news about
the negotiations for the armistice, having received
only generic secret news. Because of the uncertainty
of this situation, he deemed necessary to establish
with the commands-in-chief of the Navy,
the conventional sign
for the sinking of the ships,
to do in high sea if possible.
Admiral De Courten acquainted the persons present
with the sightings on 6th and 7th of the allied
convoy, made up of landing forces
and war units.
This meeting finished at about hrs 20,00 and my father
went to pay Admiral Iachino,
who had been his previous Naval Force
Commander- in-Chief, a courtesy visit.
At this time Admiral Bergamini thought that there was,
on one hand, the possibility to sail
on the 8th at 14,00 to face
Anglo-American Naval Battle Force
in the Gulf of Salerno, but with high probability of heavy
losses, human lives as well; on the other hand
the possibility that the situation precipitated because
De Courten talked about the sinking of ships
and about german actions against our army force.
Admiral Bergamini slept at his home and persuaded
his family to keep in touch with
Admiral De Courten,
he'll certainly show them the best line of
action to take in case
of probable german retaliation against them.
Then he went away by car at 6,00 to La Spezia.
Meanwhile during the night and at dawn of the 8th,
further sightings of the convoy going to the Gulf of Salerno
gave the certainty to Admiral De Courten that
allies were landing near
the center-southern italian coasts.
So after asking Headquarters,
that gave his approval, at 8,00 he ordered
the fleet to be ready to sail at 14,00 of the 8th.
Sailing at that time, the fleet should be in the
Southern Mediterranean sea in the early hours of the 9th,
they should be able to attack in the critical moment
of the beginning of the landing, as arranged
with Admiral Bergamini.
In the meantime, General Chief of Staff had gone back
to Rome to the Ministry of War. De Courten went
too because he had to show him some memoranda
regarding a document that General Chief of Staff
handed over to him and also to have instructions
for Naval Force departure.
General Chief of Staff said that he had
to wait for his starting signal for the ships.
However he had to send them in roadstead, ready to sail in 2 hours.
Admiral De Courten emphasized the starting
signal had to come to him absolutely by midday,
because, calculating midday plus two hours, ships could sail
at 14,00. My father arrived on board of the battle ship Roma at 13,00.
Admiral Caraciotti acquainted him with the situation.
My father realized that the order to sail,
that he was supposed to receive at 12,00 never arrived
and so he knew there was something wrong.
Admiral Bergamini at 13,30 called Supermarina
to get an explanation about it.
Admiral Sansonetti answered this call in the presence
of Admiral De Courten who specified to Admiral Bergamini
that this mission in Salerno had been canceled
and which of the conventional signals
they should recognize
for the sinking of ships.
This was very sad news for my father, although
he theoretically was ready for the armistice.
Admiral Bergamini arranged a meeting
at 15,00 on battle ship Roma
with subordinate admirals and commanders
all of which under his authority staying in La Spezia.
He summoned immediately his General Staff
to which he reported the news given to him
by Admiral Sansonetti.
Battle ships Roma and Italia should have left the dock
and go to the buoy in roadstead.
Only the Vittorio Veneto was connected by telephone
because it would have been the last battle
ship to sail. Then my father was in roadstead since
16,00 o'clock with the Roma, devoid of any telephone
comunication. At 18,30, by Radio Algiers through
the communication of General Eisenhower,
Commander-in-chief of Allied Army Force of the
Mediterranean, Bergamini knew the armistice
had been signed between Italians and Allies.
Admiral Bergamini gathered immediately
Admiral Caraciotti and his General Staff
to examine the situation and take the relative
decisions that were orientated to the fleet's sinking.
At 19,45 there was an announcement read by marshal
Badoglio at EIAR, then Rai. My father called
Admiral Caraciotti and said to him to summon
Admirals and Commanders on the Vittorio Veneto.
Admiral Bergamini called De Courten.
The beginning of the coversation was very abrupt,
because neither Admiral De Courten,
nor Admiral Sansonetti, had informed
my father about present negotiations.
Admiral De Courten was expecting this reaction,
because the armistice touched directly my father,
because there were two documents regarding the
armistice: the short armistice and the document of Quebec.
The short armistice, however, at article n.4 provided
that the ships transfer to ports placed under
allied control. It also specified the flag shouldn't be
lowered and therefore ships could only be
transfered and not delivered into the hands of the enemy.
Ships should only be equiped by an italian crew,
commanded by italian officers and only
answerable to Italian Royal Navy Ministry.
Admiral De Courten mentioned to him about the meeting
with General Chief of Staff and also the existence
of a document, the document of Quebec, being this was
the best possibility for the start of
a new life for italian people.
Admiral Bergamini after deep reflection
about contents and reasoning emphasided by
Admiral De Courten and Admiral Sansonetti, he decided
to obey the most bitter order.
At 22,00 there was a meeting with Bergamini's Admirals
and Commanders. My father explained to them
the situation. He stressed they shouldn't
deliver ships into other hands, but they should transfer them
However he didn't yet know exactly which harbour
they should go to, because the orders,
received by De Courten, were to sail
immediately from La Spezia to La Maddalena
because the port of La Spezia
had mountains totally enclosing
the harbour which made it
a danger shape for the italian ships
to be left in roadstead.
Admiral Bergamini, once back on the Roma
gathered his subordinate personnel again
to informe them about the last events and his decision
to obey the orders and to cling on to the armistice
dispositions. He informed them that within a short time
the naval force would be sail from La Spezia temporarily
to La Maddalena where the final
destination harbour would be specified.