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The Art of War by Sun Tzu
I. LAYING PLANS
[Ts`ao Kung, in defining the meaning of the Chinese for the title of this chapter, says
it refers to the deliberations in the temple selected by the general for his temporary
use, or as we should say, in his tent. See. ss. 26.]
1. Sun Tzu said: The art of war is of vital importance to the State.
2. It is a matter of life and death, a road either to safety or to ruin. Hence it is a
subject of inquiry which can on no account be neglected.
3. The art of war, then, is governed by five constant factors, to be taken into account
in one's deliberations, when seeking to determine the conditions obtaining in the field.
4. These are: (1) The Moral Law; (2) Heaven; (3) Earth; (4) The Commander; (5) Method and
discipline. [It appears from what follows that Sun Tzu
means by "Moral Law" a principle of harmony, not unlike the Tao of Lao Tzu in its moral
attribute of the ruler in ss. 13.] 5, 6. The MORAL LAW causes the people to be
in complete accord with their ruler, so that they will follow him regardless of their lives,
undismayed by any danger. [Tu Yu quotes *** Tzu as saying: "Without
constant practice, the officers will be nervous and undecided when mustering for battle; without
constant practice, the general will be wavering and irresolute when the crisis is at hand."]
7. HEAVEN signifies night and day, cold and heat, times and seasons.
[The commentators, I think, make an unnecessary mystery of two words here. Meng Shih refers
to "the hard and the soft, waxing and waning" of Heaven. *** Hsi, however, may be right
in saying that what is meant is "the general economy of Heaven," including the five elements,
the four seasons, wind and clouds, and other phenomena.]
8. EARTH comprises distances, great and small; danger and security; open ground and narrow
passes; the chances of life and death. 9. The COMMANDER stands for the virtues of
wisdom, sincerely, benevolence, courage and strictness.
[The five cardinal virtues of the Chinese are (1) humanity or benevolence; (2) uprightness
of mind; (3) self-respect, self- control, or "proper feeling;" (4) wisdom; (5) sincerity
or good faith. Here "wisdom" and "sincerity" are put before "humanity or benevolence,"
and the two military virtues of "courage" and "strictness" substituted for "uprightness
of mind" and "self- respect, self-control, or 'proper feeling.'"]
10. By METHOD AND DISCIPLINE are to be understood the marshaling of the army in its proper subdivisions,
the graduations of rank among the officers, the maintenance of roads by which supplies
may reach the army, and the control of military expenditure.
11. These five heads should be familiar to every general: he who knows them will be victorious;
he who knows them not will fail. 12. Therefore, in your deliberations, when
seeking to determine the military conditions, let them be made the basis of a comparison,
in this wise: -- 13. (1) Which of the two sovereigns is imbued
with the Moral law? [I.e., "is in harmony with his subjects."
Cf. ss. 5.] (2) Which of the two generals has most ability?
(3) With whom lie the advantages derived from Heaven and Earth?
[See ss. 7,8] (4) On which side is discipline most rigorously
enforced? [Tu Mu alludes to the remarkable story of
Ts`ao Ts`ao (A.D. 155-220), who was such a strict disciplinarian that once, in accordance
with his own severe regulations against injury to standing crops, he condemned himself to
death for having allowed him horse to shy into a field of corn! However, in lieu of
losing his head, he was persuaded to satisfy his sense of justice by cutting off his hair.
Ts`ao Ts`ao's own comment on the present passage is characteristically curt: "when you lay
down a law, see that it is not disobeyed; if it is disobeyed the offender must be put
to death."] (5) Which army is stronger?
[Morally as well as physically. As Mei Yao-ch`en puts it, freely rendered, "ESPIRIT DE CORPS
and 'big battalions.'"] (6) On which side are officers and men more
highly trained? [Tu Yu quotes *** Tzu as saying: "Without
constant practice, the officers will be nervous and undecided when mustering for battle; without
constant practice, the general will be wavering and irresolute when the crisis is at hand."]
(7) In which army is there the greater constancy both in reward and punishment?
[On which side is there the most absolute certainty that merit will be properly rewarded
and misdeeds summarily punished?] 14. By means of these seven considerations
I can forecast victory or defeat. 15. The general that hearkens to my counsel
and acts upon it, will conquer: --let such a one be retained in command! The general
that hearkens not to my counsel nor acts upon it, will suffer defeat: --let such a one be
dismissed! [The form of this paragraph reminds us that
Sun Tzu's treatise was composed expressly for the benefit of his patron Ho Lu, king
of the Wu State.] 16. While heading the profit of my counsel,
avail yourself also of any helpful circumstances over and beyond the ordinary rules.
17. According as circumstances are favorable, one should modify one's plans.
[Sun Tzu, as a practical soldier, will have none of the "bookish theoric." He cautions
us here not to pin our faith to abstract principles; "for," as Chang Yu puts it, "while the main
laws of strategy can be stated clearly enough for the benefit of all and sundry, you must
be guided by the actions of the enemy in attempting to secure a favorable position in actual warfare."
On the eve of the battle of Waterloo, Lord Uxbridge, commanding the cavalry, went to
the Duke of Wellington in order to learn what his plans and calculations were for the morrow,
because, as he explained, he might suddenly find himself Commander-in-chief and would
be unable to frame new plans in a critical moment. The Duke listened quietly and then
said: "Who will attack the first tomorrow -- I or Bonaparte?" "Bonaparte," replied Lord
Uxbridge. "Well," continued the Duke, "Bonaparte has not given me any idea of his projects;
and as my plans will depend upon his, how can you expect me to tell you what mine are?"
("Words on Wellington," by Sir. W. Fraser.) ]
18. All warfare is based on deception. [The truth of this pithy and profound saying
will be admitted by every soldier. Col. Henderson tells us that Wellington, great in so many
military qualities, was especially distinguished by "the extraordinary skill with which he
concealed his movements and deceived both friend and foe."]
19. Hence, when able to attack, we must seem unable; when using our forces, we must seem
inactive; when we are near, we must make the enemy believe we are far away; when far away,
we must make him believe we are near. 20. Hold out baits to entice the enemy. Feign
disorder, and crush him. [All commentators, except Chang Yu, say, "When
he is in disorder, crush him." It is more natural to suppose that Sun Tzu is still illustrating
the uses of deception in war.] 21. If he is secure at all points, be prepared
for him. If he is in superior strength, evade him.
22. If your opponent is of choleric temper, seek to irritate him. Pretend to be weak,
that he may grow arrogant. [*** Tzu, quoted by Tu Yu, says that the
good tactician plays with his adversary as a cat plays with a mouse, first feigning weakness
and immobility, and then suddenly pouncing upon him.]
23. If he is taking his ease, give him no rest.
[This is probably the meaning though Mei Yao-ch`en has the note: "while we are taking our ease,
wait for the enemy to tire himself out." The YU LAN has "Lure him on and tire him out."]
If his forces are united, separate them. [Less plausible is the interpretation favored
by most of the commentators: "If sovereign and subject are in accord, put division between
them."] 24. Attack him where he is unprepared, appear
where you are not expected. 25. These military devices, leading to victory,
must not be divulged beforehand. 26. Now the general who wins a battle makes
many calculations in his temple ere the battle is fought.
[Chang Yu tells us that in ancient times it was customary for a temple to be set apart
for the use of a general who was about to take the field, in order that he might there
elaborate his plan of campaign.] The general who loses a battle makes but few
calculations beforehand. Thus do many calculations lead to victory, and few calculations to defeat:
how much more no calculation at all! It is by attention to this point that I can foresee
who is likely to win or lose.
II. WAGING WAR
[Ts`ao Kung has the note: "He who wishes to fight must first count the cost," which prepares
us for the discovery that the subject of the chapter is not what we might expect from the
title, but is primarily a consideration of ways and means.]
1. Sun Tzu said: In the operations of war, where there are in the field a thousand swift
chariots, as many heavy chariots, and a hundred thousand mail-clad soldiers,
[The "swift chariots" were lightly built and, according to Chang Yu, used for the attack;
the "heavy chariots" were heavier, and designed for purposes of defense. Li Ch`uan, it is
true, says that the latter were light, but this seems hardly probable. It is interesting
to note the analogies between early Chinese warfare and that of the Homeric Greeks. In
each case, the war- chariot was the important factor, forming as it did the nucleus round
which was grouped a certain number of foot-soldiers. With regard to the numbers given here, we
are informed that each swift chariot was accompanied by 75 footmen, and each heavy chariot by 25
footmen, so that the whole army would be divided up into a thousand battalions, each consisting
of two chariots and a hundred men.] with provisions enough to carry them a thousand
LI, [2.78 modern LI go to a mile. The length may
have varied slightly since Sun Tzu's time.] the expenditure at home and at the front,
including entertainment of guests, small items such as glue and paint, and sums spent on
chariots and armor, will reach the total of a thousand ounces of silver per day. Such
is the cost of raising an army of 100,000 men.
2. When you engage in actual fighting, if victory is long in coming, then men's weapons
will grow dull and their ardor will be damped. If you lay siege to a town, you will exhaust
your strength. 3. Again, if the campaign is protracted, the
resources of the State will not be equal to the strain.
4. Now, when your weapons are dulled, your ardor damped, your strength exhausted and
your treasure spent, other chieftains will spring up to take advantage of your extremity.
Then no man, however wise, will be able to avert the consequences that must ensue.
5. Thus, though we have heard of stupid haste in war, cleverness has never been seen associated
with long delays. [This concise and difficult sentence is not
well explained by any of the commentators. Ts`ao Kung, Li Ch`uan, Meng Shih, Tu Yu, Tu
Mu and Mei Yao-ch`en have notes to the effect that a general, though naturally stupid, may
nevertheless conquer through sheer force of rapidity. Ho Shih says: "Haste may be stupid,
but at any rate it saves expenditure of energy and treasure; protracted operations may be
very clever, but they bring calamity in their train." *** Hsi evades the difficulty by
remarking: "Lengthy operations mean an army growing old, wealth being expended, an empty
exchequer and distress among the people; true cleverness insures against the occurrence
of such calamities." Chang Yu says: "So long as victory can be attained, stupid haste is
preferable to clever dilatoriness." Now Sun Tzu says nothing whatever, except possibly
by implication, about ill-considered haste being better than ingenious but lengthy operations.
What he does say is something much more guarded, namely that, while speed may sometimes be
injudicious, tardiness can never be anything but foolish -- if only because it means impoverishment
to the nation. In considering the point raised here by Sun Tzu, the classic example of Fabius
Cunctator will inevitably occur to the mind. That general deliberately measured the endurance
of Rome against that of Hannibals's isolated army, because it seemed to him that the latter
was more likely to suffer from a long campaign in a strange country. But it is quite a moot
question whether his tactics would have proved successful in the long run. Their reversal
it is true, led to Cannae; but this only establishes a negative presumption in their favor.]
6. There is no instance of a country having benefited from prolonged warfare.
7. It is only one who is thoroughly acquainted with the evils of war that can thoroughly
understand the profitable way of carrying it on.
[That is, with rapidity. Only one who knows the disastrous effects of a long war can realize
the supreme importance of rapidity in bringing it to a close. Only two commentators seem
to favor this interpretation, but it fits well into the logic of the context, whereas
the rendering, "He who does not know the evils of war cannot appreciate its benefits," is
distinctly pointless.] 8. The skillful soldier does not raise a second
levy, neither are his supply-wagons loaded more than twice.
[Once war is declared, he will not waste precious time in waiting for reinforcements, nor will
he return his army back for fresh supplies, but crosses the enemy's frontier without delay.
This may seem an audacious policy to recommend, but with all great strategists, from Julius
Caesar to Napoleon Bonaparte, the value of time -- that is, being a little ahead of your
opponent -- has counted for more than either numerical superiority or the nicest calculations
with regard to commissariat.] 9. Bring war material with you from home,
but forage on the enemy. Thus the army will have food enough for its needs.
[The Chinese word translated here as "war material" literally means "things to be used",
and is meant in the widest sense. It includes all the impedimenta of an army, apart from
provisions.] 10. Poverty of the State exchequer causes
an army to be maintained by contributions from a distance. Contributing to maintain
an army at a distance causes the people to be impoverished.
[The beginning of this sentence does not balance properly with the next, though obviously intended
to do so. The arrangement, moreover, is so awkward that I cannot help suspecting some
corruption in the text. It never seems to occur to Chinese commentators that an emendation
may be necessary for the sense, and we get no help from them there. The Chinese words
Sun Tzu used to indicate the cause of the people's impoverishment clearly have reference
to some system by which the husbandmen sent their contributions of corn to the army direct.
But why should it fall on them to maintain an army in this way, except because the State
or Government is too poor to do so?] 11. On the other hand, the proximity of an
army causes prices to go up; and high prices cause the people's substance to be drained
away. [*** Hsi says high prices occur before the
army has left its own territory. Ts`ao Kung understands it of an army that has already
crossed the frontier.] 12. When their substance is drained away,
the peasantry will be afflicted by heavy exactions. 13, 14. With this loss of substance and exhaustion
of strength, the homes of the people will be stripped bare, and three-tenths of their
income will be dissipated; [Tu Mu and *** Hsi agree that the people
are not mulcted not of 3/10, but of 7/10, of their income. But this is hardly to be
extracted from our text. Ho Shih has a characteristic tag: "The PEOPLE being regarded as the essential
part of the State, and FOOD as the people's heaven, is it not right that those in authority
should value and be careful of both?"] while government expenses for broken chariots,
worn-out horses, breast-plates and helmets, bows and arrows, spears and shields, protective
mantles, draught-oxen and heavy wagons, will amount to four-tenths of its total revenue.
15. Hence a wise general makes a point of foraging on the enemy. One cartload of the
enemy's provisions is equivalent to twenty of one's own, and likewise a single PICUL
of his provender is equivalent to twenty from one's own store.
[Because twenty cartloads will be consumed in the process of transporting one cartload
to the front. A PICUL is a unit of measure equal to 133.3 pounds (65.5 kilograms).]
16. Now in order to kill the enemy, our men must be roused to anger; that there may be
advantage from defeating the enemy, they must have their rewards.
[Tu Mu says: "Rewards are necessary in order to make the soldiers see the advantage of
beating the enemy; thus, when you capture spoils from the enemy, they must be used as
rewards, so that all your men may have a keen desire to fight, each on his own account."]
17. Therefore in chariot fighting, when ten or more chariots have been taken, those should
be rewarded who took the first. Our own flags should be substituted for those of the enemy,
and the chariots mingled and used in conjunction with ours. The captured soldiers should be
kindly treated and kept. 18. This is called, using the conquered foe
to augment one's own strength. 19. In war, then, let your great object be
victory, not lengthy campaigns. [As Ho Shih remarks: "War is not a thing to
be trifled with." Sun Tzu here reiterates the main lesson which this chapter is intended
to enforce."] 20. Thus it may be known that the leader of
armies is the arbiter of the people's fate, the man on whom it depends whether the nation
shall be in peace or in peril.
III. ATTACK BY STRATAGEM
1. Sun Tzu said: In the practical art of war, the best thing of all is to take the enemy's
country whole and intact; to shatter and destroy it is not so good. So, too, it is better to
recapture an army entire than to destroy it, to capture a regiment, a detachment or a company
entire than to destroy them. [The equivalent to an army corps, according
to Ssu-ma Fa, consisted nominally of 12500 men; according to Ts`ao Kung, the equivalent
of a regiment contained 500 men, the equivalent to a detachment consists from any number between
100 and 500, and the equivalent of a company contains from 5 to 100 men. For the last two,
however, Chang Yu gives the exact figures of 100 and 5 respectively.]
2. Hence to fight and conquer in all your battles is not supreme excellence; supreme
excellence consists in breaking the enemy's resistance without fighting.
[Here again, no modern strategist but will approve the words of the old Chinese general.
Moltke's greatest triumph, the capitulation of the huge French army at Sedan, was won
practically without bloodshed.] 3. Thus the highest form of generalship is
to balk the enemy's plans; [Perhaps the word "balk" falls short of expressing
the full force of the Chinese word, which implies not an attitude of defense, whereby
one might be content to foil the enemy's stratagems one after another, but an active policy of
counter- attack. Ho Shih puts this very clearly in his note: "When the enemy has made a plan
of attack against us, we must anticipate him by delivering our own attack first."]
the next best is to prevent the junction of the enemy's forces;
[Isolating him from his allies. We must not forget that Sun Tzu, in speaking of hostilities,
always has in mind the numerous states or principalities into which the China of his
day was split up.] the next in order is to attack the enemy's
army in the field; [When he is already at full strength.]
and the worst policy of all is to besiege walled cities.
4. The rule is, not to besiege walled cities if it can possibly be avoided.
[Another sound piece of military theory. Had the Boers acted upon it in 1899, and refrained
from dissipating their strength before Kimberley, Mafeking, or even Ladysmith, it is more than
probable that they would have been masters of the situation before the British were ready
seriously to oppose them.] The preparation of mantlets, movable shelters,
and various implements of war, will take up three whole months;
[It is not quite clear what the Chinese word, here translated as "mantlets", described.
Ts`ao Kung simply defines them as "large shields," but we get a better idea of them from Li Ch`uan,
who says they were to protect the heads of those who were assaulting the city walls at
close quarters. This seems to suggest a sort of Roman TESTUDO, ready made. Tu Mu says they
were wheeled vehicles used in repelling attacks, but this is denied by Ch`en Hao. See supra
II. 14. The name is also applied to turrets on city walls. Of the "movable shelters" we
get a fairly clear description from several commentators. They were wooden missile-proof
structures on four wheels, propelled from within, covered over with raw hides, and used
in sieges to convey parties of men to and from the walls, for the purpose of filling
up the encircling moat with earth. Tu Mu adds that they are now called "wooden donkeys."]
and the piling up of mounds over against the walls will take three months more.
[These were great mounds or ramparts of earth heaped up to the level of the enemy's walls
in order to discover the weak points in the defense, and also to destroy the fortified
turrets mentioned in the preceding note.] 5. The general, unable to control his irritation,
will launch his men to the assault like swarming ants,
[This vivid simile of Ts`ao Kung is taken from the spectacle of an army of ants climbing
a wall. The meaning is that the general, losing patience at the long delay, may make a premature
attempt to storm the place before his engines of war are ready.]
with the result that one-third of his men are slain, while the town still remains untaken.
Such are the disastrous effects of a siege. [We are reminded of the terrible losses of
the Japanese before Port Arthur, in the most recent siege which history has to record.]
6. Therefore the skillful leader subdues the enemy's troops without any fighting; he captures
their cities without laying siege to them; he overthrows their kingdom without lengthy
operations in the field. [Chia Lin notes that he only overthrows the
Government, but does no harm to individuals. The classical instance is Wu ***, who after
having put an end to the Yin dynasty was acclaimed "Father and mother of the people."]
7. With his forces intact he will dispute the mastery of the Empire, and thus, without
losing a man, his triumph will be complete. [Owing to the double meanings in the Chinese
text, the latter part of the sentence is susceptible of quite a different meaning: "And thus, the
weapon not being blunted by use, its keenness remains perfect."]
This is the method of attacking by stratagem. 8. It is the rule in war, if our forces are
ten to the enemy's one, to surround him; if five to one, to attack him;
[Straightway, without waiting for any further advantage.]
if twice as numerous, to divide our army into two.
[Tu Mu takes exception to the saying; and at first sight, indeed, it appears to violate
a fundamental principle of war. Ts'ao Kung, however, gives a clue to Sun Tzu's meaning:
"Being two to the enemy's one, we may use one part of our army in the regular way, and
the other for some special diversion." Chang Yu thus further elucidates the point: "If
our force is twice as numerous as that of the enemy, it should be split up into two
divisions, one to meet the enemy in front, and one to fall upon his rear; if he replies
to the frontal attack, he may be crushed from behind; if to the rearward attack, he may
be crushed in front." This is what is meant by saying that 'one part may be used in the
regular way, and the other for some special diversion.' Tu Mu does not understand that
dividing one's army is simply an irregular, just as concentrating it is the regular, strategical
method, and he is too hasty in calling this a mistake."]
9. If equally matched, we can offer battle; [Li Ch`uan, followed by Ho Shih, gives the
following paraphrase: "If attackers and attacked are equally matched in strength, only the
able general will fight."] if slightly inferior in numbers, we can avoid
the enemy; [The meaning, "we can WATCH the enemy," is
certainly a great improvement on the above; but unfortunately there appears to be no very
good authority for the variant. Chang Yu reminds us that the saying only applies if the other
factors are equal; a small difference in numbers is often more than counterbalanced by superior
energy and discipline.] if quite unequal in every way, we can flee
from him. 10. Hence, though an obstinate fight may be
made by a small force, in the end it must be captured by the larger force.
11. Now the general is the bulwark of the State; if the bulwark is complete at all points;
the State will be strong; if the bulwark is defective, the State will be weak.
[As Li Ch`uan tersely puts it: "Gap indicates deficiency; if the general's ability is not
perfect (i.e. if he is not thoroughly versed in his profession), his army will lack strength."]
12. There are three ways in which a ruler can bring misfortune upon his army:--
13. (1) By commanding the army to advance or to retreat, being ignorant of the fact
that it cannot obey. This is called hobbling the army.
[Li Ch`uan adds the comment: "It is like tying together the legs of a thoroughbred, so that
it is unable to gallop." One would naturally think of "the ruler" in this passage as being
at home, and trying to direct the movements of his army from a distance. But the commentators
understand just the reverse, and quote the saying of T`ai Kung: "A kingdom should not
be governed from without, and army should not be directed from within." Of course it
is true that, during an engagement, or when in close touch with the enemy, the general
should not be in the thick of his own troops, but a little distance apart. Otherwise, he
will be liable to misjudge the position as a whole, and give wrong orders.]
14. (2) By attempting to govern an army in the same way as he administers a kingdom,
being ignorant of the conditions which obtain in an army. This causes restlessness in the
soldier's minds. [Ts`ao Kung's note is, freely translated:
"The military sphere and the civil sphere are wholly distinct; you can't handle an army
in kid gloves." And Chang Yu says: "Humanity and justice are the principles on which to
govern a state, but not an army; opportunism and flexibility, on the other hand, are military
rather than civil virtues to assimilate the governing of an army"--to that of a State,
understood.] 15. (3) By employing the officers of his army
without discrimination, [That is, he is not careful to use the right
man in the right place.] through ignorance of the military principle
of adaptation to circumstances. This shakes the confidence of the soldiers.
[I follow Mei Yao-ch`en here. The other commentators refer not to the ruler, as in SS. 13, 14,
but to the officers he employs. Thus Tu Yu says: "If a general is ignorant of the principle
of adaptability, he must not be entrusted with a position of authority." Tu Mu quotes:
"The skillful employer of men will employ the wise man, the brave man, the covetous
man, and the stupid man. For the wise man delights in establishing his merit, the brave
man likes to show his courage in action, the covetous man is quick at seizing advantages,
and the stupid man has no fear of death."] 16. But when the army is restless and distrustful,
trouble is sure to come from the other feudal princes. This is simply bringing anarchy into
the army, and flinging victory away. 17. Thus we may know that there are five essentials
for victory: (1) He will win who knows when to fight and when not to fight.
[Chang Yu says: If he can fight, he advances and takes the offensive; if he cannot fight,
he retreats and remains on the defensive. He will invariably conquer who knows whether
it is right to take the offensive or the defensive.] (2) He will win who knows how to handle both
superior and inferior forces. [This is not merely the general's ability
to estimate numbers correctly, as Li Ch`uan and others make out. Chang Yu expounds the
saying more satisfactorily: "By applying the art of war, it is possible with a lesser force
to defeat a greater, and vice versa. The secret lies in an eye for locality, and in not letting
the right moment slip. Thus Wu Tzu says: 'With a superior force, make for easy ground; with
an inferior one, make for difficult ground.'"] (3) He will win whose army is animated by
the same spirit throughout all its ranks. (4) He will win who, prepared himself, waits
to take the enemy unprepared. (5) He will win who has military capacity
and is not interfered with by the sovereign. [Tu Yu quotes *** Tzu as saying: "It is the
sovereign's function to give broad instructions, but to decide on battle it is the function
of the general." It is needless to dilate on the military disasters which have been
caused by undue interference with operations in the field on the part of the home government.
Napoleon undoubtedly owed much of his extraordinary success to the fact that he was not hampered
by central authority.] 18. Hence the saying: If you know the enemy
and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles. If you know yourself
but not the enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat.
[Li Ch`uan cites the case of Fu Chien, prince of Ch`in, who in 383 A.D. marched with a vast
army against the Chin Emperor. When warned not to despise an enemy who could command
the services of such men as Hsieh An and Huan Ch`ung, he boastfully replied: "I have the
population of eight provinces at my back, infantry and horsemen to the number of one
million; why, they could dam up the Yangtsze River itself by merely throwing their whips
into the stream. What danger have I to fear?" Nevertheless, his forces were soon after disastrously
routed at the Fei River, and he was obliged to beat a hasty retreat.]
If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle.
[Chang Yu said: "Knowing the enemy enables you to take the offensive, knowing yourself
enables you to stand on the defensive." He adds: "Attack is the secret of defense; defense
is the planning of an attack." It would be hard to find a better epitome of the root-principle
of war.]
[Ts`ao Kung explains the Chinese meaning of the words for the title of this chapter: "marching
and countermarching on the part of the two armies with a view to discovering each other's
condition." Tu Mu says: "It is through the dispositions of an army that its condition
may be discovered. Conceal your dispositions, and your condition will remain secret, which
leads to victory,; show your dispositions, and your condition will become patent, which
leads to defeat." *** Hsi remarks that the good general can "secure success by modifying
his tactics to meet those of the enemy."] 1. Sun Tzu said: The good fighters of old
first put themselves beyond the possibility of defeat, and then waited for an opportunity
of defeating the enemy. 2. To secure ourselves against defeat lies
in our own hands, but the opportunity of defeating the enemy is provided by the enemy himself.
[That is, of course, by a mistake on the enemy's part.]
3. Thus the good fighter is able to secure himself against defeat,
[Chang Yu says this is done, "By concealing the disposition of his troops, covering up
his tracks, and taking unremitting precautions."] but cannot make certain of defeating the enemy.
4. Hence the saying: One may KNOW how to conquer without being able to DO it.
5. Security against defeat implies defensive tactics; ability to defeat the enemy means
taking the offensive. [I retain the sense found in a similar passage
in ss. 1-3, in spite of the fact that the commentators are all against me. The meaning
they give, "He who cannot conquer takes the defensive," is plausible enough.]
6. Standing on the defensive indicates insufficient strength; attacking, a superabundance of strength.
7. The general who is skilled in defense hides in the most secret recesses of the earth;
[Literally, "hides under the ninth earth," which is a metaphor indicating the utmost
secrecy and concealment, so that the enemy may not know his whereabouts."]
he who is skilled in attack flashes forth from the topmost heights of heaven.
[Another metaphor, implying that he falls on his adversary like a thunderbolt, against
which there is no time to prepare. This is the opinion of most of the commentators.]
Thus on the one hand we have ability to protect ourselves; on the other, a victory that is
complete. 8. To see victory only when it is within the
ken of the common herd is not the acme of excellence.
[As Ts`ao Kung remarks, "the thing is to see the plant before it has germinated," to foresee
the event before the action has begun. Li Ch`uan alludes to the story of Han Hsin who,
when about to attack the vastly superior army of Chao, which was strongly entrenched in
the city of Ch`eng-an, said to his officers: "Gentlemen, we are going to annihilate the
enemy, and shall meet again at dinner." The officers hardly took his words seriously,
and gave a very dubious assent. But Han Hsin had already worked out in his mind the details
of a clever stratagem, whereby, as he foresaw, he was able to capture the city and inflict
a crushing defeat on his adversary."] 9. Neither is it the acme of excellence if
you fight and conquer and the whole Empire says, "Well done!"
[True excellence being, as Tu Mu says: "To plan secretly, to move surreptitiously, to
foil the enemy's intentions and balk his schemes, so that at last the day may be won without
shedding a drop of blood." Sun Tzu reserves his approbation for things that
"the world's coarse thumb And finger fail to plumb."]
10. To lift an autumn hair is no sign of great strength;
["Autumn" hair" is explained as the fur of a hare, which is finest in autumn, when it
begins to grow afresh. The phrase is a very common one in Chinese writers.]
to see the sun and moon is no sign of sharp sight; to hear the noise of thunder is no
sign of a quick ear. [Ho Shih gives as real instances of strength,
sharp sight and quick hearing: Wu Huo, who could lift a tripod weighing 250 stone; Li
Chu, who at a distance of a hundred paces could see objects no bigger than a mustard
seed; and Shih K`uang, a blind musician who could hear the footsteps of a mosquito.]
11. What the ancients called a clever fighter is one who not only wins, but excels in winning
with ease. [The last half is literally "one who, conquering,
excels in easy conquering." Mei Yao-ch`en says: "He who only sees the obvious, wins
his battles with difficulty; he who looks below the surface of things, wins with ease."]
12. Hence his victories bring him neither reputation for wisdom nor credit for courage.
[Tu Mu explains this very well: "Inasmuch as his victories are gained over circumstances
that have not come to light, the world as large knows nothing of them, and he wins no
reputation for wisdom; inasmuch as the hostile state submits before there has been any bloodshed,
he receives no credit for courage."] 13. He wins his battles by making no mistakes.
[Ch`en Hao says: "He plans no superfluous marches, he devises no futile attacks." The
connection of ideas is thus explained by Chang Yu: "One who seeks to conquer by sheer strength,
clever though he may be at winning pitched battles, is also liable on occasion to be
vanquished; whereas he who can look into the future and discern conditions that are not
yet manifest, will never make a blunder and therefore invariably win."]
Making no mistakes is what establishes the certainty of victory, for it means conquering
an enemy that is already defeated. 14. Hence the skillful fighter puts himself
into a position which makes defeat impossible, and does not miss the moment for defeating
the enemy. [A "counsel of perfection" as Tu Mu truly
observes. "Position" need not be confined to the actual ground occupied by the troops.
It includes all the arrangements and preparations which a wise general will make to increase
the safety of his army.] 15. Thus it is that in war the victorious
strategist only seeks battle after the victory has been won, whereas he who is destined to
defeat first fights and afterwards looks for victory.
[Ho Shih thus expounds the paradox: "In warfare, first lay plans which will ensure victory,
and then lead your army to battle; if you will not begin with stratagem but rely on
brute strength alone, victory will no longer be assured."]
16. The consummate leader cultivates the moral law, and strictly adheres to method and discipline;
thus it is in his power to control success. 17. In respect of military method, we have,
firstly, Measurement; secondly, Estimation of quantity; thirdly, Calculation; fourthly,
Balancing of chances; fifthly, Victory. 18. Measurement owes its existence to Earth;
Estimation of quantity to Measurement; Calculation to Estimation of quantity; Balancing of chances
to Calculation; and Victory to Balancing of chances.
[It is not easy to distinguish the four terms very clearly in the Chinese. The first seems
to be surveying and measurement of the ground, which enable us to form an estimate of the
enemy's strength, and to make calculations based on the data thus obtained; we are thus
led to a general weighing-up, or comparison of the enemy's chances with our own; if the
latter turn the scale, then victory ensues. The chief difficulty lies in third term, which
in the Chinese some commentators take as a calculation of NUMBERS, thereby making it
nearly synonymous with the second term. Perhaps the second term should be thought of as a
consideration of the enemy's general position or condition, while the third term is the
estimate of his numerical strength. On the other hand, Tu Mu says: "The question of relative
strength having been settled, we can bring the varied resources of cunning into play."
Ho Shih seconds this interpretation, but weakens it. However, it points to the third term as
being a calculation of numbers.] 19. A victorious army opposed to a routed
one, is as a pound's weight placed in the scale against a single grain.
[Literally, "a victorious army is like an I (20 oz.) weighed against a SHU (1/24 oz.);
a routed army is a SHU weighed against an I." The point is simply the enormous advantage
which a disciplined force, flushed with victory, has over one demoralized by defeat." Legge,
in his note on Mencius, I. 2. ix. 2, makes the I to be 24 Chinese ounces, and corrects
Chu Hsi's statement that it equaled 20 oz. only. But Li Ch`uan of the T`ang dynasty here
gives the same figure as Chu Hsi.] 20. The onrush of a conquering force is like
the bursting of pent-up waters into a chasm a thousand fathoms deep.
V. ENERGY
1. Sun Tzu said: The control of a large force is the same principle as the control of a
few men: it is merely a question of dividing up their numbers.
[That is, cutting up the army into regiments, companies, etc., with subordinate officers
in command of each. Tu Mu reminds us of Han Hsin's famous reply to the first Han Emperor,
who once said to him: "How large an army do you think I could lead?" "Not more than 100,000
men, your Majesty." "And you?" asked the Emperor. "Oh!" he answered, "the more the better."]
2. Fighting with a large army under your command is nowise different from fighting with a small
one: it is merely a question of instituting signs and signals.
3. To ensure that your whole host may withstand the brunt of the enemy's attack and remain
unshaken - this is effected by maneuvers direct and indirect.
[We now come to one of the most interesting parts of Sun Tzu's treatise, the discussion
of the CHENG and the CH`I." As it is by no means easy to grasp the full significance
of these two terms, or to render them consistently by good English equivalents; it may be as
well to tabulate some of the commentators' remarks on the subject before proceeding further.
Li Ch`uan: "Facing the enemy is CHENG, making lateral diversion is CH`I. Chia Lin: "In presence
of the enemy, your troops should be arrayed in normal fashion, but in order to secure
victory abnormal maneuvers must be employed." Mei Yao-ch`en: "CH`I is active, CHENG is passive;
passivity means waiting for an opportunity, activity beings the victory itself." Ho Shih:
"We must cause the enemy to regard our straightforward attack as one that is secretly designed, and
vice versa; thus CHENG may also be CH`I, and CH`I may also be CHENG." He instances the
famous exploit of Han Hsin, who when marching ostensibly against Lin- chin (now Chao-i in
Shensi), suddenly threw a large force across the Yellow River in wooden tubs, utterly disconcerting
his opponent. [Ch`ien Han Shu, ch. 3.] Here, we are told, the march on Lin-chin was CHENG,
and the surprise maneuver was CH`I." Chang Yu gives the following summary of opinions
on the words: "Military writers do not agree with regard to the meaning of CH`I and CHENG.
Wei Liao Tzu [4th cent. B.C.] says: 'Direct warfare favors frontal attacks, indirect warfare
attacks from the rear.' Ts`ao Kung says: 'Going straight out to join battle is a direct operation;
appearing on the enemy's rear is an indirect maneuver.' Li Wei-kung [6th and 7th cent.
A.D.] says: 'In war, to march straight ahead is CHENG; turning movements, on the other
hand, are CH`I.' These writers simply regard CHENG as CHENG, and CH`I as CH`I; they do
not note that the two are mutually interchangeable and run into each other like the two sides
of a circle [see infra, ss. 11]. A comment on the T`ang Emperor T`ai Tsung goes to the
root of the matter: 'A CH`I maneuver may be CHENG, if we make the enemy look upon it as
CHENG; then our real attack will be CH`I, and vice versa. The whole secret lies in confusing
the enemy, so that he cannot fathom our real intent.'" To put it perhaps a little more
clearly: any attack or other operation is CHENG, on which the enemy has had his attention
fixed; whereas that is CH`I," which takes him by surprise or comes from an unexpected
quarter. If the enemy perceives a movement which is meant to be CH`I," it immediately
becomes CHENG."] 4. That the impact of your army may be like
a grindstone dashed against an egg - this is effected by the science of weak points
and strong. 5. In all fighting, the direct method may
be used for joining battle, but indirect methods will be needed in order to secure victory.
[Chang Yu says: "Steadily develop indirect tactics, either by pounding the enemy's flanks
or falling on his rear." A brilliant example of "indirect tactics" which decided the fortunes
of a campaign was Lord Roberts' night march round the Peiwar Kotal in the second Afghan
war. ("Forty-one Years in India," chapter 46.)
6. Indirect tactics, efficiently applied, are inexhausible as Heaven and Earth, unending
as the flow of rivers and streams; like the sun and moon, they end but to begin anew;
like the four seasons, they pass away to return once more.
[Tu Yu and Chang Yu understand this of the permutations of CH`I and CHENG." But at present
Sun Tzu is not speaking of CHENG at all, unless, indeed, we suppose with Cheng Yu-hsien that
a clause relating to it has fallen out of the text. Of course, as has already been pointed
out, the two are so inextricably interwoven in all military operations, that they cannot
really be considered apart. Here we simply have an expression, in figurative language,
of the almost infinite resource of a great leader.]
7. There are not more than five musical notes, yet the combinations of these five give rise
to more melodies than can ever be heard. 8. There are not more than five primary colors
(blue, yellow, red, white, and black), yet in combination they produce more hues than
can ever been seen. 9 There are not more than five cardinal tastes
(sour, acrid, salt, sweet, bitter), yet combinations of them yield more flavors than can ever be
tasted. 10. In battle, there are not more than two
methods of attack - the direct and the indirect; yet these two in combination give rise to
an endless series of maneuvers. 11. The direct and the indirect lead on to
each other in turn. It is like moving in a circle - you never come to an end. Who can
exhaust the possibilities of their combination? 12. The onset of troops is like the rush of
a torrent which will even roll stones along in its course.
13. The quality of decision is like the well-timed swoop of a falcon which enables it to strike
and destroy its victim. [The Chinese here is tricky and a certain
key word in the context it is used defies the best efforts of the translator. Tu Mu
defines this word as "the measurement or estimation of distance." But this meaning does not quite
fit the illustrative simile in ss. 15. Applying this definition to the falcon, it seems to
me to denote that instinct of SELF RESTRAINT which keeps the bird from swooping on its
quarry until the right moment, together with the power of judging when the right moment
has arrived. The analogous quality in soldiers is the highly important one of being able
to reserve their fire until the very instant at which it will be most effective. When the
"Victory" went into action at Trafalgar at hardly more than drifting pace, she was for
several minutes exposed to a storm of shot and shell before replying with a single gun.
Nelson coolly waited until he was within close range, when the broadside he brought to bear
worked fearful havoc on the enemy's nearest ships.]
14. Therefore the good fighter will be terrible in his onset, and prompt in his decision.
[The word "decision" would have reference to the measurement of distance mentioned above,
letting the enemy get near before striking. But I cannot help thinking that Sun Tzu meant
to use the word in a figurative sense comparable to our own idiom "short and sharp." Cf. ***
Hsi's note, which after describing the falcon's mode of attack, proceeds: "This is just how
the 'psychological moment' should be seized in war."]
15. Energy may be likened to the bending of a crossbow; decision, to the releasing of
a trigger. [None of the commentators seem to grasp the
real point of the simile of energy and the force stored up in the bent cross- bow until
released by the finger on the trigger.] 16. Amid the turmoil and tumult of battle,
there may be seeming disorder and yet no real disorder at all; amid confusion and chaos,
your array may be without head or tail, yet it will be proof against defeat.
[Mei Yao-ch`en says: "The subdivisions of the army having been previously fixed, and
the various signals agreed upon, the separating and joining, the dispersing and collecting
which will take place in the course of a battle, may give the appearance of disorder when no
real disorder is possible. Your formation may be without head or tail, your dispositions
all topsy-turvy, and yet a rout of your forces quite out of the question."]
17. Simulated disorder postulates perfect discipline, simulated fear postulates courage;
simulated weakness postulates strength. [In order to make the translation intelligible,
it is necessary to tone down the sharply paradoxical form of the original. Ts`ao Kung throws out
a hint of the meaning in his brief note: "These things all serve to destroy formation and
conceal one's condition." But Tu Mu is the first to put it quite plainly: "If you wish
to feign confusion in order to lure the enemy on, you must first have perfect discipline;
if you wish to display timidity in order to entrap the enemy, you must have extreme courage;
if you wish to parade your weakness in order to make the enemy over-confident, you must
have exceeding strength."] 18. Hiding order beneath the cloak of disorder
is simply a question of subdivision; [See supra, ss. 1.]
concealing courage under a show of timidity presupposes a fund of latent energy;
[The commentators strongly understand a certain Chinese word here differently than anywhere
else in this chapter. Thus Tu Mu says: "seeing that we are favorably circumstanced and yet
make no move, the enemy will believe that we are really afraid."]
masking strength with weakness is to be effected by tactical dispositions.
[Chang Yu relates the following anecdote of Kao Tsu, the first Han Emperor: "Wishing to
crush the Hsiung-nu, he sent out spies to report on their condition. But the Hsiung-nu,
forewarned, carefully concealed all their able-bodied men and well-fed horses, and only
allowed infirm soldiers and emaciated cattle to be seen. The result was that spies one
and all recommended the Emperor to deliver his attack. Lou Ching alone opposed them,
saying: "When two countries go to war, they are naturally inclined to make an ostentatious
display of their strength. Yet our spies have seen nothing but old age and infirmity. This
is surely some ruse on the part of the enemy, and it would be unwise for us to attack."
The Emperor, however, disregarding this advice, fell into the trap and found himself surrounded
at Po-teng."] 19. Thus one who is skillful at keeping the
enemy on the move maintains deceitful appearances, according to which the enemy will act.
[Ts`ao Kung's note is "Make a display of weakness and want." Tu Mu says: "If our force happens
to be superior to the enemy's, weakness may be simulated in order to lure him on; but
if inferior, he must be led to believe that we are strong, in order that he may keep off.
In fact, all the enemy's movements should be determined by the signs that we choose
to give him." Note the following anecdote of Sun Pin, a descendent of Sun Wu: In 341
B.C., the Ch`i State being at war with Wei, sent T`ien Chi and Sun Pin against the general
P`ang Chuan, who happened to be a deadly personal enemy of the later. Sun Pin said: "The Ch`i
State has a reputation for cowardice, and therefore our adversary despises us. Let us
turn this circumstance to account." Accordingly, when the army had crossed the border into
Wei territory, he gave orders to show 100,000 fires on the first night, 50,000 on the next,
and the night after only 20,000. P`ang Chuan pursued them hotly, saying to himself: "I
knew these men of Ch`i were cowards: their numbers have already fallen away by more than
half." In his retreat, Sun Pin came to a narrow defile, with he calculated that his pursuers
would reach after dark. Here he had a tree stripped of its bark, and inscribed upon it
the words: "Under this tree shall P`ang Chuan die." Then, as night began to fall, he placed
a strong body of archers in ambush near by, with orders to shoot directly they saw a light.
Later on, P`ang Chuan arrived at the spot, and noticing the tree, struck a light in order
to read what was written on it. His body was immediately riddled by a volley of arrows,
and his whole army thrown into confusion. [The above is Tu Mu's version of the story;
the SHIH CHI, less dramatically but probably with more historical truth, makes P`ang Chuan
cut his own throat with an exclamation of despair, after the rout of his army.] ]
He sacrifices something, that the enemy may *** at it.
20. By holding out baits, he keeps him on the march; then with a body of picked men
he lies in wait for him. [With an emendation suggested by Li Ching,
this then reads, "He lies in wait with the main body of his troops."]
21. The clever combatant looks to the effect of combined energy, and does not require too
much from individuals. [Tu Mu says: "He first of all considers the
power of his army in the bulk; afterwards he takes individual talent into account, and
uses each men according to his capabilities. He does not demand perfection from the untalented."]
Hence his ability to pick out the right men and utilize combined energy.
22. When he utilizes combined energy, his fighting men become as it were like unto rolling
logs or stones. For it is the nature of a log or stone to remain motionless on level
ground, and to move when on a slope; if four-cornered, to come to a standstill, but if round-shaped,
to go rolling down. [Ts`au Kung calls this "the use of natural
or inherent power."] 23. Thus the energy developed by good fighting
men is as the momentum of a round stone rolled down a mountain thousands of feet in height.
So much on the subject of energy. [The chief lesson of this chapter, in Tu Mu's
opinion, is the paramount importance in war of rapid evolutions and sudden rushes. "Great
results," he adds, "can thus be achieved with small forces."]
VI. WEAK POINTS AND STRONG
[Chang Yu attempts to explain the sequence of chapters as follows: "Chapter IV, on Tactical
Dispositions, treated of the offensive and the defensive; chapter V, on Energy, dealt
with direct and indirect methods. The good general acquaints himself first with the theory
of attack and defense, and then turns his attention to direct and indirect methods.
He studies the art of varying and combining these two methods before proceeding to the
subject of weak and strong points. For the use of direct or indirect methods arises out
of attack and defense, and the perception of weak and strong points depends again on
the above methods. Hence the present chapter comes immediately after the chapter on Energy."]
1. Sun Tzu said: Whoever is first in the field and awaits the coming of the enemy, will be
fresh for the fight; whoever is second in the field and has to hasten to battle will
arrive exhausted. 2. Therefore the clever combatant imposes
his will on the enemy, but does not allow the enemy's will to be imposed on him.
[One mark of a great soldier is that he fight on his own terms or fights not at all. (See
Col. Henderson's biography of Stonewall Jackson, 1902 ed., vol. II, p. 490.) ]
3. By holding out advantages to him, he can cause the enemy to approach of his own accord;
or, by inflicting damage, he can make it impossible for the enemy to draw near.
[In the first case, he will entice him with a bait; in the second, he will strike at some
important point which the enemy will have to defend.]
4. If the enemy is taking his ease, he can harass him;
[This passage may be cited as evidence against Mei Yao- Ch`en's interpretation of I. ss.
23.] if well supplied with food, he can starve
him out; if quietly encamped, he can force him to move.
5. Appear at points which the enemy must hasten to defend; march swiftly to places where you
are not expected. 6. An army may march great distances without
distress, if it marches through country where the enemy is not.
[Ts`ao Kung sums up very well: "Emerge from the void [q.d. like "a bolt from the blue"],
strike at vulnerable points, shun places that are defended, attack in unexpected quarters."]
7. You can be sure of succeeding in your attacks if you only attack places which are undefended.
[*** Hsi explains "undefended places" as "weak points; that is to say, where the general
is lacking in capacity, or the soldiers in spirit; where the walls are not strong enough,
or the precautions not strict enough; where relief comes too late, or provisions are too
scanty, or the defenders are variance amongst themselves."]
You can ensure the safety of your defense if you only hold positions that cannot be
attacked. [I.e., where there are none of the weak points
mentioned above. There is rather a nice point involved in the interpretation of this later
clause. Tu Mu, Ch`en Hao, and Mei Yao-ch`en assume the meaning to be: "In order to make
your defense quite safe, you must defend EVEN those places that are not likely to be attacked;"
and Tu Mu adds: "How much more, then, those that will be attacked." Taken thus, however,
the clause balances less well with the preceding--always a consideration in the highly antithetical
style which is natural to the Chinese. Chang Yu, therefore, seems to come nearer the mark
in saying: "He who is skilled in attack flashes forth from the topmost heights of heaven [see
IV. ss. 7], making it impossible for the enemy to guard against him. This being so, the places
that I shall attack are precisely those that the enemy cannot defend.... He who is skilled
in defense hides in the most secret recesses of the earth, making it impossible for the
enemy to estimate his whereabouts. This being so, the places that I shall hold are precisely
those that the enemy cannot attack."] 8. Hence that general is skillful in attack
whose opponent does not know what to defend; and he is skillful in defense whose opponent
does not know what to attack. [An aphorism which puts the whole art of war
in a nutshell.] 9. O divine art of subtlety and secrecy! Through
you we learn to be invisible, through you inaudible;
[Literally, "without form or sound," but it is said of course with reference to the enemy.]
and hence we can hold the enemy's fate in our hands.
10. You may advance and be absolutely irresistible, if you make for the enemy's weak points; you
may retire and be safe from pursuit if your movements are more rapid than those of the
enemy. 11. If we wish to fight, the enemy can be
forced to an engagement even though he be sheltered behind a high rampart and a deep
ditch. All we need do is attack some other place that he will be obliged to relieve.
[Tu Mu says: "If the enemy is the invading party, we can cut his line of communications
and occupy the roads by which he will have to return; if we are the invaders, we may
direct our attack against the sovereign himself." It is clear that Sun Tzu, unlike certain generals
in the late Boer war, was no believer in frontal attacks.]
12. If we do not wish to fight, we can prevent the enemy from engaging us even though the
lines of our encampment be merely traced out on the ground. All we need do is to throw
something odd and unaccountable in his way. [This extremely concise expression is intelligibly
paraphrased by Chia Lin: "even though we have constructed neither wall nor ditch." Li Ch`uan
says: "we puzzle him by strange and unusual dispositions;" and Tu Mu finally clinches
the meaning by three illustrative anecdotes--one of Chu-ko Liang, who when occupying Yang-p`ing
and about to be attacked by Ssu-ma I, suddenly struck his colors, stopped the beating of
the drums, and flung open the city gates, showing only a few men engaged in sweeping
and sprinkling the ground. This unexpected proceeding had the intended effect; for Ssu-ma
I, suspecting an ambush, actually drew off his army and retreated. What Sun Tzu is advocating
here, therefore, is nothing more nor less than the timely use of "bluff."]
13. By discovering the enemy's dispositions and remaining invisible ourselves, we can
keep our forces concentrated, while the enemy's must be divided.
[The conclusion is perhaps not very obvious, but Chang Yu (after Mei Yao-ch`en) rightly
explains it thus: "If the enemy's dispositions are visible, we can make for him in one body;
whereas, our own dispositions being kept secret, the enemy will be obliged to divide his forces
in order to guard against attack from every quarter."]
14. We can form a single united body, while the enemy must split up into fractions. Hence
there will be a whole pitted against separate parts of a whole, which means that we shall
be many to the enemy's few. 15. And if we are able thus to attack an inferior
force with a superior one, our opponents will be in dire straits.
16. The spot where we intend to fight must not be made known; for then the enemy will
have to prepare against a possible attack at several different points;
[Sheridan once explained the reason of General Grant's victories by saying that "while his
opponents were kept fully employed wondering what he was going to do, HE was thinking most
of what he was going to do himself."] and his forces being thus distributed in many
directions, the numbers we shall have to face at any given point will be proportionately
few. 17. For should the enemy strengthen his van,
he will weaken his rear; should he strengthen his rear, he will weaken his van; should he
strengthen his left, he will weaken his right; should he strengthen his right, he will weaken
his left. If he sends reinforcements everywhere, he will everywhere be weak.
[In Frederick the Great's INSTRUCTIONS TO HIS GENERALS we read: "A defensive war is
apt to betray us into too frequent detachment. Those generals who have had but little experience
attempt to protect every point, while those who are better acquainted with their profession,
having only the capital object in view, guard against a decisive blow, and acquiesce in
small misfortunes to avoid greater."] 18. Numerical weakness comes from having to
prepare against possible attacks; numerical strength, from compelling our adversary to
make these preparations against us. [The highest generalship, in Col. Henderson's
words, is "to compel the enemy to disperse his army, and then to concentrate superior
force against each fraction in turn."] 19. Knowing the place and the time of the
coming battle, we may concentrate from the greatest distances in order to fight.
[What Sun Tzu evidently has in mind is that nice calculation of distances and that masterly
employment of strategy which enable a general to divide his army for the purpose of a long
and rapid march, and afterwards to effect a junction at precisely the right spot and
the right hour in order to confront the enemy in overwhelming strength. Among many such
successful junctions which military history records, one of the most dramatic and decisive
was the appearance of Blucher just at the critical moment on the field of Waterloo.]
20. But if neither time nor place be known, then the left wing will be impotent to succor
the right, the right equally impotent to succor the left, the van unable to relieve the rear,
or the rear to support the van. How much more so if the furthest portions of the army are
anything under a hundred LI apart, and even the nearest are separated by several LI!
[The Chinese of this last sentence is a little lacking in precision, but the mental picture
we are required to draw is probably that of an army advancing towards a given rendezvous
in separate columns, each of which has orders to be there on a fixed date. If the general
allows the various detachments to proceed at haphazard, without precise instructions
as to the time and place of meeting, the enemy will be able to annihilate the army in detail.
Chang Yu's note may be worth quoting here: "If we do not know the place where our opponents
mean to concentrate or the day on which they will join battle, our unity will be forfeited
through our preparations for defense, and the positions we hold will be insecure. Suddenly
happening upon a powerful foe, we shall be brought to battle in a flurried condition,
and no mutual support will be possible between wings, vanguard or rear, especially if there
is any great distance between the foremost and hindmost divisions of the army."]
21. Though according to my estimate the soldiers of Yueh exceed our own in number, that shall
advantage them nothing in the matter of victory. I say then that victory can be achieved.
[Alas for these brave words! The long feud between the two states ended in 473 B.C. with
the total defeat of Wu by Kou Chien and its incorporation in Yueh. This was doubtless
long after Sun Tzu's death. With his present assertion compare IV. ss. 4. Chang Yu is the
only one to point out the seeming discrepancy, which he thus goes on to explain: "In the
chapter on Tactical Dispositions it is said, 'One may KNOW how to conquer without being
able to DO it,' whereas here we have the statement that 'victory' can be achieved.' The explanation
is, that in the former chapter, where the offensive and defensive are under discussion,
it is said that if the enemy is fully prepared, one cannot make certain of beating him. But
the present passage refers particularly to the soldiers of Yueh who, according to Sun
Tzu's calculations, will be kept in ignorance of the time and place of the impending struggle.
That is why he says here that victory can be achieved."]
22. Though the enemy be stronger in numbers, we may prevent him from fighting. Scheme so
as to discover his plans and the likelihood of their success.
[An alternative reading offered by Chia Lin is: "Know beforehand all plans conducive to
our success and to the enemy's failure." 23. Rouse him, and learn the principle of
his activity or inactivity. [Chang Yu tells us that by noting the joy
or anger shown by the enemy on being thus disturbed, we shall be able to conclude whether
his policy is to lie low or the reverse. He instances the action of Cho-ku Liang, who
sent the scornful present of a woman's head-dress to Ssu-ma I, in order to goad him out of his
Fabian tactics.] Force him to reveal himself, so as to find
out his vulnerable spots. 24. Carefully compare the opposing army with
your own, so that you may know where strength is superabundant and where it is deficient.
[Cf. IV. ss. 6.] 25. In making tactical dispositions, the highest
pitch you can attain is to conceal them; [The piquancy of the paradox evaporates in
translation. Concealment is perhaps not so much actual invisibility (see supra ss. 9)
as "showing no sign" of what you mean to do, of the plans that are formed in your brain.]
conceal your dispositions, and you will be safe from the prying of the subtlest spies,
from the machinations of the wisest brains. [Tu Mu explains: "Though the enemy may have
clever and capable officers, they will not be able to lay any plans against us."]
26. How victory may be produced for them out of the enemy's own tactics--that is what the
multitude cannot comprehend. 27. All men can see the tactics whereby I
conquer, but what none can see is the strategy out of which victory is evolved.
[I.e., everybody can see superficially how a battle is won; what they cannot see is the
long series of plans and combinations which has preceded the battle.]
28. Do not repeat the tactics which have gained you one victory, but let your methods be regulated
by the infinite variety of circumstances. [As *** Hsi sagely remarks: "There is but
one root- principle underlying victory, but the tactics which lead up to it are infinite
in number." With this compare Col. Henderson: "The rules of strategy are few and simple.
They may be learned in a week. They may be taught by familiar illustrations or a dozen
diagrams. But such knowledge will no more teach a man to lead an army like Napoleon
than a knowledge of grammar will teach him to write like Gibbon."]
29. Military tactics are like unto water; for water in its natural course runs away
strong and to strike at what is weak. [Like water, taking the line of least resistance.]
31. Water shapes its course according to the nature of the ground over which it flows;
the soldier works out his victory in relation to the foe whom he is facing.
32. Therefore, just as water retains no constant shape, so in warfare there are no constant
conditions. 33. He who can modify his tactics in relation
to his opponent and thereby succeed in winning, may be called a heaven- born captain.
34. The five elements (water, fire, wood, metal, earth) are not always equally predominant;
[That is, as *** Hsi says: "they predominate alternately."]
the four seasons make way for each other in turn.
[Literally, "have no invariable seat."] There are short days and long; the moon has
its periods of waning and waxing. [Cf. V. ss. 6. The purport of the passage
is simply to illustrate the want of fixity in war by the changes constantly taking place
in Nature. The comparison is not very happy, however, because the regularity of the phenomena
which Sun Tzu mentions is by no means paralleled in war.]
VII. MANEUVERING
1. Sun Tzu said: In war, the general receives his commands from the sovereign.
2. Having collected an army and concentrated his forces, he must blend and harmonize the
different elements thereof before pitching his camp.
["Chang Yu says: "the establishment of harmony and confidence between the higher and lower
ranks before venturing into the field;" and he quotes a saying of Wu Tzu (chap. 1 ad init.):
"Without harmony in the State, no military expedition can be undertaken; without harmony
in the army, no battle array can be formed." In an historical romance Sun Tzu is represented
as saying to Wu Yuan: "As a general rule, those who are waging war should get rid of
all the domestic troubles before proceeding to attack the external foe."]
3. After that, comes tactical maneuvering, than which there is nothing more difficult.
[I have departed slightly from the traditional interpretation of Ts`ao Kung, who says: "From
the time of receiving the sovereign's instructions until our encampment over against the enemy,
the tactics to be pursued are most difficult." It seems to me that the tactics or maneuvers
can hardly be said to begin until the army has sallied forth and encamped, and Ch`ien
ears or eyes.]