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I'm giving a paper on the case against purely neuroscientific proof of reductive theories
of mind, how neuroscience has kind of fallen out of the spirit of what neuroscience and
philosophy should be. Reductive theory is saying that well, you know, these mind events,
these cognition and consciousness events are identical to you know, some interactions of
the neurons in the brain. It shows that although we have great, great experiments, great support
of, of these things, that there's no necessity behind that and that to make those assumptions
going into the experiments, isn't in the spirit of philosophy or neuroscience. Right now these
experiments are being used to prove these reductive theories, um, but what I show is
that it can't possibly prove it and then I show that the proper role of it, is what is
called a falsificaton tool. Being here has really made me see that there is this huge
disconnect between these neuroscientists and these philosophers who really are studying
the same thing, but who approach in completely different ways, but really up until now, don't
really talk to each other much. So that's what I really loved about this, this whole
experience, was getting to, as a philosopher, getting to talk to these neuroscientists and
these neurosurgeons and you know, start to try to bring that gap. The nature of philosophy
is most of it is discussion, but that said, I had the amazing opportunity to shadow Dr.
Shah, um, and go and see some surgeries, see what he does, um, go around with him for a
day. And it's just absolutely incredible and it really, it let's you see, the, what your
philosophy's impacting, you know, the kind of pragmatics of it, you know, how does this
affect his daily life and the decisions he makes.