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Today lectures, I am going to talk about Phenomenal Consciousness, qualia and quining qualia.
The phenomenal consciousness plays vital role in philosophy of mind. The phenomenal consciousness
is one of the most important aspects of explaining the concept of mind, because the phenomenal
consciousness cannot be explained in terms of physicalistic or mechanistic way. Even
if some philosophers and some scientist that trying to explain it, those explanations are
not acceptable, why it is not acceptable and I will be discussing in this lectures. As
we know that, conscious experience not only refers to the psychological concept of mind,
but also refers to the phenomenal concept of mind, the phenomenal concept of mind as
conscious experience, and of a mental state as a consciously experienced mental state.
And the psychological concept of mind, as a causal or an explanatory basis of behavior,
what according to the psychological concept of it, matters little whether a mental state
has a conscious quality or not.
Here, we find a fundamental distinction between both the conceptions.
According to the phenomenal concept of mind, mind is characterized by the way it feels,
and on the psychological concept of mind is characterized by what it does.
For Chalmers, this distinction between psychological and phenomenal mind is absolutely necessary.
Here he remarks, I could, I will sometimes speak of the phenomenal and psychological
aspect of mind, and sometimes of the phenomenal mind and the psychological mind. At this early
stage, I do not wish to beg any question about whether the phenomenal and the psychological
will turn out to be the same thing.
According to Chalmers, every phenomenal state is a psychological state, in that it plays
a significant role in the causation and explanation of behaviour, and every psychological state
has an intimate relation to the phenomenal concept of mind.
Accordingly, there is a a conceptual distinction between the two notions; what it means for
a state to be phenomenal is for it to feel a certain way, and what it means for a state,
to be psychological is for it to play and appropriate causal role, the distinction between
the phenomenal and the psychological has a long history.
Here we can points out Descartes concept of mind; Descartes is partly responsible for
these, because Descartes held that every event in the mind is a cogitatio, or a content of
experience. To this class, he assimilated intentions and every type of thought, he assumed
that every psychological, that is worthily of being cold mental as a conscious aspect,
that is whatever is a mental content is necessarily according to Descartes, a content of conscious
experience. Therefore, for him the notion of unconscious
method state is a a contradiction in terms. After Descartes, a new objective brand of
psychological explanation was developed with no room for consciousness in its explanation.
This mode of explanation had only partly success, what it established, the idea that psychological
explanations can be proceed while ignoring the phenomenal.
But behaviorist differed in their theoretical positions, some recognized the existence of
consciousness, found it irrelevant to psychological explanations, and some denied its existence
all together, many went further denying the existence of any kind of mental state, behaviourist
in general accepted that the mental states are irrelevant in the explanation of behaviour
which could be carried out entirely in external terms. The move from behaviourism to computational
cognitive science for the most preserved the idea that, there are no two intentional mental
states, although the move brought back a role for internal states which could even be called
mental state. And there was nothing particularly phenomenal
about then, these states where admissible precisely on the grounds of their role, in
the explanation of behavior, the concept of mental, therefore was taken to be synonymous
with psychological.
This explanation of phenomenal concept of leaves it unclear, why there is anything phenomenal
at all. According to him, there is no great mystery about how a state might play a causal
role, but what is truly mysterious is, why that state should feel like something, why
it should have a phenomenal quality at all.
In Chalmers words, we can see, I could there is no great mystery about how a state might
play some causal role, although there are certainly technical problems there for science.
What is mysterious is why that state should feel like something; why it should have a
phenomenal quality. Why the causal role is played and why the phenomenal quality is present
are two entirely different questions. The functionalist analysis denies the distinction
of these questions, and therefore to be unsatisfactory.
The phenomenal concept deals with the first person aspect of mind, while psychological
concept deals with the third-person concept of mind. The dualism between the phenomenal
and the psychological is the fact that the dualism between the first-person and the third-person
perspective of the mind.
Let us see the first-person and the third-person perspective of mind. The double aspects of
mind or mental terms are psychological and phenomenal. The concept of pain provides a
clear example; the term is often used to name a particular sort of unpleasant phenomenal
quality. On the other hand, there is also a psychological
notion associated with the term, the concept of the sort of state that is causally connected
with the damage to the organism, the relation of the organism and so on, both of these aspects
are central to the common sense notion of pain.
The reason why phenomenal and psychological properties often run together is clear, it
is because the relevant properties tend to co-occur, when the processes resulting from
tissue damage leading to discomfort tech plays, some sort of phenomenal quality arises. That
is, when psychological pain is presented, some sort of experience of pain is also present
phenomenal. Chalmers says that, it is not a conceptual truth that the processes should
be accompanied by the phenomenal quality, what it is a fact about the world. Once we
have this state of co-occurrence of properties in everyday situations, it is natural that
our every day conception of things will bind them together.
From the above discussions, we find that many mental concepts lead a sort of double life.
For example, perception can be taken as a psychological process involving cognitive
response to the environment. On the other hand, it may also be taken phenomenally,
involving the conscious experience of what it is perceived, a Chalmers shows that some
of these concepts lead more strongly towards the phenomenal and some lead towards the psychological.
The concept of sensation, which is close to the concept of perception, has both phenomenal
and psychological components. The phenomenal component is more prominent in sensation than
in perception. Sensation is something like perception’s phenomenal counterpart. Another
questions are, can there be a mental concept which is psychological, but not phenomenal?
That is an easy to the case that the psychological and the phenomenal are factually a co-occurant,
but are independent casually.
Chalmers endorse the factual co-occurrence of the psychological and phenomenal but not
there necessary relation. It is evidenced in his analysis, the proposition attitudes
like beliefs, desire, and etcetera. In the case of propositional attitudes, the central
feature of these mental states is the semantic content, or intentionality. Phenomenal experience
thus is not directly associated with a propositional attitude.
However, a belief though psychological is still a state on conscious such that as Searle
says, the intentional content of a belief depends entirely on the associated state of
consciousness that the belief can be, can bring about. Without consciousness, all that
is present is as if intentionality. What Searle intense to say is that, the belief is always
associated with consciousness, because unconscious machines have no beliefs, a conscious mind
alone has the capacity of intentionality, about the world. Chalmers argues with Searle
on the analysis of propositional attitudes.
Chalmers has shown that all mental states have a psychological and a phenomenal aspect,
and we need not legitimate which is primary, although a strong case might be made for a
psychological analysis. There is no aspect of this state that outstrips
both the psychological and the phenomenal. Thus, psychology and phenomenology together
constitutes the centre aspect of the mind. In spite of togetherness between phenomenology
and psychology, we cannot identify the phenomenal with the psychology, there are two distinct
aspects of the mind, the phenomenal is picked out as the experience that tends to accompany
psychological. We can coherently imagine a situation in which
the phenomenal quality occurs without the psychological properties. This distinction
between the phenomenal and the psychological is source of the distinction between the easy
and the hard aspect of the human mind. Why it is easy, and why it is hard? It is
easy, because it is a phenomenal consciousness, it is a conscious experience which cannot
be explained in a functional terms; it is hard, because it cannot be explained in the
phenomenal consciousness. It is easy, because it can be explainable
in the scientific way and if it is explanation in the scientific way, then it is an easy
problem, the actual the problem of consciousness is one of the hard problems of consciousness
according to David Chalmers.
Let us see the phenomenal consciousness. As we have seen mental terms are dual in nature.
There are two concepts of consciousness, psychological consciousness and phenomenal consciousness.
One may put forward an explanation of consciousness by emphasizing the phenomenal quality of consciousness,
what will end by giving an explanation of some aspect of psychological consciousness,
such as the ability to introspect, to think and to perceive etcetera. There are varieties
of psychological consciousness such as awareness, introspections, self consciousness, attentions,
voluntary conduct, knowledge and mainly other mental states.
These are holds that all largely functional and this can be seen from a psychological
perspective, although many of them are associated with the phenomenal state. It is clear that
there is a phenomenal and a psychological property in the vicinity of each of these
concepts. The phenomenal and the psychological properties in the vicinity of these notions
tend to occur together, but as with other mental concept, they should not be conflated.
We should also be careful not to conflict the phenomenal sense of these terms with phenomenal
consciousness in general.
We may point out that psychological perspective of consciousness can be analyzable in terms
of phenomenal prospective, but phenomenal consciousness cannot be explained in terms
of psychological perspective because of its irreducibility and non-computational nature
or non mechanical nature. But Chalmers, the reductive explanation of consciousness is
not possible because consciousness cannot be logically supervenient on the physical.
This non-reductive aspect of consciousness is naturally supervenient, but not logically
supervenient. Chalmers writes that to make the case against reductive explanation, we
need to show that consciousness is not logical supervenient on the physical.
In principle, we need to show that he does not supervene globally that is, that all the
micro physical facts in the world do not entail the facts about consciousness. In practice
it is easier to run the argument locally, argument that in an individual, micro physical
facts in the world do not entail the facts about consciousness. When it comes to consciousness,
local and global supervenes possibly stand and fall together.
So, it does not matter much which we run the argument, if consciousness supervenes at all.
It almost shortenly supervenes locally; if this is disputed, however all the arguments
can be run at the global level with the straight forward alternations. This is because the
phenomenal property of consciousness makes it different from all other properties.
If phenomenal consciousness would have been logically supervenient on the physical body,
then it would have been functionally identical with the latter. In that case, consciousness
would be explained completely in terms of physical properties. As Chalmers argues, of
course there is a sense in which the physics of the universe most entails the intense of
consciousness. If one defines physics as the fundamental
science from whose facts and cause everything else follows, these construal of physics,
however the questions involved. If one allows physicist who include theory, they brought
special to deal with the phenomena of consciousness, motivated by more basic considerations, then
we may get an explanation of consciousness. But it will certainly not be a reductive one,
for our purpose it is best to take physics to be the fundamental science developed to
explain observations of the external world. If this kind of physics entails the facts
about consciousness, without invoking consciousness itself in a crucial role, then consciousness
would truly be reductively explained for the region, David Chalmers have given, there is
a good reason to believe that no such explanation is a possible.
Therefore, one cannot reduce facts about consciousness to physical facts and cannot explain the occurrence
of consciousness. Chalmers argues that here is a little hope
that a purely physicalist or materialist theory can explain consciousness at all, especially
the phenomenal or qualitative aspect of consciousness. We may say that our knowledge of consciousness
comes from our experience and not from external observations. The existence of the external
world is not enough for us to assume the intense of conscious experience; it is only the first
person experience of consciousness which possesses the problem of non computationality in consciousness.
Therefore, it is subjective character of experience which is not analyzable through any explanatory
systems of functional state or human behaviour.
If it is logically supervenient, there would be no such epistemic asymmetry, a logically
supervenient cannot be detected straight forwardly and there is no special role for the first
persons, therefore it is subjective character of experience which is not analyzable through
any explanatory system of functional states or human behaviour.
If it is logically supervenient on this, then there would be no such epistemic asymmetry,
a logical supervenient can be detected straightforward and there is no special role for the first
person case. Chalmers shows that consciousness is a first-person phenomena and cannot be
inferred or defined from the physicalistic or mechanistic way. This is because there
is gap between physical level and the level of a conscious experience.
Consciousness cannot be explained reductively, because it can be explain in its own terms,
because the conscious mental states as distinguished from the physical facts have a subjective
aspect. For example, the mental state of pain which
is not the same as the state of the brain, since there is subjective experience of pain
is not explainable in terms of the computational functions of the brain. Thus conscious experience
can be reductively explained in terms of physical and functional laws of the brain.
Now, we have to see the concept of qualia and the how qualia is explaining in the phenomenal
consciousness because the conscious experience is nothing but the phenomenal qualia the term
qualia means the qualitative character of experience every experience as a distinct
qualitative character the subjective or qualitative field of a conscious experience is characterized
as something which is organisms necessarily have in order to be conscious thus qualia
are the qualitative subject be experience of mental state and the properties of conscious
experience.
Now, the question is, are these subjective experiences or qualia real? It is a controversial
question among philosophers whether qualia are definable in functional terms and whether
qualia are the psychological states of the brain.
The most important argument is that qualia are the functional states of the brain and,
thus, are real only as the physical state of the brain. Opposed to this is the argument
that qualia are the qualitative feel of the conscious states and so are subjective in
character. Subjective qualia experiences thus have qualia inherent in them.
In other words, an experience is a conscious experience, if and only if that is some raw
feel in which is subjective, qualia are experiential properties of sensations, feelings, perceptions,
or the way it feel to have a pain, or the way it feels to see. According to Ned Block,
the qualia, or qualia that include the ways it feels to see here, and smell the way it
feels to have a pain, originally what it is like to have mental states.
Qualia are experimental properties of sensations, feelings, perceptions, and thought, and desire
as well also.
The first-person experiences such as pain, colour, sensation and the sensation of touch
and smell, etcetera are the qualitative experiences of mental states. These mental states are
the common staff of mind. For example, in having the smell of flowers
or the taste of ice cream, we have subjective experience of these things, but we cannot
describe them, because these experiences have a distinctive phenomenological character.
Our colour experiences are such that there is something likes to have them with a phenomenological
image. A quale is thus a mental state that has the property of being a phenomenal experience.
Qualia constitute the essence of the conscious states. For example, the quale pain is the
feeling of a pain rather than a mere bodily sensation. Thus, the qualia are the raw feeling
association with the conscious state. The type of conscious experience is something
we cannot do without if we are to generated and test hypothesis about the links between
the phenomenological and the psychological, the psychological and the neural.
The qualitative experiences like experiences of colour, smell, taste, pain, and etcetera
can be explained in neuroscientific terms, these experiences play a causal role in the
domain of mental state. The experience of pain for example, has the belief that, he
is in pain and he acquires a desire to take step to recapitulate. When he is in pain,
he is in a state that definitely has a range of causal or dispositional properties. However,
in addition to the, to their functional role, the qualitative experience have a characteristic
phenomenal feel called qualia.
Searle argues that every conscious state has a certain qualitative feel to it. For example,
the conscious experience of tasting beer is very different from hearing some music and
from smelling a rose or watching a movie; both of these have a different qualitative
character. Hence, there are the different qualitative
features of conscious experiences. Thus, qualia constitute the essential properties of conscious
experience. That is why, one cannot derive pleasure of drinking beer by listening to
music, or the pleasure of witnessing sunset by smelling a rose.
That is a logical, not an empirical truth, and Chalmers characterize it as the subjective
quality of experience. A mental state is conscious if there is something, it is like to be in
that mental state. To put it another way, we can say that a mental state is conscious
if it has a qualitative feel, or a qualitative experiences, these qualitative feels are also
known as phenomenal qualities, or qualia for short.
The problem of explaining these phenomenal qualities is just the problem of explaining
consciousness. According to Chalmers, phenomenally conscious states are not functional state,
but can be realized through our experience like the experience of red, the phenomenal
consciousness does not metaphysically on lower level facts, that is to say, even though two
functional states are isomorphic, they differ in phenomenal consciousness, and experience
or other mental entity is phenomenal conscious only when there is something to be like to
be that state. For example, perceptual experiences like testing,
seeing, feeling, etcetera are cases of such experiences. The qualities to us in conscious
experience are the qualities which represent object in the world, thus qualia are considered
as the qualitative characteristics of mental state which include perceptions, sensations,
affections, desires, thought and beliefs. For a very conscious experiences or conscious
mental state, there is something which is like for the subject to have it, or to be
in it, they have a phenomenal feel or raw feeling.
Hence, problem of phenomenal consciousness is the problem of explaining how subjective
feel is in the brain. Phenomenal consciousness is a form of state consciousness, it is a
property which some, but not other mental states. Specifically, it is a property which
mental states have, when it is likes something to undergo then. And phenomenally, conscious
states have distinct subjective feels and some would say, they have qualia, phenomenal
conscious properties are experiential properties. For example, we have phenomenal conscious
states, what we see, hear, smell, taste and have pains, these properties are the experimental
properties of sensations, feelings, and perceptions, and thoughts, etcetera. Thus, the phenomenal
feature of the mind is characterized by what it is like for a subject to have that feature.
Phenomenal experience is not nearly a succession of qualitative distinguished sensory ideas,
but rather the organized cognitive experience of a world of objects, and of our self has
subject within that world. However, according to the functionalist, minds
are complex arrangement of functional states, states that bear the right kinds of causal
relation to one another and to inputs and outputs. A functionalist may therefore, assets
that experiences themselves like qualities of their own, qualities indefinable independently
of the qualities of object experienced or although, an experience may have qualities,
these are not qualities we are in any sense our of in understanding the experience.
This subjective quality of experience or a quality we experiences is very difficult to
get from the psychological aspect of mind. And these distinctions is very applicable
to philosophy of mind, it is because there is a phenomenal and psychological distinctions.
The phenomenal consciousness is a kind of conscious experience or qualitative experience
and that is called as qualia. And because of these qualia, it is very difficult to explain
consciousness in mechanistic or functionalistic way. And some of these qualia, I will be explaining
in the next lectures, thank you.