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Good morning everyone and thank you so much, Mike and thank you to all the previous speakers.
I think we've got both the hardest and in some ways the most challenging part of the
program this morning which is I would broadly define as ground truth what happens when the
big frameworks and ideas that we've been talking about earlier this morning actually collide
with reality. And not just the reality of the Security Council and the veto although
that's part of it, but what actually happens on the ground. And I think practitioners was
the term given to all three of these very distinguished panelists and that is a very
understated description for the enormous challenges that each of them has faced at various points
in their careers inside of government as well as thinking about them outside of government,
writing about them. So I am just looking forward to the conversation and that's what we're
going to have this morning. So I'm going to jump right in with everyone and start I guess
with the hardest problem that faces us today which is Syria and to what extent each of
the panelists thinks that that represents a challenge to even the basic idea of having
an international framework when we see the political challenges that arise at a time
when certainly everyone, at least in this room can probably agree, that a massive loss
of innocent civilian life is a consequence of our inability to figure out some solution.
So please, Heather, why don't you start us off and we'll just get going from there.
Well, first, thank you so much to the cosponsors and to Susan for including in this very distinguished
company. And it's very difficult to follow the two panels we've had already this morning.
It's very humbling. But I think one way of approaching, Susan, the question of Syria
is by comparing Syria with some of the conflicts that we tried to deal with before we had the
R2P norm and I think specifically Bosnia because this is one that has come up in the media,
and it happens to be one in which I served both in the legislative and executive branches
of government so saw it from both sides. And I think the two similarities that I would
point out is that, for better or worse, we are only two years in. And we tend to forget,
although those of us who lived through it, and certainly the folks on the ground don't
forget how very long it took the international community to come to something that could
stop the violence in Bosnia. And here I come to the differences because in Bosnia we had
a regional legitimator, in fact two regional legitimators, in the forms of the E.U. and
NATO. We had a future, a regional future, that you could say to the warring parties
that you want to be part of this. And you had, eventually, Rwanda as a recent motivator.
And this I mention because it goes to this question of public opinion that where when
the distinguished earlier speakers did the work of putting the R2P norm together, we
all those of us of a certain age and global public opinion were very motivated by the
memory of Rwanda. Right now for all that we talk about the greater acceptability of the
R2P norm, what motivates elite public opinion in the US and other countries is Iraq. And
that points you toward a very different set of lessons and frankly it makes it much harder
to see Syria through an R2P paradigm. Now the good news, and I do think there is some
good news, is that two years into Bosnia we were still fighting about whether it was legitimate
for outside states to be concerned about what was going on on the ground. And what the R2P
norm I think has comprehensively changed as Secretary Albright and the others said earlier
- no one can say they don't know what's going on in Syria. The U.N. system is one of the
leading providers of undisputed information about the scale of the humanitarian catastrophe
there. And we have tools like the ICC, like the human rights body, that have been active
and engaged on Syria in a way that we didn't have in the Bosnia context. Now that has not
saved a single human life which is a very sobering thing for us fans of R2P to take
on. So I would sum up by saying that what the comparison shows us is that the tremendous
amount of work that was done on R2P has changed the terms of the debate but what it hasn't
changed or hasn't changed enough is the fundamental power relation that Ambassador Williamson
talked about. Ambassador Burns, I'd love to get your thoughts
on Syria and then we definitely want to go back to Heather on this very provocative but
also very sad notion that it's an accomplishment for the U.N. to provide information about
people being killed when it can't stop them from actually being killed.
Susan, thank you and it's also a pleasure for me to be here and I really should start
by thanking the Holocaust Museum, Sara Bloomfield and Michael Abramowitz for putting this together
with Brookings and USIP. And I think we should all thank Secretary Albright and Ambassador
Williamson. It's great to see a democrat and republican working together on a leading international
issue and they've done- they produced a very important report. And for me the takeaway
is the Responsibility to Protect is an essential element of international security in the 21st
century because people are being killed. More than five million in Congo. More than 100,000
people in Syria. Not by interstate conflicts, but by conflicts within their own societies
where their governments are preying upon them. And one of the essential foundation stones
of this museum is to remember the destruction of European Jewry. Certainly we need to remember
what happened in Rwanda, and we have got to use that template to think about the responsibilities
that the United States has in the world as the leading power in the world. And part of
it is to think about our self-interest and that was mentioned this morning, always. But
part of it is to think about what is right internationally and what our role is and mobilizing
the international community. So if we think about Syria, it's very definitely complicated,
Susan, I think by the fact that, as President Obama has said, we're just coming out of this
decade of war. We are looking in the rearview mirror. We are trying to learn rightly the
lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan but in a way I think our national debate in some ways is
imprisoned by them, and we've become immobilized. And there is this presumption out there that
those of us who advocate action on a humanitarian basis need to prove the case and those who
don't, don't need to prove it. And I think it might be the other way around. And so we
created this dilemma I think where the United States has to think very deeply about its
role in the world. It's no longer the bipolar world of the Cold War. It's no longer the
unipolar led world of the Clinton administration when I was working for Secretary Albright
but we're still the dominant actor. What are our interests in Syria? We have a huge interest
in the humanitarian catastrophe that's developed there. The numbers are really appalling, 100,000
people dead, 4.2 million people internally displaced, 1.5 million Syrian refugees outside
of Syria in countries that matter greatly to us, like Jordan and Turkey and Iraq. There's
an interest. It combines both the self-interest and the global interest. A second interest
we have is a realpolitik interest. We should want to stop Iran from becoming a dominant
country in the Middle East, but Iran and Hezbollah and Russia are arming the Assad government
and there is no comparable counterforce opposed to them. There could be. It could be led by
the United States with Turkey, with Saudi Arabia, with Qatar and with some of the European
countries but it's not well led right now. And so I think the balance of the argument
has to be towards intervention, more affective support for the refugees led by the United
States, and more effective aid to the moderate rebel groups who need to take the fight in
this war to Assad. And if that doesn't happen and I think you'll see - and there are I think
a couple of articles both in the Washington Post and New York Times this morning - we're
probably looking at a very long war indeed. We should try to want to stop that war. I
am very much with those people who believe that the United States needs to lead more
vigorously, and needs to do more to try to cope with this terrible war.
Mike, both Heather and Nick have raised the specter of the experience of the last decade
not in terms R2P but in terms of the Bush administration and the way it waged the war
in Iraq and Afghanistan as being the relevant context to Syria as opposed to a humanitarian
framing. Do you agree with that and more broadly what's your take on Syria?
I think that there's a definitely a political context in which all this takes place. And
that is kind of national weariness with intervention. If you look at the most recent Pew polling
on this topic you have 40 year lows in support for various categories of global engagement.
That certainly is related to those events. There is also a serious foreign policy debate
going on in the Republican Party about these issues about the value of intervention. And
so you have a lot of factors at work here. I point out, I want to get to Syria, but we
were dealing with Sudan, Darfur at the same time we were dealing with Iraq and that was
a limiting context even then. When you're thinking about intervening in the middle of
another Muslim country, in the middle of fighting a battle in Iraq so that was a limiting factor
even then. So I don't want to deny that. But I guess I agree with the earlier commentary
that we've heard all through this event, which is important, is that the needs that persecuted
minorities in the world face and American national interests are not determined primarily
by matters of psychology; they are actually determined by interests and values. And Syria
is a case where we often talk about a conflict between interests and values, and I don't
think it exists in this case. When we were dealing with Darfur, a terrible humanitarian
crisis, but instability in Darfur meant instability in Chad. Instability in Syria means instability
in Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey, along the Israeli border and Syria is a proxy, increasingly
just a puppet of Iranian influence having been supported by that influence. And so I
think we've got a real confluence of those things here. But I want to be sympathetic
with the administration on this, having lived through some of it - that's one of the lessons
of "formers" when we approach these things, it's that they're not easy - is that the application
of the Responsibility to Protect in the context of an active two-sided civil war is not an
easy thing, particularly when neither side is kind of pure in this conflict. And that
I think is a context that we need to take seriously. In general, I would just point
out more broadly that when you face the choice between war and allowing impunity, the focus
needs to be on producing better choices than this. That's one of the disappointing aspects
for me in the Syrian context is that this began as a peaceful protest, in which, it
might have been possible to take a more active role. But even there, I would just point out
because I don't want to be too harshly judgmental on this, that it's hard enough to take action
when there are real atrocities. It's very difficult to take action when there are prospective
atrocities down the road. That is something that requires a lot of leadership and foresight,
which are not always easy to show in a situation like this. And there is a tension at the heart
of some of these issues between the understandable desire to use force as a last resort and the
desire to take early preventive action. Sometimes early interventions can avoid terrible consequences
down the road - even avoid cycles of conflict and revenge. One of my fears in Syria now
is even the triumph of the rebels would result in terrible revenge. So early action can undermine
some of those dynamics but it's a very difficult thing to do when the threats are prospective.
Ambassador Burns, let's go back to this question of what's in the toolkit for someone sitting
in the White House, in a senior job in the State Department as this is played out. So
you saw this during the Balkan War. You are familiar with the Bush era debates and that
balance between what's a military tool in the toolkit, what are diplomatic tools. Does
it help or not to think of something like R2P as a legal resource in a situation like
that or ultimately is it really about politics? Give us a sense of the mix as you're considering
what to do when a situation like Syria breaks out.
I'd agree with Mike that one of the problems with Syria is that there is a risk of action
and there's a risk of inaction. Secretary Albright referred to this when she was speaking
too. It's difficult for the President and I have great sympathy for the President. I
very much support him. It's really difficult to make this decision because you can see
the course of American leadership, you can see why that would be in our interest to get
more involved, to try to help with this regional picture to prevent an Iranian victory, to
prevent Iran and Hezbollah from teaming up to strengthen themselves and to help our allies
that Mike talked about. But you can also see that, I think you also have to see the risks
of inaction as well. If you don't act you probably see that victory by the Iranians,
you see further suffering by the civilians. The biggest question the President has to
answer is, "Is there a scenario that the military can present that is achievable, that has an
end state to it, and that is affordable?" It is very interesting to read this open letter,
a letter that was publicized by the White House, that General Dempsey sent to the Congress.
This is obviously a very difficult action to foresee. Arming the moderate rebel groups
is not as expensive or as risky as setting up a no-flight zone so you've got to distinguish
between the two. But the President is going to have to ask those questions. He's also
going to have to ask whether the United States can rely on others to work with us and again
Secretary Albright referred to this. Responsibility to Protect with the US in the lead does not
mean the US alone. And in this case I think there are a large group of countries that
want the same ends as the United States and Syria but don't have a leader. They are accustomed
to the United States playing that lead role and that's not happening now as a further
complication. I think finally Susan, the President is going to ask do we have the diplomatic
wherewithal? Do we have the ability to lead on the ground? And I think in this case we
certainly do because we still in a political sense are the most influential country in
the world. We have a legion of friends both in the Arab world who want to be helpful here
and want the US to lead as well as in Europe. So I would argue that if you look at that
balanced question what's the risk of action versus inaction, I think that the weight of
action, the risks are stronger for us on inaction. And this is a doable proposition that the
United States could be more active in supporting the moderate rebel groups in trying to isolate
Assad and take away the great advantage that he has now and the resupply by Iran, Hezbollah
and Russia. It's interesting that most of your arguments
have made the very compelling geopolitical case for where the US national interest lies
there. Do you think that the humanitarian case just isn't sufficient to overcome the
public opinion concerns that Mike referred to?
Well I think in this case and interestingly enough and this doesn't always happen, the
United States can't intervene everywhere and it's not in our national interest to do so.
I think our national interests and the humanitarian interests of alleviating the conflict actually
coincide. And for some Americans that humanitarian impulse is going to be very convincing. For
others it's going to be the national security argument. I think they're integrated and you
really need to make both arguments to the Congress and the American people.
So Heather, thinking back you referred to your time in government and the Balkans conflict
that erupted. In what ways do you think it would have changed the US response, or would
it have been useful to you in your role, had the world adopted something like the Responsibility
to Protect framework at that time? Or is it better or worse to have a policy against atrocities,
to have an official US atrocity prevention board and then to have atrocities occur while
that board exists or not? I think there are a certain number of speeches
that I helped Secretary Albright get ready to give about why we should care about what
was going on in the Balkans and maybe she would have had to give somewhat fewer of them.
You know I was sitting here and thinking about what were our successes and failures and where
the tools came from, and so I wanted to in the spirit of bipartisanship mention a bipartisan
success and a bipartisan failure. And the bipartisan success that nobody actually knows
about or talks about is Macedonia. And I was just thinking but if we hadn't intervened
in Bosnia and Kosovo, if we hadn't seen two sets of mass killings, would we have been
able to muster the will of both the US and the E.U. to send troops to help keep a peace
in Macedonia? So that you were using that part of the toolbox where you weren't firing
weapons but you were putting the parties on notice that there were weapons that could
be fired. And with some difficulty first with the Clinton and then the Bush administration
very successfully partnered with the E.U. to prevent the kind of conflict that had broken
out in Bosnia and Kosovo from breaking out in Macedonia. And that was done on the one
hand without the R2P norm, on the other hand with the hindsight of years of violence in
the Balkans. One of my most searing memories was of going with Secretary Albright to West
Africa just as the conflict in Sierra Leone was winding down. And everyone understood
that there were continuing extensive regional tensions that required a lot of outside support.
There was also a lot of excitement about Mali's new democracy. And there was a lot of eagerness
in the administration and in Europe to support the government of Mali and to support the
other countries of the region and as I say it's a very searing memory for me that one
morning we were in the region, we picked up our news clips back from the US -this was
in pre-iPhone days - and some member of Congress had sort of inquired as to what the secretary
was doing over there, pouring more money down a rat hole etcetera, etcetera. And so when
recent events happened in Mali, I thought we had a decade to use all the non-violent
R2P tools and we tried to use some of them, and we - the US - and we - the international
community - failed there across multiple administrations and multiple governments. And so when you're
talking about that's a case where we had all the nonviolent tools and we at least tried
to use them but as an international community we failed.
Mike, would it have made a difference during the Bush administration for something like
the Responsibility to Protect to be more enshrined for there to have been an Atrocity Prevention
Board? Would that have done anything about Darfur?
First of all, I'll point out that the administration, the Responsibility to Protect was an internal
commitment of the Bush administration. Our people helped produce the document and approved
it so I think it represented this spirit that the President brought to a lot of these matters
and which I saw on issues like Darfur. I mean at least the mythology of Rwanda is that there
wasn't enough high-level attention. If George W. Bush had spent any more attention he would
have had to have quit his day job. He was constantly on this issue. But this is the
source of frustration to some extent from my own experience. We employed just about
everything you can employ in the toolkit when it came to this, and tried to do it in a timely
fashion. President talked about Darfur as a genocide. He ordered intelligence over-flights
of Darfur, declassified the photos within weeks in order to call attention to what was
going on. We provided massive aid, over two billion dollars in humanitarian aid, sixty-five
percent of the total. We pursued sanctions against individuals and corporations. We worked
with regional organizations, equipping and moving A.U. forces. The President, I heard
him on the phone trying to get NATO involved and Chirac and others refused to get involved
in the matter. We gave tacit support to the ICC. At one point threatened to veto an attempt
to undermine the indictment against Bashir. We sponsored the peace process. Tried to work
the Darfur rebels, I was there in Nairobi when we were trying to make them more presentable
in these negotiations which was a difficult task, kind of a motley crew. The result was
a humanitarian achievement. A lot of lives were saved because of massive levels of aid.
But very little progress on the security side and really these events went forward with
impunity. It points to the ultimate problem here, which I think is at least in my limited
experience you have to take seriously. And that it's that a sovereign state dedicated
to destroying a portion of its people, with the support of China and Russia and the Security
Council and the cover of Arab solidarity in the Arab League, is a very difficult thing
to deal with. Bashir, by the time I met him in 2005, when Bob Zoellick and I were in Khartoum
he felt almost no pressure because he was shielded by a variety of these factors. And
we could not and nothing would have happened in this circumstance, it did happen without
the ability to generate a credible threat of force. And we could not do that for some
of the reasons we've talked about but also for diplomatic reasons like the context of
the North-South agreement which was taking place at just the same time to bring a conclusion
to a bloody civil war. And also, and I'll point out that it's newsy, that the military,
the Department of Defense, was one of the largest they were not a neutral actor in this,
they were one of the most vigorous opponents of any action that related to humanitarian
issues in Darfur - and as you are seeing in Syria with the testimony of the information
that we see today. To the point where, I had the experience and I won't go into details,
but to the point of near insubordination when the military would refuse to plan for the
possibility of events where the President wanted planning. Because they didn't want
the plan to ever be called upon. And so there's a variety of problems in this about coming
up with a credible threat of force, the plan B that we talked about in Darfur and could
never produce. And it's hard sometimes when you have dedicated offenders in this to get
much progress without that credibility. I am sure we're all thinking of Secretary
Albright's famous line when it comes to the military in whether they should be called
upon in crisis like this to step up and take action. But I wanted to highlight and ask
the others to respond to your point about the U.N. Security Council, which has sort
of come up in many ways. It's I don't know if that's a tool in the toolkit or a negative
tool in the toolkit or just another weapon that trumps the toolkit, but clearly many
conversations not just about Darfur but about Syria come back to the veto in the U.N. Security
Council. Do you use that as basically trumping many of the tools that we have developed?
Well it's the fundamental problem that the Obama administration has in Syria is that
it doesn't have the capacity to use the power of the Security Council which can be considerable
in this case because Russia and China in the most cynical way are blocking even a coherent
discussion of how to respond to the humanitarian crisis. Not just whether or not the Security
Council should intervene politically or militarily, they don't want to give any credence, any
role to the Security Council in Syria because they are protecting Assad. And so because
of that the administration faces the same challenge that the Clinton administration
faced, as Secretary Albright said, in '98-'99 when it became clear that the Russian federation
was going to veto any military intervention in Kosovo despite the fact that Milosevic
was just about to annihilate a million Muslims there. The United States was forced, and this
is really to the great credit of President Clinton and Secretary Albright, was forced
to take up leadership of its own. We used the NATO Alliance, it worked very well, a
very successful example, as was Bosnia, of American-led military interventions to save
people in a very difficult situation; so in this case the United States has to create
a coalition of willing in Syria of its own, but as I said before, Susan, I think we have
many countries ready for that. And one way to think about this, David Miliband, who has
just left British politics - he was British Foreign Secretary and the last Labor government
is now going to take up the Presidency of the International Rescue Committee in New
York - he gave a really insightful speech ten days ago at the annual Ditchley Lecture
outside of Oxford, where he essentially said we have to understand that we're at a time
when ten years ago there was a lot of criticism of the US and U.K. for intervening too frequently
and too aggressively in the world. Now we're at a point where there's criticism that those
two countries and others are not intervening sufficiently. We don't have a big enough sense
of our own role and he said something at the end of the speech which really resonated with
me. He said, "I prefer the course of activism to prevent problems rather than passivity
in reacting to them." And that's the essential choice that we face in Syria. This problem
is so severe in its geopolitical implications and humanitarian as well, it will be with
us. The question is do we engage and lead now, and hopefully have a chance of the Assad
regime sooner? Or do we wait for that country to tear itself apart, the humanitarian crisis
will be greater and then we perhaps have a bigger problem because as Mike has said Lebanon,
Turkey, Jordan, are engulfed by it and it's Israel's northern border as well. So to me,
that's the calculus that the President has got to- the administration has to face.
So Heather, it seems like we're having one of those very Washington conversations. It's
there's the seductive power to the idea of a policy and a toolkit, that's a wonderful
phrase to an American ear. There's a toolkit to deal with atrocity. There's a toolkit to
deal with genocide, but really we're talking about politics, aren't we? So what's your
view of the politics here? I have been known to ban the phrase "toolkit"
from the stuff that we put out at the National Security Network because it is such an inside-the-beltway
construct. And I actually want to talk politics on the global level first because the Security
Council, for better or for worse, carries with it a degree of legitimation that nothing
else matches. But there are other routes to getting legitimation. We talked about the
role that NATO and the E.U. were able to play in Bosnia and Kosovo, and the big global political
challenge that I see in Syria is that we simply don't have a body, a structure, somebody that
can give legitimacy to the kind of coalition of the willing that Nick, you're talking about.
And I from a US national interest perspective, but also from the perspective of the legitimacy
of R2P, frankly, that if you see a coalition of the willing acting in Syria without some
ability to say we are representing the will of the people of the region, particularly
when it is so clear that you have some regional proxy conflicts going on. That that will fatally
undermine both an effort to end the conflict and deliver another blow to the norm of R2P.
And I think what's particularly challenging in the American context is that, you made
the argument and it's one that has great appeal to many people, that one of the reasons the
US should get involved in Syria is due to our geopolitical conflict with Iran. Now that
does not sit terribly well globally with our assertion that we would be getting involved
in Syria for humanitarian reasons. Nor does it sit well with the idea that we could be
a fair or neutral arbiter of what comes out afterwards. And this is a challenge that we
face. It's a very, very real challenge in Syria but it's something that we're always
going to face with R2P. And it's something that has made it very difficult in the US
political context because we live in a period for better, for worse where national security
is very politicized and that we have frankly as I said we are all the Rwanda generation.
And the generation that has come up after us, Susan everybody that writes for you, everybody
that works for me, everybody that works here - does not see, is not seared by Rwanda the
way we were and doesn't necessarily believe that there is such a thing as disinterested
humanitarian intervention, and we haven't figured out either to talk to our own elites
or to talk globally how to square that circle and say, "Yeah, we do have an interest with
respect to Iran and we have a humanitarian interest and both of those things are on the
table." And I see that as a really fundamental political problem for R2P globally.
I want to get to Nick but I also want to make sure that we get at least a few questions
because I'm sure everyone has a lot of questions for this great conversation to keep it going
and I'm sure you all have those. So start thinking what your questions are and Ambassador
Burns I'll let you respond to Heather. Well I think we're in agreement that countries
and governments act for a multiplicity of reasons, and it's the responsibility of the
president to think first and foremost about what's good for our own country but he also
has an obligation to think internationally and in this case I think you can use both
of those arguments in a compatible way. I don't think it's a contradiction to assert
that we have narrow interests, geopolitical interests, I should say as well as humanitarian
interests that should guide us here. Can I just add real quick? I think norms like
Responsibility to Protect help create momentum even internally within government systems
to raise the profile of these issues and the decisions that are made. It's the reason I
am a big supporter of the atrocity prevention panel. It takes away excuses, raises things
higher in the system earlier. I think that's all to the good. I also think advocacy groups
play an important role in this to provide some political constituency and sometimes
cover for these issues. Save Darfur and a lot of other groups played an important role
in raising profiles and but I would only add that ultimately it's a matter of national
will by the main actors in the international system. Whether they block things or whether
they push things. And how you weigh the cost of action and inaction and the real goal here,
the important goal, these types of interventions are seldom popular in any circumstance. Libya
was not popular. And the question is whether you have the type of leadership that can not
only determine what your responsibilities are but give you early enough options that
are realistic to make a real difference in these situations.
Those are important points. Okay questions? Right here you sir? We have a microphone and
give us your name and an ID, and please make it a question so we can move on. Thank you.
Hi, I'm Lieutenant Colonel Dave Buffalo. I'm the Military Advisor in the International
Organizations Bureau of the State Department, PhD student at George Mason and at one time
as a young lieutenant peacekeeper in Macedonia. The question is going back to the toolkit,
I know you hate the term "toolkit". But going back to the toolkit and what Syria has highlighted
for us or taught us. The atrocities prevention emerging doctrine states that as soon as you
where we have no diplomatic relations and no trade and no mil-to-mil exchanges, and
disposal should they want to prevent atrocities. But we had none. We come back to the whole
comment on the conditionality of the toolkit. Thanks for a great question.
very brave and really tried to use all of his personal tools that he had to try to go
using public pressure, using what pressure they could muster at the U.N., trying to use
tools is maybe not quite right but what it does show you as you said is that you don't
If you compare Syria with Kenya where neither side was really interested in taking their
parties didn't want to do to their country what Assad is willing to do to Syria. And
advocate of realpolitik, but in a case like Syria you have one side of the conflict, a
side, and that makes not just Assad's strategic calculations different but I think even more
a leader himself. We often talk about we would prefer to do negotiations in a circumstance
about Syria is you simply can't have two sided negotiations when one side believes that they
one side believes that they have an advantage. And that's something I think the United States
I would just say great question. We have the tools. It's just a question of strategy and
morning on this open letter that General Dempsey sent to the Congress. One would be arming
should the President decide to take that further. The bigger question is should the United States
and against his own people and to kill so many civilians and to drive them out of their
'91 and 2003, that might be the single most important thing you can do. But it was interesting
have the money? And I must say that when I was working both for the Bush 41 and 43 administrations
that question as General Dempsey did. I think the figure the Pentagon put out publically
Hi thank you, my name is Barbara Dellow. I wondered can the humanitarian efforts be evenhanded
You know I'm thinking of Syria, in particular, where there is plenty of cruelty to go around.
where there are ongoing investigations of various Rwandan officials in that case. So
of a cycle of atrocities in these cases where very few people have clean hands at the end.
allowed to be an obstacle for the prevention of civilian casualties. The primary goal here
commitment of Responsibility to Protect is the protection of civilians. And that should
to be the guiding principle in policy. We have a question here and then one there.
I want to refer to what former Foreign Minister Axworthy said about the architecture involved
at the U.N. function better? What can we do to mobilize forces that can get on the ground
to develop a standing army. We know the political objections. We know the caricature of the
to check out on the Ditchley website. He says, that for a long time now the great powers
with our own troops as you know. And it's been a particular weakness so I certainly
and very little fairness in how this all works out. The bloodiest place on earth is not Syria,
most Americans aren't aware of the dimensions of the conflict, but the United Nations is
thing. I guess I'd also say we can't always depend on the United Nations because if the
or as we did in Kosovo. So you really have to have the capacity of the central political
powers prevent justice from occurring. I will agree. I mean some of the challenge
of their armored vehicles operational right now in the peacekeeping force there. This
it is capabilities of regional organizations, the A.U. and others that I think would be
off now but increasing the capabilities of these institutions, I think, is very much
get other actors in the system that have military capabilities. I'm kind of hopeful that at
mandate. So it's not just, I mean I've been to Congo several times and the U.N. just sits
if some of those more aggressive regimens worked out. It would be a good option.
Hi my name is Paul Light. I'm an undergraduate student from Southern Alberta in Canada. I
side of the rebels and an increasing amount of infighting of the rebel factions. How is
counterbalance between the Qataris and the Turks and the Saudis and they make no distinction
And if it is to degrade the advantage of the Assad regime, does that not beg the question
I'm sure we can answer that in 30 seconds or so. Would anyone care to try?
conceptualizers of R2P and Mr. Axworthy was in the lead on that so we really owe Canada
summit. Second, I agree with you and one of the most complicated issues that the President
we arm them they turn those weapons on American or Canadian civilians or innocents elsewhere.
that you think share, in a basic general way our own values and our own strategic interests.
as to whether we're all in or whether we're going or be marginal players. The difference
or even contemplate intervening in Syria but not in other places? Because of this mixture
countries are all critical to us. It makes Syria important. And it gets back to the central
the rebels. And there are real risks of being passive and so the United States and Canada
I want to make two points and one is to go back to something Secretary Albright said
you fail some places is not a justification for not trying other places. And we have really
due to the existence of R2P. The Cote d'Ivoire would not have happened both if R2P hadn't
as a humanitarian catastrophe that all of us who have had a hand in not stopping should
of thousands of lives and keep societies together in other places. The point I would add or
strategic failure and it's one that our political system at this point makes almost inevitable.
is on the ground preventing, Mike as you said, revenge killings that equal in scope what's
region looks like that you don't have either ongoing Sunni -- ***'a civil war or the establishment
in democracy promotion? And until you can answer those questions, I actually don't think
perspective. I don't have too much to add. But I would
in the Syrian civil war and one of the tributes, I think, to Secretary Kerry's focus on this
to the right people. It's often a role that American plays. If we don't take that type
raise it shows why American needs to be involved, why it's important that it is involved, and
solve all the problems of the world." And that's true. It's frustrating and true. But
have come when we didn't try. And so our predisposition should be the priority of Responsibility to
Powerful note to end on. Thank you all very much and thank you to everyone in the audience.
Secretary Albright, Ambassador Williamson. We are done. Thank you for coming.