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Before we discuss objectives any further, let's get two other philosophical theories
about the status and morality on the table.
The second theory I want to discuss is moral relativism.
There are many forms of relativism, but the basic idea is that our moral opinions
are indeed true of false, but they're only true of false relative to something that
can vary between people. This way, my opinion that polygamy is
wrong might be true for me, but false for someone else.
How is that possible? Well, one extreme form of relativsm is
subjectivism. This is the view that are moral opinions
are relativized to each of our own subjective attitudes.
For example, the subjectivism says that by assertion, polygamy is wrong, it's true,
just is case I morally disapprove of polygamy.
But someone else's assertion that polygamy is not wrong would be true, just in case
they do not morally disapprove of polygamy.
Here's a rough analogy. It's like when I say, okra is yummy, and
you say, okra is gross. We might think that my assertion is true
for me, even while your assertion is true for you.
If morality is like this, it would explain why our moral opinions can seem very
personal and why they're intimately tied up with motivational to action.
However, this extreme form of relativism has a really hard time explaining the
possibility of genuine moral disagreement. Unlike the example about okra, when it
comes to polygamy, those who disagree are not generally prepared to chalk up their
disagreement to mere differences in taste. This motivated some philosophers to
endorse a less extreme form of moral relativism.
They claimed that truth of moral opinions is relative to culture.
Here's another rough analogy. When someone in Britain says one must
always drive on the left, and someone in the U.S.
Says one must never drive on the left, they are plausibly interpreted as making
completely consistent claims, that are simply relativised to different driving
rules. That is, the statement made in Britain is
true, relative to the driving rules in Britain, while the statement made in the
US is true, relative to the driving rules in the US.
Since these are not overlapping jurisdictions, there's no real dispute.
Of course, if the jurisdictions did overlap, there might be more than dispute.
There might be traffic accidents. The cultural relativist view about the
status of morality is similar. The relativist says that my opinion that
polygamy is wrong relative to my culture, but someone else's opinion that polygamy
is not wrong could be true relative to their culture.
Then there'd be no real conflict. To explain the possibility of moral
disagreement, the relatives who argue that sometimes, even often, people find
themselves in overlapping cultures. And in these cases, there is a real issue
to dispute. Which actions are morally right and wrong
relative to the culture sham of above people.
But other times, when cultures are not overlap, there's no real dispute, says the
relavists..