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This afternoon we’re going to try to have a look at this thing called beyond compliance
and what that might mean. So many times I hear mining companies talk about, oh we don’t
want to talk about compliance, that is old hat we’re beyond compliance we’re this
thing called best practice but what does that actually mean? And is it more than a state
of mind? I rather like umm this slide up here I am going through a lighthouse stage. These
things were built by engineers in the 19th century and this one’s off France. Does
anyone notice anything happening to that lighthouse? Anything unusual about it? Is someone going
to say there’s water? Audience; it’s getting wet.
Speaker; it’s getting wet, that’s right. By the way there are prizes at the end of
this presentation for those that speak the most and harmful, yet painful electric shocks
for those that don’t say anything. So jump on. I’m going to have a go at changing it.
These are the questions that I’d really like us to think about this afternoon. Because
if we’re contemplating what does it mean to be beyond compliance, what are the questions
that we are actually asking ourselves? Oh and by the way what is happening in that photograph?
Anything unusual? I got some laughter from here. What’s happening? Who is going to
tell me? Have we got a roaming mike somewhere? Audience; he’s about to get blown up
Speaker; he’s about to get blown up When I first saw this, I thought, this is
worrying and then I reflected on it and I thought this is a really good, this guy has
been trained and this is the trainer assessor who’s just got his cert four um and that’s
a really good sort of assessment tool. I don’t really know what the evidence would look like
hopefully there will be some. But the real issue we’ve got to ask onsite are really
these. Are events random? If events are random how do we control them? and what’s the point
of doing them with legislation? What is legislation anyway? How many pieces of legislation do
you have governing mining in New South Wales? Two? Four? Righto let’s just take the mining
act of 2002 ( Pointing into the audience) I think that you are going to tell us there
is another one later this afternoon hands up everyone who has heard of um the mining
safety legislation of 2002? Hands up. Beautiful, look at that go on keep them up keep them
up. Who’s actually held a copy in their hand? Keep your hand up if you have. Who’s
had a little browse through the legislation? You don’t count you wrote it. Who’s had
a little browse? Who now has read it from cover to cover and who is ready, Rob thank
you, (laughter erupts) to answer questions? Now, why has no one read the legislation?
And we’re talking about compliance, how can you be compliant if you haven’t even
read the rules for which you are going to be compliant and tested against? Just a little
question to take home. Is human behaviour random? Where’s a girl? Do you have any
doubts that male behaviour is random?(laughter) Audience (female); this is a bad audience
Speaker; this is a bad audience 3.40 Laughter through the room
Speaker; what from the female perspective? 3.44 laughter through the room
And what about engineering design? Amidst the audience; Coughing
Are we getting some certainty in numbers? Right. How many engineers have we got here?
Hands up. Right, I lost faith in all you lot when you told me that there were an infinite
number of infinities all of different sizes. How can that be? Go on add parallel lines
made infinity that’s got to be rubbish hasn’t it? And lastly what about safety system design.
Is that random or is it meant to have some sort of coordination some sort of system to
it? What does everyone think? Hands up if it’s random. Hands up if it’s
systematic For me I suspect from what I see it’s random.
There are paper systems out there that are beautiful unless you are a tree.
The only problem is, that it’s got absolutely nothing to do with what happens down the pit.
Why would that be? Because people are supposed to do their work under the rules set out in
a safety system. And what is a safety system? How should we think about it?
Points to the screen and clicks remote control Maybe these will give us some answer. These
slides are probably something you have already seen. But I really like them because this
expresses my life perfectly. Everyone see what is happening here? We have had a car
go in and than a nice little truck pulling it out, oh dear, so far so good but then we
have got another problem haven’t we? We try and solve that problem? Let’s do that,
so we got a big one, and look we have pulled a nice little car out and that is a good thing.
Up it comes. We happy? Beautiful job. Have we done our Take 5? We done our WRAC? Oh and
by the way even though bowtie analysis is the latest thing, I like the WRACs because
you’d only do the work wouldn’t you if your number came out as 11. Right?
Eleven is a beautiful number it’s a prime number isn’t it? It’s also a palindrome.
No matter how you look at it,it is double one. If it is more than 11 it’s too risky
isn’t it? So you wouldn’t do the job and if its below 11, 1-10 it just means the supervisors
have sat on the guys to get the numbers down and how do you multiply and subtract these
numbers on the five by five and the last question what is the quantivies difference between
11 and 12 in terms of risk? It’s a very, very good way of ranking risks
or hazards or whatever you want to call them onsite absolutely dreadful in determining
what is an acceptable level of risk and we’re not even going near that other nice little
juicy one of what is reasonably practicable. There is a scorpion sting in the concept in
the legislation around how do you understand reasonably practical?
(Looks and points to the screen and clicks remote control) Oh dear, um.
And here are the questions, is anyone surprised? Does this just speak about what life at work
is all about? What went wrong?
Audience; nothing Speaker; nothing?
Audience; It was setup Speaker; it was setup
Audience; particularly for the internet Speaker; particularly for the internet
Was the adverse event foreseeable? Because this really is when we begin to drill down
and do this thing called beyond compliance. You got to comply with the law otherwise Rob
would get very cross but if you think about it logically all the legislation is, is simply
a community opinion about how to manage risk and it comes from the history. There’s a
reason why coal mines underground have to have two shafts a secondary egress and that
is because of the new Hartley pit in England that killed, where over 240 people died and
there was only one shaft. But that’s another story. The key that I see time and time again
is the mischaracterisation of risk. In so many fatalities I’ve got my usual suspects
um and that is nearly always one - they have misunderstood the risk that they were trying
to manage. And when you see risk assessments that note as hazards the deputy and the safety
and health management system without controls do you think you’ve found out something
about how those people were really using the system? Were they competent? I don’t think
so. That’s the life that we actually have on a day to day basis on site. So what does
it mean to be beyond compliant? What we do know, is we can sort of think about risk as
assessment, management and communication. The only problem is how do you ever communicate
with another person and actually have some certainty that their understanding is the
same as ours. As a male we all know the rules. Wifey gets
flowers on her birthday, anniversaries … and look um, Oh women please can you not listen
to this because this is secret men’s business … anniversaries and birthdays. That’s
it no flowers any other time. Well I broke the rule. Up in Brisbane they’ve got markets
and lovely flowers. Karen loves orientals so I was feeling a bit romantic one day and
I brought her flowers. That’s okay. That was random. Then the next week, oh and I got
a kiss on the cheek and a lovely dinner and all the rest of it so that was good. The next
week I fell into the trap. I broke the rule. I brought flowers again I took them home and
I got the same reaction, you know, this is carrots and all that sort of stuff. She liked
the flowers and made sure that I knew she liked the flowers.
The third week, trying to ensure that I didn’t create a pattern, I didn’t buy flowers.
I got home and you know what was said to me don’t you? If you love me you would have
brought me flowers! And I’ve been stuffed ever since! Every Wednesday I’ve got to
buy flowers! (laughter) So we need to be thinking how we communicate
risk as much as we are putting so much time and effort into this other stuff about assessing
it and what are we assessing? What is risk? Why are we hung up on concepts of frequency
and consequence? Or probability and consequence? Because one of the difficulties as soon as
you start having probabilities is how do you deal with independent events? And each shift
is an independent event and the probabilities of some things go wrong just reset and um
we have one particular case in Queensland which was just a perfect example. People were
acting on their experience based on past probabilities of how the job should end up. The problem
was that it did not turn out as expected and a man died.
Risk is the chance of an error causing you harm where chance is an undesigned, or fortuitous
occurrence, or cause. It’s a different way of thinking about risk and it’s different
to how it’s usually set out in the legislation but think about it, that’s normally what
bites us and if you talk to the inspectors … how many times will you hear them say
that guys just didn’t plan for this, this was not what they were expecting. This happened
by chance and that’s their view. Now the inspectors may or may not agree with that
but often that is the emotional response that a lot of the, the guys have when there’s
been an adverse incident. In France what’s interesting there is that
they include vulnerability because their definition of risk looks at it very much from the community
perspective. And why vulnerability? If you put a dam near a town and the dam wall breaks
what happens to the town? So they want people to be actually thinking about vulnerability.
I wonder if we’re thinking about electricity whether we should include vulnerability. And
who would be the people that would be most vulnerable? Not electricians because they
wouldn’t know about electrons would they? How do you manage and avoid a hazard if you
don’t know the hazard exists? Isn’t that the electrical problem? Where is Lionel? He
was talking to me at lunch time. Where is he hidden? He’s got a new book coming out.
Lionel? (Audience: Right in front of you) There he is, he has a new book coming out
and that is what we are talking about he said of the greatest problems that I have got on
site is getting non-electrical people to understand that there’s a great big bitie out there
and they do not even know about it. The other thing that … Bernard, where is Bernard hiding
away? He is concerned about water and people getting electrocuted because they’re using
power tools near water. I don’t have a problem with that. What is wrong with water and power
tools? I just ask this. When we’ve got an electrocution, we like please in the Coroner’s
court to have clear entry burns and clear exit burns. If they’re lying in too much
water then we don’t get the nice exit burns and then we spend two days arguing about whether
or not they were electrocuted. That’s a terrible thing that I’ve just said but I’ve
said it to ram home a point. And that is: water and electricity doesn’t mix and we
know that and yet why am I hearing from the inspectorate that it is a big issue? I can’t
believe this, this is bizarre. What have you got in place? If an inspector
or someone else came out some, dreadful piece of work like me, and said show me how you
are separating electricity, people, and water. What are you going to show me? And when you
show it to me would you feel comfortable as the experts that you’ve really gone beyond
compliance? This has actually happened. Some people say
that it was a mistake. I happen to know it was modern art, that they are doing a building
up and this wee little forklift thingy um is going to hang out of the windows as a piece
of modern art. Risk is the effect of uncertainty on an organisation’s objectives. That’s
the latest Standard. Well I can reduce risk now to zero like that (clicks fingers) just
take it out of the organisation’s objectives. The Australian Standard I think has lost its
way if that is how we are thinking about safety. Um and of course this is for the engineers.
This is one of the earliest definitions. It is a mathematical definition and it appeared
in the Journal of risk analysis in about 1984. The only problem is what’s the relevance
of that definition in your workplace? Because the really, really hard question is why do
we have safety systems? What is the purpose of the safety system? Who is going to tell
me? Have you all got one onsite? Hands up everyone that does not have a safety
system? Right, well, you’ve all got one. Who is going to tell me what is the point
of the safety system? (17.07 walking along hand held out to the audience) What is the
purpose of, oh, no I am not going to ask you, you’lll know the answer … see lawyers
are evil you can tell, they wear coats. Audience: Prevent injury and harm
Speaker: Prevent injury and harm, who agrees with that? What’s the focus? If it is to
prevent injury and harm what are we looking at? Humans, aren’t we? Humans. Well how
does our system understand the human condition? What does it mean to have a system that is
individual person focused that will keep them safe. What does that mean?
From an operator’s point of view, something bad, or really nasty, could happen. And if
it does – No one will thank you! That’s the operators definition of risk.
It’s not up in the clouds. Oh and take fives: very supportive, beautiful gets people to
stop. And when was the last time you saw a Take five that said, well you know this friggin
drive it’s too narrow for the continuous miner so we will stop we’ll retreat um and
we will redo the mine plan. Anyone ever see a Take five like that? No. What do you get?
Be situationally aware. What does situationally aware mean? For God’s sake. What does that
mean? And how are you supposed to do it for 12 straight hours. It’s not going to happen.
This is from Jim Joy and I talked to him at play lunch and he said it was all right. This,
these were a couple of slides that he put into a presentation for quarries, and in Queensland,
quarries are the problem children. That’s where all of our major incidents and fatalities
are occurring. What I like about it is no longer are we simply
asking the question “Is the safety and health management system effective?” because if
you sit the CEOs down and say paint me a picture of an effective safety management system they
can’t. And if you can’t paint a picture how is anyone going to build it?
Maybe what we can tackle though is control effectiveness. Because if we’ve got a situation
that is an unacceptable risk and we say we will put in place a control and with that
control in place it’s now acceptable. What happens if the control fails? Who’s going
to tell me? Where are we? Back to where we started? Unacceptable risk.
The other thing is when we look at the swiss cheese can I ask you to remember this? The
holes aren’t stationary! The friggin holes constantly move. So just because a control
might contemplate a particular scenario, what happens if the scenario changes?
The piece of cheese changes it shape, the holes change. Do you then still have an effective
control? The issues I think from beyond compliance
is really a state of mind and we will have a look at a couple of slides in just a moment
that just develop that theme, but really what are we asking in a safety system? What are
we asking our guys at the floor to actually do? And what are we asking our CEOs to do?
And I would like to suggest we are asking them to simply answer these questions: What
could go wrong, how can it happen, what are the consequences, how likely is it to happen,
what can we do about it and lastly how can we check that what we are doing is actually
effective um and that last evaluation question or loop is usually missing. It’s quite remarkable
we don’t evaluate. We put in place controls and then walk away and I think a couple of
speakers before lunch said that. Why do we do that? Because we started the
day with a comment from Einstein, which is that if you’re doing the same things with
the same people expecting a different result you are an idiot! Well how do we know that
what we are doing is actually effective? We all know this, the purpose of risk management
to achieve a level of risk. But how do we develop effective controls? That’s the question
I would like you to really, really think about. Legislative compliance is really the basic
step. With a bit of luck and a fair breeze what the Act and the regs do, is they give
you not just a community standard but a way of dealing, in a decision-making context,
with the risk you’re trying to manage. But what would it mean to go further than what
the bare regs say? And lastly when we look at all incidents, we are always looking at
failure of defenses. You know it is one of the biggest things, What was the absent defense?
What was the failed offence? And nearly always that comes back to how we have categorised
risk and how we have thought about the controls. I have just finished a fatality in the Queensland
metals mine and ah, you know, it’s just the usual suspects. That was a fall into a
stope, right? Now a fall into a stope, as everyone who’s involved in metal mining
knows, um is a principal hazard. That, and roof fall, they’re the things that really
knock over metal miners and that the way they categorise risk in their risk register really
talked about people falling from scaffolding so before they even started, right up in the
higher elements of the safety system, they’d mischaracterised. Mis-diagnosed and everything
else that flowed from that risk register was wrong. The coal equivalent would be seeing
gas in the goaf as “a failure of containment” or gas in the mine or gas coming out of the
seam as a “failure of containment”. Would that be a great characterisation? Don’t
all speak at once. I’ll move on. Jim Joy has talked about this and it is really
quite critical because one of the things we are beginning to look at is more and more,
which I am very approving of frankly, is how do we recover if the control has failed? So
it’s actually looking at both sides. If you are running a wash plant fall from height
is always a possibility. Do you have things on site near the wash plant that can actually
do something to assist a person once they’re injured? Or alternatively, lessen the consequence
of the the adverse event ? What would have stopped this from happening?
Who’s going to tell me? (Audience: high bridge?) High bridge. Yep it’s a nice story
isn’t it? Is it human error? Come on, hey we always find the human don’t we? There’s
gotta be a human. It’s his fault. That’s beautiful because it protects our system.
We don’t have to ask the hard question! How did management make a mistake? How did
the safety system allow this to happen? We’ve got a bad egg! If we get rid of the driver
that won’t happen again will it? Am I right? Beautiful, who said no? You get a prize, Rob,
this man down here gets a prize. So how can we fix this to make sure it doesn’t happen
again? Audience: Put in a system in place so that
it can’t. Audience: With that it’s obvious he didn’t
know the height of his load and he went through a bridge that was low. If we plan the route
that we’re going to drive and we know what bridges are on that route, we wouldn’t drive
down that road. Speaker: Yes or some other way where you know
the bridges are at least 3m so you make sure the load can’t go above so we are looking
at some sort of engineering control along with just simple good planning. From a female
perspective, can males plan? Female audience: I’m not going to comment.
Speaker: My firm view is that women were put on this earth to manage males. I don’t want
to steal the thunder of my friend who is going to be talking about the legislation, but realistically
what Rob and the inspectorate and the regulators, New South Wales, Queensland and everyone is
trying to do, is we’ve got to develop community set of standards that have developed over
time and we try and prevent adverse incidents but it is also worker’s compensation and
there is also rehabilitation. So we are trying to move further and further into a statuatory
scheme that is person focused, and promotes productivity and not having illnesses in the
workplace, or accidents in the workplace. So we can think of the legislation very much
as a community standard and the community, as we know, will hold people accountable to
the standard. Equally though, we can think of the legislation, we can think of statutory
positions, we can think of the advisory council and these other organisations as being part
of the safety structures of the industry. And it is quite important that everyone works
together. Time brings change. That of course is the
Sydney Harbour Bridge um that was built when? Does anyone know? About
Audience: 1930-32 Speaker 1930-32. Does anyone notice anything
curious on these photographs? Audience: no opera house
Speaker: That’s right but look .. just show you. Can you see these fellows here? They’re
electrical engineers, you can tell because they are wearing hats, who’ve gone up to
the top there to make sure that they are putting in the lightning bolts in the right spot and
there’s old mate down the hole, as you can see doing a bit of work. There’s not any
fall restraint or anything as far as you can see. Just not acceptable any longer. It was
though then. Of course having not read from cover to cover your own legislation it would
be fairly curious if I asked you whether you were aware of all of the pieces of legislation
that actually govern health and safety in NSW and that includes some of the Commonwealth
ones. It’s a huge list. And this again is the community trying to say: “this safety
gig is something that is critical and important”. We are getting more and more caught up with
ALARA and ALARP. Iis there a difference? In New South Wales it’s all about reasonably
practicable but bear this in mind, and I am sure the speaker later this afternoon will
be touching on at least one of these concepts, that reasonably practicable is defined in
the legislation. You’ve basically got to do a risk assessment first and then after
that you can consider cost against the risk of litigating it. And all the court cases
are going to be about whether or not it was reasonably practicable to take the steps that
people said you should have taken. I won’t dwell too long on that.
What is important though where does all this legislation stuff flow from? And curiously
it comes from safety science and that is a driver again for the law of torts particularly
negligence and negligence is a driver of safety science but also statuatory safety and health
legislation. And all of this really can be traced back to two concepts. One is the employer’s
duty as it was said in the House of Lords, which is the like, the High Court of England,
in 1937: a safe system of work, the appointment of competent workers, fit for purpose equipment
and properly maintained equipment. And that’s where the history comes in. And you see the
wheel on the right? Anyone heard of the NERTNY Wheel? That’s straight out of safety science.
And what’s the difference between what the NERTNY Wheel tells us is important about work
processes and what we see in Clyde, Coal and English?
And I’d like to suggest there is no difference. And what about the safety legislation? If
I was to say to Rob does your Act and your Regulations cover trying to get people to
have a safe system of work, you would say? Yes! What about the appointment of competent
people? Yes. Fit for purpose equipment and properly maintained? Yes. And lastly, which
does not come quite on this slide, proper supervision? The key in my view to keeping
people safe is the quality and the competency of your supervisors. Front line. The difficulty
that we’ve got though, is, as engineers, if we trying to understand the problem what
do we do? We go and down. It’s Newtonian. Because we are not like Mr Newton because
in his Principia Mathematica he wrote it just like Euchlids Elements with the same sort
of approach. The difficulty is that whilst that is good for understanding complex machinery
it does not help us understand systems which are complex and we need to think about things
in a different way so as we move to notions of beyond compliance we start to need to contemplate,
how do we think in systems? And, it cooks your noodle. Get a book on systems theory
and get the sherry out cause you will need it. I can live with this proposition: A causes
B. That’s nice isn’t it? Beautiful. What’s the difference between A causes B, and B follows
A? Oh, well, it ain’t got no causal connection but what do you need to take a following statement:
B follows A though to a causal statement of A causes B? What do you need for causation?
It’s one of the problems when we start contemplating root cause. What’s a root cause? That presupposes
one commencing domino and I think that theory came around in the 1930s and it’s blown
up because there are usually multiple causes. That’s the whole idea of (?) tap roots and
all of those sort of things. The other thing I suspect about systems is
I have noted in the second part of this slide. The nature, purpose and operation of the whole
is always different from and more than the sum of its unassembled collection of parts,
for the philosophers in the room it’s a Gestalt. It’s so totally different and that
adds an element of complexity when we are trying to contemplate how do we keep people
safe at work. I would like to suggest to you, but from a
systems perspective, that’s what you’ve got and it is always about faster, better,
cheaper. That’s what the companies want. That’s what the accountants are keen on.
Aand accountants are special people. Love ‘em. To go through life finding beauty in
the left hand column of figures adding up and equalling the right hand column, is pretty
special. You’ve gotta admit it is pretty special. What always gets caught is safety
and the boundary is always decreased to the limit. Does anyone see that on their sites?
It’ that inherent tension between productivity and safety and cutting corners and most safety
systems, unless there is a lot of energy put in them will gradually drift into failure.
And that is one of my usual suspects. They may have started okay but five years later
they are not worth the paper they are written on and that then leads us to the bigger problem
and this is about beyond compliance. The organisation that you work for will have operational missions
and purpose. That’s up the top there. Safety and health, reputation, legal, consumers,
financial, cultural, they are all constraints or restraints on achieving the goal that the
organisation was created to do. How am I going for time? One minute left? Oh gee whizz I
will need two. Something to think about and we’re going
to go forward, what I would like you to think just a little bit about is how do you go down
into the iceberg of thinking? Currently we react, and that’s normally where legislation
sits. How are you going to go about transforming and redsigning your system? I will just move
on a bit. What happened there? There is a big truck
that’s a burnt truck. Have we got a systems failure there? Cause
we can create one. Or we can just simply say the guy made a mistake with his hook. When
you’re thinking about your safety system, look critically at it because we are always
wise in hindsight. After the event it is very, very easy to see what went wrong and normally
we say things like “the bloody fools, this was so obvious”. The true answer is: No,
it wasn’t. They wouldn’t have done it if it was. I have heard lots this morning
talked about standard operating procedures, the difficulty is that they tend not to work.
And this is a lovely story of the four inch flight where the work instructions said with
the lower cable on the rocket, after the rocket goues up, cut off the burnt bit and put another
plug on. They did that until that plug and that cord was too short and the way the rocket
worked is that the top cord had to go first, then the second cord second. If it went the
other way around it turned the motors off and that was the end of the thrust. This little
punter managed to fly for four seconds four foot and this little cockpit at the top was
found 100 metres up the way. And you can say to yourself how is it that people can be doing
this? This is absolutely ridiculous? I should finish on this slide but I am going to talk
about this one and then I am going to go through the second last slide than I will stop. So
with your indulgence I will be one minute maybe two. What I want to tell you is this:
if I am talking to the guys at the face I will simply say: “listen buttercups, see
this one here? Natural variability? It will kill you”. To engineers, I say: “See this
one up here? Kknowledge? Uncertainty? In both consequence and probability that will kill
others”. And that’s the big fundamental difference between technical knowledge and
being in a supervisory or a management role in a workplace as opposed to being down in
the pit doing the actual work. And the movement which is, and there’s another example of
that, we expect work to come out in a particular way. It’s the outliers, those that are couple
of standard deviations out from the mean. Just things weren’t expected that will kill.
What would have stopped that from happening? Does anyone notice anything unusual in that
photo? Oh, please say you do, it is my favourite photo. Comes with me everywhere. Darth Vader!
This is an event that happened very recently in the Surat Basin and the pictures tell the
story. Compliance is how you actually go about strapping these things down. And this is gas
and petroleum. And no-one was hurt in this, may I say, and each company would do about
750,000 kilometres a month dragging bits of pipe all over the outback of Queensland. The
compliant response is to retrain the workforce on proper laying of the straps. Going beyond
compliance is actually redesigning the cab and the back of the truck so that friction
is your friend and you stop the pipes from beginning to move so this can’t happen again.
So beyond compliance is about how you might think around solving the problem.
This is Bernard’s water problem and again it is the same question that Jim Joy addressed
you on, how do you consider the effectiveness to your controls? I think these slides will
be up on the webpage if you want to watch it.
And the last slide I’d like to share with you is something that I am very keen and encourage
inspectorates to look at. It actually comes from the model Work Health and Safety legislation
of the Commonwealth. I assume that it’s going to be introduced or it has been introduced
in New South Wales. It certainly has been introduced in Queensland. It’s an ongoing
obligation for accountants and others in management roles to be able to demonstrate due diligence.
It’s an ongoing obligation such that if an inspector or someone calls and says how
are you doing with due diligence in your workplace you must be able to prove that you understand
the nature of the operations and associated risks and hazards that is a positive obligation
on everyone including accountants and others who haven’t got technical knowledge. Secondly
that you have an understanding of resources and processes, knowledge of work health and
safety matters timely response to incidents and process for legal compliance. But this
is all now beginning to look very much like accountants have to go down the pit on a certain
number of hours per week or per month. And if they don’t how are they showing that
they’re actually exercising due diligence? It’s something that really is trying to
push accountability for safety up from the operational level into the managerial ranks
but ultimately the question that you need to go home with is: Is being beyond compliance
more than a state of mind? Thank you.