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Now that we understand a little bit about how our
minds work and the mental tendencies we employ on a
daily basis, let's try to apply it to a fire scenario.
While we go through this, it may be helpful to refer
to the Human Factors Barriers to Situation
Awareness and Decision Making in your IRPG.
On July 7, 2007 at 7:45 p.m., lightning started a
fire near Hot Springs, South Dakota.
The origin was located at the north end of Alabaugh
Canyon, just below the Pine Shadows housing subdivision.
The weather conditions in the southern Black Hills
were unusually hot and dry.
Al Stover was the local Fire Management Officer
and was called in as the IC.
He entered Alabaugh Canyon from the north and
proceeded south towards the fire.
He found the fire working its way upslope to the
east, and down canyon to the south.
They anchored the heel of the fire in the bottom of
the canyon while air attack and two
single-engine air tankers made drops on the east
ridge of the canyon to stop the fire from going
into the subdivision.
The fire continued to increase in intensity as
it moved up and across the east wall of Alabaugh Canyon.
The fuels were heavy on the slopes with
very low crown base heights. After coordinatig
the initial plan, the IC drove back out of
the canyon and around to the Pine Shadows Subdivision.
Because the IC happened to live in this subdivision
he was also getting fire updates from his wife on his cell phone.
The fire worked its way south on the east side of
the canyon and made a big run out of the canyon
toward the south end of Pine Shadows.
By 2048, the IC had local volunteer fire department
personnel in the Pine Shadow Subdivision and had
requested a Type 3 Incident Management Team.
Al : We're in the Pine Shadows Subdivision.
These are the first two houses that were really impacted
by the fire run up out of the canyon from this direction here.
This is the subdivision that I live in.
I live on the north end of the subdivision.
This house here is where my daughter was just prior
to the fire coming out of the canyon... very intense fire.
We had a fire whirl hit the back side of that
house and melted the siding off of it...and
just spectacular fire behavior coming up out of
the canyon behind this house here.
Ted : As a member of the local community and a homeowner
in this subdivision, Al obviously had more on his
mind than just being the IC.
Let's listen to Al talk about how the elements of
human factors played out in his decision making and
what lessons he learned from this experience.
Al : I've never had this happen to me before, but I've
been on fires where structures have been lost, at risk.
A house is a house until it's your house.
And that's the thing.
When my wife called me up...when I asked her if
she could see anything in the canyon because of the concern.
She calls me up and says it's right below the house.
It's different at that point.
Air attack...I talked with them, and they said it's
gonna hit the structures very hard.
These were my friends, my neighbors.
If it was somewhere that I didn't have such close
ties, it's lots easier to make those decisions objectively
versus trying to separate the emotional ties to things.
It's very similar to doctors. You don't operate on a relative.
You can't make that decision-making process
and things like that when you are attached to the patient.
If you find yourself in that kind of a situation,
probably the best thing to do is get out of that
command position whether it's operations or IC and
become an advisor to someone else.
Turn it over. Sit in the truck with them.
You can brief them with your local knowledge and
things like that, but they can make that objective
decision and not have the emotion that it's
impossible for you to separate yourself from.
Ted : After assigning resources to protect the first two
houses, the IC moved south, along a dozer line that had
been completed from the subdivision to the Flyway Road.
Local fire department personnel burned out the dozer line.
At approximately 2130, the IC ordered a
Type 2 Incident Management Team.
The IC arrived at a large safety zone on the north
end of Flyway Road where he met with more incoming
resources and gave a briefing.
Al : Here's what we call the fly-away safety zone.
We had moved from Pine Shadows subdivision.
There was some line put in with the road grater, cat,
and burnout with local fire department engines;
and we had black all the way to here.
When we got here, we started to gather up with some of the
overhead and fire department's local resources that were here.
We pushed this safety zone immediately with the
dozer-get some bare ground in.
This became basically the ICP for quite some time.
The main concern was getting people out of here.
This thing came out of the canyon very rapidly...
Of course at night, some of the residents are sleeping.
It's more difficult to find the houses.
Just the sheer number of houses that needed to be
evacuated very quickly was a problem.
Kind of an objective was to try to keep herding the fire
south and keep it as close to the canyon rim as we could.
If we could work our way through the grassy nobs
and use the lighter fuels with some dozer line and burn
that out, we'd eliminate fire from impacting more structures.
Eventually we're gonna end up down at the highway.
The backup plan-we're gonna have to back off to
the Flyway Road and take it all the way to the
highway, burning out around structures and
doing the best that we could.
Ted : Before the plan could be implemented, a spot fire
was seen on the east side of the Flyway Road.
Also at the briefing were Grant Gifford and Jay Kurth,
both of whom had been dispatched as Division Supervisors.
Jay Kurth was then reassigned as Operations Section Chief, Type 3.
Grant : While we were briefing, this patch of timber right
here is where the spot was. About that time,
we started getting impacted with winds;
and this spot takes off.
And at the same time, we start getting fire coming
up out of this canyon, and it's torching this tree,
and throwing additional spots across over here.
Jay : We had come up with a plan to try and put dozer line
along Alabaugh Canyon and keep the fire from coming
up out of the canyon. And that came out and put us in
a position of trying to hold the Flyway Road.
Grant : Last ditch effort trying to catch the spot, there's
a road blade here; and I grabbed it.
I cut the fence...this is that maintainer's line
where they took off trying to catch the spot.
Jay : The spot fire came across the safety zone and over
Flyway Road and got hit by the wind and immediately
was going too fast even to be caught with the road graters.
From that point, it put us entirely in a defensive situation.
We knew that we had structures throughout the area.
Ted : The fire was increasing in size and intensity in all divisions.
It broke through containment lines and
spotted throughout the Pine Shadows Subdivision.
It continued to move south down the Alabaugh Canyon
and was now spotting across Flyway Road.
The one radio frequency assigned to the incident
was completely clogged with traffic and "chaos"
was how many of the firefighters described the situation.
Al : Once we had the spotting and the adverse weather.
I gathered everyone up in this area-into the safety zone...
the hand crews and some of the engines.
Same thing was going on, on the other
divisions-they were all gathering up into safety zones.
Grant : I called this...I don't know what structure
engines were on it...at this first house and told
them they were gonna get impacted shortly with fire.
They pulled out.
Me and Jay were sitting in the safety zone, and you
could see there's another house just down here on
top of the ridge.
And you could see the lights from the volunteer
fire departments that were set up on it.
You could see that the fire was going to impact it before long .
Al : Sent the OPS and DIVS...went on a scouting
mission to see what the new plan...what options we
had for the new plan because the old plan was
no longer gonna work with the spotting.
Ted : Because the Operation Section Chief was less
familiar with the area, the Division Supervisor
got into the Operations Section Chief's vehicle as
they started back down Flyway Road.
One of the Forest Service engine captains took over
the Division Supervisor's command vehicle and would
shortly thereafter be promoted to Task Force Leader.
Role changes on the fireline are very common
and necessary during emerging incidents.
However, they can also act as one of the barriers to
situation awareness.
Throughout the rest of this scenario, we will
periodically visit with Dr. Ted Putnam to hear how
various elements of human factors have the potential
of working their way into our thought processes.
Dr. Ted Putnam : Whenever you're given a job,
your mind tends to focus on that.
And because of autopilot, then you start to lock in
attached to whatever that job is.
If you change jobs rapidly like in a fire,
you have a lot of experience.
It's easier to do it, but there's always kind of a
little inertia lag where part of you is still
trying to do the old job and the new you is trying
to pick up and see the different perspective.
And if you don't change fast enough, usually your
job changes to take on more responsibility.
And if you hang on to the old responsibility, that
interferes with seeing the bigger picture you're now
assigned to provide leadership under.
Ted : As the Operations Section Chief and the Division
Supervisor left the safety zone, the first house was
now unstaffed and being overrun by fire.
Down the road, local volunteers were coating
the second house with a fire protection gel.
The Task Force Leader and two engines would
eventually go down Flyway Road and end up at house #3.
The IC stayed in the safety zone for a short
time and then made his way back over the dozer line
to assess the fire run through Pine Shadows Subdivision.
The Operations Section Chief and Division Supervisor
arrive at the second house to check on the volunteers.
When it became apparent that the fire was making a strong run
towards their position, they ordered the volunteers to leave.
Jay : Interagency cooperation is very important.
Familiarity with who you're working with buys you a lot.
Grant : We told the structure resources that it wasn't a good
place to be and it was time to pull out... and had no luck.
Jay : It took a lot for Grant and I to convince them
that it was time to go primarily because they
didn't know who we were. They didn't know what
our authority was on the incident and stuff.
One of the engines-the gel truck-knew us.
We said time to go, and he bugged out immediately.
It took a little convincing to get the
other two engines to pull out and head out of the area.
It think some of that human attachment was there.
It typically is with the volunteer fire department
engines because they're committed to a structure.
That's their role.
And so a lot of times in wildland incidents, when
you give them a specific house to defend, they're
gonna defend that house.
The thing that got us the opportunity to break
through that was when we mentioned the Structure
Protection Specialist, Rick Lehman, who was from
Rapid City Fire Department as an Assistant Chief.
They knew him; and then when I said he wants you to come
down and tie in with him, they were more than happy to respond.
Ted : Another barrier to situation awareness listed
in your IRPG is the stress reaction of target
fixation, or locking into a course of action.
Let's listen to Dr. Putnam share his thoughts on this element of human factors.
Dr. Putnam : Volunteer fire departments historically
have a lot more attachment to the local homes.
It's in their community and the results of whether
it burns or doesn't, affects them more
personally than if you're from out of the area.
Once you start to prep a house, you get more and
more involved in it; and therefore, you have
more ownership, more attachment, more resistance to leave.
So as the DIVS and night ops start to leave,
they look back and nobody's moving from the volunteers.
So they go back this time get right up in their face
and said they had to physically grab a hold of them
and pull them to communicate staying isn't an option.
You need to leave and leave now.
And it could be with that break and what they would
have done if they'd stayed on the autopilot response
of protecting the house.
Shaking them up literally shakes up both their body
and their mind, and now they have a chance to look anew.
Ted : After evacuating house #2, the Operations Section
Chief and the Division Supervisor started down
the road to the third house.
They were unaware that fire had made its way
further south in the bottom of Alabaugh Canyon
but had not crested the ridgeline.
As they made their way to the third house, they had
to stop four different times because fire was
jumping back and forth across the road.
By this time, the Task Force Leader with the two
Forest Service engines had arrived at the third house.
Jeremy Dalman : It was extremely dark. You couldn't see.
What we were actually calling an adequate safety
was actually a really big safety zone.
It was a big...probably about a 5-acre field.
But as we got in there, we determined we were gonna
fire out around the structure.
And once we had started that, we were just...we as
the two engines that were in there and myself had
come up with a plan that we were just gonna fire it out,
let the main fire pass; and then we'd move out as needed.
Ted : The Task Force Leader had the crewmembers run a
strip burn around the house, up the driveway,
across the road, and back to the house.
Just after midnight, the Operations Section Chief
and Division Supervisor pulled onto Cascade Springs Road.
The conditions were dark and very smoky.
Grant : As we rounded the corner coming into the third
house, we weren't gonna stay on it.
We were gonna grab everybody and run.
From here, my initial impression was there was a
lot of heat in and around the structure even with
their fire on the ground.
It had stayed on the ground but you could tell
that there was a lot of heat built up, and I
didn't know if the house would make it.
As I approached, we got closer to the house, I
guess my opinion started to change.
To me it looked like they'd done a really good
job keeping the fire to the ground.
It was now moving away from the structure.
And then you get into the whole deal that these two
engines I'd worked closely with over the years.
I had a higher comfort level with.
Jay : Things were doing really well.
And I remember Grant and I talking thinking with the
fire that they had done, the only thing that was
gonna get the house, we thought, was direct flame
impingement rolling over out of the canopy and onto the house.
The canopy was close enough to that house to
where that could have occurred pretty easily.
Grant : Operations and me talked and we pretty much
instantly knew that we needed to at least try to
fire the remaining patch of this timber or island
out; and then we'd pull off and go to the next house.
Jay : We knew that if things changed, we were standing
in a big safety zone-stubble grass
surrounded by black underneath it.
And the opportunity that we were talking about and
the burnout that we were talking about was 30-40
feet long up and then right back down a 5-10% slope.
Grant : Right here is where Operations and myself had stopped
and were talking, looking at what we wanted to fire out.
Basically, we just wanted to take a strip up and
then follow this natural little gentle slope back
out to this point and wrap it; and we were gonna pull the resources and go.
A minute to a minute and a half it should have taken.
Ted : Once again, let's refer to the Human Factors Barriers
to Situation Awareness and Decision Making in the
IRPG, and listen to Dr. Putnam discuss the
human elements that may have played a part in this situation.
Dr. Putnam : And when they come in and all the people there...
this is the first time everybody's...
they're all Forest Service people.
And so there's more likely to be bonding.
And these are people you work with off and on anyway.
So it's like everybody's...you know,
are people you know, you understand.
So when you come into that environment, then you see
what your own people are trying to accomplish.
It's easier to relate that, so you shift more
naturally into the position of saying, "Well,
what is it they're trying to accomplish here?"
They're trying to burn out around that house.
So they've gone from this conclusion that they saw
so clearly with the volunteers.
They come in with their own people, buy into what their
own people are doing, and now what can we do to help.
Ted : By this time, the Task Force Leader was in
the safety zone with the Forest Service engines 663 and 664.
Josh Lange, a crewmember of 663, had completed the
original burnout around the house and was asked to
burnout some mowed grass around a travel trailer
parked on the northeast side of the driveway.
Josh Lange : After we did the burnout around the house,
I went and talked to Dalman.
He asked me to go and strengthen the line on the
east side of the house by putting down some more fire.
But the grass in that area was mowed grass, so it
wasn't carrying fire at all.
So I started making my way back towards the engines,
and that's when I ran into Grant and Jay.
Ted : When the Division Supervisor and Operations
Section Chief arrived at the house, they got out of
the vehicle to assess the situation.
In doing so, the Division Supervisor left his radio,
personal gear bag, and gloves in the truck.
Dr. Putnam : And so when they jump out,
their first thing that they're engaged in is doing the
assessment-should we do anything like that or not.
And in that role, the culture is like when
you're getting out of a rig as a supervisor,
you're gonna make a quick assessment.
You don't put on your PPE because it's gonna be
quick, you're gonna jump back in the rig, and you
don't want to be buckling and unbuckling your gear.
So that was one of the things that they were gonna do.
Then they decide that the thing to do is to shift gears now,
and they need to hurry up and get some more fire on the ground.
So they have a crewmember nearby...ask the
crewmember to come up and the DIVS now says that
he'll take that person and show them where to lay the
fire and watch-actually be a lookout for that person
because the main fire is still on its way and gonna
be there fairly soon. Time's of the essence.
But at that moment in time, the DIVS shifted
from being a planner where the original plan-pull
everybody out-the next plan is maybe to lay that strip.
As soon as he shifts gear, he should have had the realization
that I'm no longer a supervisor. I'm now going out.
I'm gonna go tactical and implement the action which
is to lay this strip of fire.
So he loses that focus-it's okay to jump out without
your PPE for the one thing but not for the second.
Jay : But the one thing that I didn't look at or didn't
recognize in my mind was I was focusing on Grant's
face and talking about the things that were going on.
I never looked at him physically.
Do you have your fire shelter in your pack?
Do you have your gloves and all of your PPE?
It's something that just never registered in my mind.
Dr. Putnam : And the reason that you failed to note it is
because autopilot takes you...
shifts you into that new role.
And earlier, I mentioned when you shift into a new
role, a lot of times things get lost because
part of your mind's tugging at you to be what you were.
And what's that's really saying is that part of
that limited cognitive capacity is being eaten up
by the role shift, and so you have less awareness to
look at what the new situation is.
And because they're parked in a safety zone, there
really isn't any concern from the main fire.
And because there isn't concern from the main
fire, part of that may have transmitted into when
the DIVS goes up into the timber...that the fact
that the big safety zone is right there-only 40-50
feet away-that we're okay here.
And he doesn't...then there's no plan for if
anything unexpected happens...maybe a false
sense of security due to that huge safety zone.
Ted : The Division Supervisor instructed the crewmember
from 663 to follow him into the timber to
complete the secondary burnout while the
Operations Section Chief went to the safety zone to
talk to the Task Force Leader.
Jay : From the time that Grant and Josh started the burn
operation, I stood there long enough to make sure
that the fire that they were putting on the ground
was sucking over and into the initial burn out.
When I saw that was occurring, I moved over to
talked to Jeremy Dolman, the TFLD, and let him know
that we had grabbed his crewmember and that they
were doing a real short operation and were gonna
be coming back into the safety zone.
Ted : The Division Supervisor and the crewmember started
the burnout and took note of a small spot fire in
the meadow at the edge of the timber.
They were still unaware how far the fire had moved
south in the bottom of Alabaugh Canyon.
Grant : At this point, Josh is having a hard time keeping
his torch lit due to winds. Everything's sucking in,
pulling into the fire around the house well.
That was the first time I turned back. I was ahead of Josh.
As we progressed, his torch starts staying lit;
and I'd say somewhere in this vicinity, I turned
around again, and I'm noticing more of a
flanking out pattern from his firing.
It's sucking in still, but it's wanting to flank away from it.
As we continue, I'm seeing a massive glow coming out
of the canyon. It's very evident at this point in time.
And as I'm starting to get over here, I'm can see
fire on the back side of the ridge.
The fire around the house is really hot at this
point, so I know that there is no option to cut to the left.
Jay : The wind goes slack at some point in there, and I recognize that.
And then open the door to my vehicle and all of the
sudden a wind gust hit us and about knocked the...
blew the door out of my hand and I thought it
was gonna blow the door off the car.
So when I looked up, there was an exponential change
in fire behavior that had occurred.
Grant : As I entered, there was a really small spot kind of
off at the point here in this timber.
And between our fire and it, I think it just button
hooks around us; and at that point, we're cut off.
As I look out in the meadow, I got a continuous
line of fire out in the meadow.
Most it I'd say is 4-6 foot flame lengths.
There's a finger that jetted back that has like 2-foot
flame lengths, and it isn't with the rest of the front.
And you can basically draw a straight line up under the slope-
this little slope here. And at this point,
we got 4-6 foot flame lengths all the way underneath us.
And that's when I turned and I grabbed Josh and I
said, "We gotta make a run for it now.
Get rid of your torch. We're running for it."
I pulled his radio out of his chest harness, and I called
Operations-told him we'd been cut off; we gotta make a run for it.
That was the only transmission I made.
At that point in time I thought our best chance was
going for the finger with 2-foot flame lengths through the grass.
I didn't want to stay in this timber patch. I knew that.
And I could tell that whatever was coming up out
of the canyon wasn't going to be a good place to be either.
Josh : When he stopped and he was like,
"We are going to start a different direction."
I could kind of tell the urgency in his voice.
That we need to go, and we need to go now.
But at that time, it was just like alright,
we'll be out of here. We'll find a way out.
At that point, not really too nervous about what was going on.
I was just following my officer at that time.
Didn't feel uncomfortable about it at all.
Grant : Right here is where I knew there...I could see there
was a good straight shot, and we start running.
And as we come out, we're at a good jog and the
wind's starting to pick up a bit.
As we progressed towards that direction, the urgency just
built faster and faster every couple of seconds.
We started moving at a quicker pace.
We're still headed for this finger that's right
out here that has 2-foot flame lengths on it.
Right out in here I'd say is 4-6 foot still in the
grass-unburned, knee-high grass.
Somewhere right in here is where I feel a really
strong down burst, and I grab Josh by the shirt
collar, and I told him...
He felt the down draft, and so like he said grabbed a
hold of me and said, "Alright, let's hold here for a second."
"We gotta see what it's gonna do." I didn't even get the words out of my mouth.
Instantly this is now 30-foot flame lengths laid running at us.
At that point, my focus really went into
concentrating on what Grant wanted me to do and
to follow his orders to a "T."
At that point, it was about keeping track of
where he was at because that was where I was going.
I just did a quick scan, turned around.
And just about where this tree is right here, there's 4-6 foot flames.
And I told him, "That's where were going. We gotta run through it."
And at this point, it's a dead sprint.
This is chasing us as quick as we're moving.
He was right in front of me; and we're running for
our lives at that point.
We're putting everything we've got into it.
We run towards the flame front; he jumps and covers
his face and I do the same and we end up in the black.
And at that point, he has me get low because smoke
is extreme at that point.
It's tough to breathe...little to no visibility.
Once we come through it...to me it was dark, extremely smoky.
I couldn't see all this timber.
I thought I was standing in the meadow.
I felt that it was gonna be a hot, smoky safety zone at this point.
We might have been here a minute or two at tops.
And there was a tree that torched over here and we
got some radiant heat from it and we felt the embers
hitting us with the wind.
And at first it donned on me...I thought it was
weird because I originally thought we were in the
grass-we were in a meadow.
And at that point in time, I grabbed Josh; and I told
him "We'll just bump over out of the way here just
get away from the radiant heat of that tree."
We started moving around.
And he was just keeping us away from any of the
radiant heat off any of the trees that were torching.
At that point, I was like...we'll probably just
ride it out right here.
And then in a matter of seconds, that plan changed.
We get here. I get Josh back low on the ground.
We are maybe here for five seconds and just an
instant blast of hot air.
I could feel the skin on the right side of my face.
I was standing about like this.
Josh is right here by my knee.
And as I feel the skin start to burn on my face,
I can look over and I can see a huge wall of glow;
and it's starting to raise in the canopies.
Then suddenly we got a heat blast; and we both could feel it.
And at that instant, that's when Grant said,
"Get your shelter out. We gotta deploy."
I yell at Josh to deploy his shelter and I say,
"I'm burning. I'm burning."
And at that point, I cover my face and my airway.
As soon as I bring my hands up around my face,
the skin on my hands starts to run is how I describe it.
It felt like somebody was pouring water off.
You could just feel the skin bubbling and coming off.
At that point in time, it was weird.
There's this surge of adrenalin saying,
"Oh...you're burning" at this point.
I had this immense power in my legs telling me it was time to run.
And as I was burning, I could remember almost a
football stance-chopping my feet-just instantly wanting to run.
But my mind's telling me, "No, you're not running.
You gotta stay put."
Then the adrenalin kicks in a hundred fold right there.
You're like, alright, you're actually doing it.
This is life or death right here.
It's...we're getting in this or we're not.
And he's struggling getting his pack off.
He's in the kneeling position.
He struggles with the top buckle, and he can't get
the bottom buckle undone. He finally gets it.
He opens his pack; and as he gets the shelter,
he's pulling his gloves off.
And he tries to do the strap around the shelter
and he misses it and it won't pull.
I honestly don't remember actually taking off my
gloves until revisiting the site and seeing my gloves there.
And I think it was because the mobility-trying to get the tab off.
He finally gets it. And as he flops it out...with the New
Generation fire shelter he missed the left and the
right hand tabs, and he couldn't get the shelter open.
I reached down because I could see him,
and I told him he missed the hand tabs.
I grabbed it and just shook it once, and it instantly opened up.
I just put the...it was perfect with the wind, and
I put it over his head.
And as he was getting in I asked him I asked him...
you know, for me this is the toughest part of the whole deal.
Here I am without my PPE, and I have to ask a young
man to share his shelter with me.
There's a lot of guilt that goes with that and
endangering his life because I don't have my equipment.
So he graciously said, "Yes."
And as I'm crawling in the shelter, I can tell that this point.
This is a full crown fire and everything's starting
to want to suck right up to us from all directions.
You can see the in-drafting, and it building.
That's when I crawled in.
Inside the shelter I expected to be laying on
top of Josh's legs or not having much room.
He had kind of gone into a ball in a fetal position
at the front of the shelter.
I ended up sitting down cross-legged because I
felt that I could use my butt and my legs to hold
the shelter down because I didn't know how much heat
we'd get impacted with; and I didn't think my
hands were gonna be able to do it.
Once I was in there it just became...really for
me it was all about just praying.
As soon as I started praying, it just put me at ease.
I was in a life or death situation right there, and so I
was getting myself right and... put a calming effect on you.
And then I started talking about his burns-how he was doing.
He thought that his airway was closing.
At that point in time, I thought that he'd taken heat
to his airway and that we needed to get out and call mayday.
I told him to stay in the shelter. I crawled out.
The radio that I had, I dropped right near the shelter
because I couldn't hold on to it when I was being burnt.
I picked it up and tried to call emergency traffic-
"Mayday. Mayday. Emergency traffic.
There's been a deployment."
And I couldn't break through the radio.
It took several times just before Operations and the
other two Forest Service engines could hear it just
down the hill from us here.
And at that time, we could just barely see Jay said
he couldn't see us. I told him to keep coming.
We could see him driving straight north.
I told him, "We're off your back quarter panel at
a 45 degree."
He just started backing up and we told him to stop
and we picked up and ran towards him.
Josh wasn't going to let go of the shelter for anything.
He took it with him.
I threw the radio down to mark where we actually deployed.
Ted : The Alabaugh fire was contained five days later
on July 12th after burning over 10,000 acres.
During the first 24 hours, the fire burned 5,000 acres,
destroyed 27 homes, and claimed the life of one homeowner.
The final investigation report can be found on the lessons learned website.
At this time let's take a break and read part of the
summary Dr. Putnam wrote in his analysis of the