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Hi everybody, it's Stef, I hope that you're doing well.
It's time for part three of ethics, wherein we really do start to get to some of the juicy
stuff.
Let's have again the blinding recap as we've done quite a bit in the realm of ethics over
the last few podcasts. With your permission I will give you a quick recap over the questions
that we have talked about.
We have defined ethics, or morality, and universally preferred behavior, and we have also, I think,
taken a fairly good swing at proving that preferred behavior exists universally, and
you simply can't oppose the existence of preferred behavior without claiming that you prefer
some other form of behavior. So we can take it as pretty much an axiom that preferred
behavior exists.
Then we can look at the question of, Is there generally better universally preferred behavior?
In other words, is there behavior that people should choose over other forms of behavior?
What we can do in those circumstances we'll start to get into now, and I'm going to lean
rather heavily on the analogy of nutrition, or to some degree, medicine, to help make
the case for a universal system of ethics. We will also run a few common ethical questions
through our ethics machine, so to speak, and see if we can't come up with some rational
ideas or things that make sense at a gut level. As I mentioned in the last podcast, Aristotle
is quite keen on the idea that if you come up with an ethical system that can prove that
*** and *** are moral, you might have missed (laughs) a certain syllogistical step
that would make sense, because it would be very tough to come up with something like
that and have it "feel right." I know I've talked about logic so far, but I think that
if I come up with an ethical system that says *** is the most moral action, you might
have a certain amount of problems with it.
Let's have a look at this question of, Are there behaviors that should be universally
preferred by people, or not?
The first thing that I would ask is, How would we define what would be universally preferred
or not? And again, we're gonna lean on the scientific method, and on the science of nutrition
to help us out a little bit here, just so we don't have to reinvent the wheel from the
ground up, so to speak. So the first thing that I would ask is, Is the theory that would
propose or define universally preferred behavior required to be logical, or not? And of course,
the moment we use "universal" we're in the scientific method, we're in empirical reality,
we do have a requirement for logic and consistency. So if I say, *** is most foul on Tuesday
and most fair on Wednesday, then I'm going to have a problem with consistency, like saying
water flows downhill on Tuesday and uphill on Wednesday. That would be a scientific theory
that would have some pretty fundamental flaws or problems with it.
We do, I think, have to have the idea and follow the rigor to say that any moral philosophy
that we put forward has a requirement to be at least internally consistent and logical,
and universal across human beings. And again, we'll get into some sort of minor exceptions
down the road, but we're just talking in general here.
If we accept that as a standard, that any ethical theory has to be at least at the very
least internally consistent, and this we do for scientific theories as well. For a scientific
theory, the first thing that is required is internal consistency. So again, if I say that
all other things being equal, water flows downhill on a Tuesday and uphill on a Wednesday,
then what happens is the scientific community does not immediately rush out and start testing
water flows on Tuesday versus water flows on Wednesday. They don't do that, and they
don't have to! Because the theory is internally inconsistent.
A mathematical theory when you go down to the basics and it turns out that it relies
on the assumption of 2+2=5, once you understand that, let's just say that a mathematical proof
starts off with a miscalculation at the very basis which says 2+2=5, you can stop right
there. This is a very important thing to understand when it comes to logic. When you find a logical
inconsistency, a self-contradiction, a premise which contradicts another premise, an axiom
that is not universally valid, the moment you come across that, you can stop. In the
same way if you're trying to go west to get to a particular town, and you're in fact going
east, the moment you see that on the map, you don't have to keep going east to find
out if it's the case, you can [realize] you're going the wrong way and turn around.
The moment that a theory that is put forward independent of any kind of empirical observation
or corroboration from experimentation or, in this case, it would be the examples both
across the world, within your own life, and throughout history, for certain kinds of ethical
theories, the moment that a theory that is put forward is internally inconsistent, self-contradictory,
illogical, based on false premises, or axioms which aren't universal, the moment you come
across one of those logical problems within any proposed theory, that's where you stop.
You say, Excellent try.
And this may be the case for me, as well, 'cause you may of course come across faulty
premises, in which case, please feel free to let me know, I will praise you to the skies
and post the corrections here, because as I mentioned in the very outset of this series
on ethics, this is the last thing in the world that anybody should be wrong about, so I recognize
the danger of what it is that I'm doing and the problems that will accrue if mistakes
end up being made. So please let me know if I'm making faulty arguments.
The moment that you come across a logical inconsistency in a proposed theory, that is
the very moment that you can simply abandon that theory. You don't have to go into empirical
validation or empirical testing. (This is rather bright, isn't it... Is that better?
Ahh, the forehead.)
From that standpoint, we must say that any ethical theory must at least first and foremost,
or at its very basis, have internal consistencies, be logical, have premises that are founded
on universal principles and general human experiences and the nature of reality, matter
and energy in physics etc. And if a moral theory fulfills all of those requirements,
if it at least is internally consistent and consistent with its axioms and premises, then
we can start to bring in examples from history and see if the moral theory explains that.
We've talked about some criteria by which a moral theory can be evaluated according
to the, let's just for the moment call them the Facts of History, etc., there are some
which we can relatively accept.
That's the number one consideration. The number one consideration is it has to be logical.
And if it's logical,then we can test it against the facts of reality. But the moment that
we come across an ethical theory that is illogical or inconsistent, then we can dismiss it without
going any further.
If we're going to talk about universally preferred behavior, in any way, shape or form, then
either it exists or it doesn't.
Let's take a look at the premise that universally preferred behavior does not exist; there is
no such thing as universally preferred behavior. We can generally say that if an organism has
a goal called survival, that eating and drinking and sleeping would probably be pretty high
on that list, because if you are a human being and you neither eat nor drink, you're probably
dead within 48-72 hours. Dehydration, I think comes before starvation (at least it would
for me). We can at least say that if an organism's goal is life, then there is universally preferred
behavior. You have to at least eat, drink and sleep.
From a biological standpoint, this is not philosophy really. This is more just receiving
the observed and fairly rigorously defined facts of biology. From that standpoint there
is such a thing as universally preferred behavior, if the organism wishes to live. There's lots
of if's in biology. A rock falls down whether or not it wants to because it has no consciousness,
willpower, or mechanism to impede its flight, but an organism, particularly human beings,
have the choice to survive or not. Logically, if you want to survive, eating, drinking,
sleeping is a good thing. If you don't want to survive, throwing yourself off a bridge
or eating cyanide would be the preferred behavior.
What certainly does seem to be the case in human life is that, since we have this requirement
for consistency among ethics, if we accept the proposition that there is no such thing
as universally preferred behavior [hence UPB], if there is no such thing as UPB, anything
goes, whatever you want. We could just call this 'radical hedonism' or 'radical moral
skepticism,' whatever you want to call it. Basically it's the idea of, Anything goes,
anybody can do whatever they want, that there is no UPB. Well, let's take that and see if
we can't come up with any problems with it. Of course, if we do find that at its basis
it is logically self-contradictory, then we can pretty much dismiss it without any real
further ado.
So let's just say I put forward the proposition: there is no such thing as UPB. That UPB is
a fundamental conceptual error and that preferred behavior is whatever people want it to be.
So I'm putting forward a theory, not saying it's an opinion, because if it's my opinion
that UPB is invalid, then my opinion has the truth value of the statement that says, "I
like bread." It may be true that I believe that, but who cares? It doesn't mean that
you have to like bread. If I say 2+2=4 and that's consistent with the facts of reality
and with logic, then it is incumbent upon you to accept that proposition if you want
to be logical, have truth value in what it is that you're arguing for, and of course
if you're arguing, it is totally incumbent upon you to inject truth value into what you're
saying. Otherwise you're just yelling opinions across a breakfast table and it doesn't really
mean anything (although it would probably get you some good shows on CNN).
If you say there's no such thing as UPB, and it's just your opinion, that's fine. You like
red, you like Cap'n Crunch, go have a nice day. It's not a philosophical argument, and
nobody else is bound to believe it. Nobody else is bound to believe it. If I say rocks
fall down, then it is incumbent upon you to believe that, because it's actually true.
And you don't need to get all fussy about the concept of "down," I'm aware that (laughs)
Einstein says that's not the case, and I guess even Newton would as well.
If I put forward the proposition that says UPB is invalid, then I'm putting that forward
as a UPB, is that everyone should believe that UPB is invalid. If I believe that there
is a truth value in my statement in the same way that 2+2=4 and rocks fall down and I exist,
then you can't put forward a truth value statement that says UPB does not exist. It's exactly
the same as we talked about before when we talk about, I'm going to use your hearing
to convince you that the senses are invalid. That's a complete logical contradiction. We
actually can stop right there and dismiss it. We can go on a little further if we like.
Basically, if I say that UPB does not exist, then I'm putting forward the proposition that
it is universally preferable that people believe that UPB does not exist. This is a complete
self-contradiction. I can say UPB does not exist, that's my mere opinion, and it has
no truth value that is at all required for other rational people to believe, like "I
like blue." Then it's not a debate, it's merely a statement of opinion, as we've talked about
before.
We can immediately say that if somebody is arguing for the proposition that UPB does
not exist, that that person is contradicting themselves already. Let's go one step forward,
because the great thing about logic is that if there's a mistake at the root, in the premises
and axioms, then there are mistakes all the way along, and the contradiction doesn't exactly
resolve itself, next step. It's like if you're heading east when you should be going west,
the further you go east, the further you're getting away from your destination. It's not
like you get to the next town and suddenly you're west. So when you're going in the wrong
direction in terms of logic, anywhere you stop there's going to be lots of contradictions.
Let's just say that the principle that UPB does not exist... If UPB does not exist, then
everybody should be able to do whatever it is that they want to do. UPB does not exist,
so everybody can do whatever they want to do. Well, that's fine. Now let's suppose that
we accept that as a premise. What happens then, if I wish to become the dictator of
the world? What I want is to rule over 6 billion human beings with an iron fist and the rule
of law and my own little Gestapo and NKBD, my own little secret police and torture chambers,
and I want to be the all-shiny dictator of the world. That's my preferred behavior.
If it is universally true that preferred behavior, that is common to all human beings, does not
exist, what happens when one person's preferred behavior interferes with another person's
preferred behavior? So let's say that you prefer to be free, and I prefer that you be
my slave. So we have contradictory preferred behavior. What are you going to do as a moral
philosopher to resolve this problem? 'Cause if everybody wants to go live in the woods
and do their thing independently of everyone else, then you have a fairly decent (I think)
or at least consistent argument with the proposition that UPB doesn't exist. But if I want to enslave
you, lock you in my basement, make you cook my meals, maybe we'll withdraw a little from
the six billion slave scenario and just work on a more personal level. If I want to enslave
you then my preferred behavior is that you be my slave, and your preferred behavior is
that you not be my slave. (Irrational though that may be)
So how do you resolve this from a logical standpoint? If there's no such thing as UPB,
then for one person to impose preferred behavior on another is wrong! Because there's no such
thing as UPB. So if I put forward the argument that says you have to be my slave 'cause it's
a good thing, a moral thing, a great thing, I am your country you should be a patriot,
then I'm putting forward the proposition that you should want to be my slave, but you don't
want to be my slave. So here we have that if UPB does not exist, then it is completely
irrational and wrong for one person to impose standards of behavior on another. Parent to
child, Jailer to prison[er], however you wanna call it. For any human being to impose any
values on any other human being is totally illogical. And so you have a problem, a logical
contradiction, even if we accept the base premise that UPB does not exist, we then end
up with a contradiction that if UPB does not exist, it is universally preferable that human
beings not impose their values on others, because that would be a violation of the subjectivity
of preferred behavior. We then end up with another logical problem.
I think it's safe to say that there's no argument that can be put forward that says UPB does
not exist without invoking UPB, unless you state it as a mere opinion that has no truth
value, is not binding upon anyone else. Nobody else would be required to believe you.
That having been said, then, the question is not "Does preferred behavior exist?" the
question is not "Does UPB exist and is it a valid concept?" the question is only (in
the looser sense of the term) "What can be considered UPB?"
We've come an enormous amount here. We've come all the way from the nature of reality
through the questions of knowledge through the questions of truth value. We've defined
morality, and we've actually (I think) fairly logically come to the place where we're not
saying "Does morality exist?" we're not saying "Does UPB exist?" We know that it does, we
know that they're valid concepts. The only question is, What can be considered in a logical
and consistent way UPB?
Let me take a moment. Let's have a toast to our journey. We're making great strides.
Given that we know that UPB exists and the only question is What could be considered
UPB, now we have a two-fold task. We'll obviously divide this into two podcasts.
The first fold task is, let's put forward some propositions and see if they conform
to UPB.
Secondly, let's say that we come up with a set of UPBs, that is logical, consistent,
and can be considered universal, etc. If we can come up with those as a theory, and of
course we're trying to use and follow the scientific method (as an outgrowth of philosophy
it seems only valid), and so once we come up with a universally consistent theory, we've
proved the existence and requirement of something, and we've got a theory that is at least internally
consistent, then what we need to do is compare our theory against testable reality to find
out if the theory holds true.
If you have a theory that says a steady diet of only ice cream is bad, then you can prove
the internal consistency, you can say here's how it works within the body, here's what
it does to the pancreas, kidneys, liver, and fat cells, etc. Then what you do once you've
got an internally consistent theory, of course, is you go out and convince somebody or a whole
bunch of people if you're lucky to eat nothing but ice cream and measure the results. Once
you've got the internally consistent theory, then you can go out and test it.
There are times when you notice things in the world, like everybody on a steady diet
of only ice cream tends to get a little pudgy, then what you can do is abstract and try to
find out the root causes from a biological standpoint, and then you go back and retest
to make sure you've come to the right conclusions, etc. We're just talking about working from
theory to practice, but you can of course boomerang from practice to theory to practice
again with a test at the end. Let's just work from this first standpoint to begin with.
Let's put forward a proposition that says "*** is wrong." This is something we're
all fairly comfortable with, I doubt there's too many people out there who say No no no,
*** is right. Although there are a disturbing number of people who believe that under certain
circumstances, which we'll get to later. But let's just say in general that we can agree
with the proposition that *** is wrong.
If we say that *** is wrong as a proposition of universally preferred behavior, in the
same way that we would say as a doctor, eating a balanced and healthy diet and exercising
is good, that *** is wrong. Again, it doesn't mean that everyone's going to follow the proposition
that *** is wrong, any more than people eat their vegetables because a nutritionist
tells them to, but the fact that human beings deviate from an ideal, as we talked about
in the last podcast, does not mean that that ideal is subjective and irrelevant, etc.
If we put forward that proposition, then can we make it universal? The first question is
can it be universal, independent from time, space, etc. We'll define *** as the initiation
of the use of force, not as self-defense, which we'll get into at another time.
If I say that *** is wrong, can I universalize it? Yeah, I can. I can say that *** is
wrong on Tuesdays, Wednesdays, in San Diego, in San Francisco, and in Syria, and in the
Andes, and on Mount Everest, etc., that ***, the initiation of the use of force against
a victim is wrong. We can at least universalize it. We talked about *** before, and if
I come up with a proposition that says "*** is the most moral action," then we can't universalize
it. A person in a coma can't be virtuous, a person who has no arms and legs and can't
go and kill anyone can't be virtuous. Anybody who's not currently in the act of killing
someone can't be virtuous. If you have two guys in a room, the only virtuous action that
they can have is to both stab each other. The fulfillment of the virtuous commandment
"Thou shalt kill" would be to end all human life. You shouldn't have children, 'cause
that's quite the opposite of killing (creating life). Anyway, there's lots of logical problems
with the proposition "Thou shalt kill."
We also came up with logical problems with the proposition "Thou shalt steal," which
we talked about. In other words, if I say you must steal, then I'm saying that you must
take other people's property. In other words, they have no valid property rights, but that
you must also keep the property that you've stolen, and so you have property rights but
the people that you're stealing from don't. So I'm both simultaneously denying and affirming
the existence of property rights. If I say "Thou shalt steal," we face the same problem
as we do with ***, which is that it's an active positive action, and therefore a toddler
who doesn't understand the concept is evil because he/she is not stealing, that somebody
in a wheelchair who is currently disoriented or has Alzheimer's or something is evil, because
they're not actually out there stealing. Two guys in a room are just snatching back and
forth goods from each other, and that doesn't really seem to conform to any rational idea
of morality.
"Thou shalt not steal" is universal. We can universalize that very easily. We can say
that at all times and in all places that theft (not the recovery of property that's been
stolen from you, but the initiation of property transfer from another human being against
their will, with either force or deception involved, etc.). We can get into the complications.
Fraud, I've actually done in a number of podcasts. We can at least begin that process of beginning
to define some logical propositions that would make sense, because if you say (whatever morality
you come up) "Theft is good because you should take whatever you want, because you should
satisfy your own desires. Theft is good because if I see something in a shop window that I
want, I should just grab it. I should satisfy my desires, I should act to maximize my pleasure."
That would be one possible principle behind it all.
Well, I could certainly make that case. But the problem that I'm gonna have in terms of
universality is, it's gonna be rather tricky for me to say that all human beings should
satisfy the desires that give them the most pleasure, should maximize their pleasure,
etc., and therefore that justifies stealing, ***, ***, etc., because of course it's
not universal. If I see something in a shop window and I want to maximize my pleasure
and maximizing my pleasure is the greatest goal, then the problem I'm gonna face in justifying
that is that by stealing I am maximizing my pleasure, but the person who I'm stealing
from is having his pleasure automatically diminished. I can't just make up a rule for
myself, because we're talking about universals here, which means it has to apply to all human
beings at all times under all circumstances (minor exceptions, people who are mentally
deficient, people in comas maybe, etc.). We're just talking about the vast majority of human
beings, in the same way that the vast majority of human beings have [eight] fingers, two
thumbs, five toes, etc.
If I'm making up a moral rule, I can't just have it apply to myself, any more than I can
make up a rule about biology and have it only apply to one tsetse fly. I mean, if it's a
tsetse fly, it's all the tsetse flies. You can't just make up a rule for one. You can't
just make up a physics rule and have it apply to one rock. It has to apply to everything;
otherwise it's not a rule. It's just a nonsensical opinion.
So if I have a theory which says hedonism is the thing, you just go out there man, and
you satisfy your own wants and desires, maximizing your own pleasure is the primary goal of life,
then it's not universal, because whatever you do to maximize your own pleasure that
diminishes somebody else's pleasure would automatically contradict the moral theory.
You're gonna have a real problem with putting forward an idea that says you should steal
because. If you say you should steal because there's no such thing as stealing, property
rights don't exist, well that's fine. But in taking property from other people, you
are establishing property rights.
You're saying if I see a Rolex in your store window and I grab it 'cause I want to wear
it, it's going to give me pleasure, then I'm saying I should be allowed to own the Rolex
that I have stolen. If the moment I steal the Rolex it gets stolen from me, I'm not
gonna steal the Rolex. If the moral theory is consistently applied, moral actions cannot
result. This is a very important thing. That really wouldn't make any sense. If I'm only
gonna steal the Rolex from the store window because I imagine, want or believe that I
am going to get to keep the Rolex, I'm not gonna bother stealing, breaking the window,
maybe getting myself cut, etc., setting off those loud alarms, maybe drawing the ire of
the security guard... I'm not gonna do all of that if the moment that I grab the Rolex
somebody else grabbed it from me.
If it's moral to steal, it's moral for everyone to steal at all times under all circumstances.
Then of course the Rolex would never be assembled, because that would require somebody transferring
property from somebody else. In a coercive or deceptive manner, because stealing is good.
If stealing is good, then voluntary trade is bad or evil.
A moral proposition should not directly result in immoral actions. If it's moral to steal,
then nobody's gonna bother stealing, 'cause everybody who steals is gonna get stolen from
immediately. The storeowner's just gonna steal it right back. If stealing is moral, nobody's
gonna bother stealing, so you have a contradictory system wherein you're saying that UPB, if
consistently applied, would deny the existence or the possibility or the motive for that
UPB. It's a total contradiction.
If you were to say the same thing about ***... If you were to say that a man must *** a
woman, it's moral to *** a woman or another man, if a man rapes a woman, he is justified
in doing so, because (I don't know) the *** gratification is immediate and should be open
to the whim of the human being, that the pursuit of *** pleasure or whatever.. I know there's
lots of arguments and *** has nothing to do with sex, but just for the moment, let's
even say it's about dominating another human being. If a man rapes a woman, then he is
justified in doing so because the pursuit of *** pleasure, domination of others,
blablabla, is the highest good or virtue.
Well, it can't be universalized. Because while a man is raping a woman, let's say he is maximizing
whatever perverted *** pleasure he gets out of it, he's maximizing his own pleasure,
he sure as hell is not maximizing the pleasure of the woman. Quite the opposite: he's exposing
her to a moral horror of possibly just about the worst kind. If you say that human beings
should act to maximize their pleasure and therefore men should ***, well you have immediately
a contradictory moral phenomenon wherein the man is maximizing his sensual pleasure or
whatever pleasure he's getting out of it, but the woman simultaneously is not maximizing
her pleasure. Quite the opposite. So you have a moral action creating its exact opposite.
If the pursuit of pleasure is good, then *** is justified, but at the same time, *** does
not maximize pleasure for the woman, so you have a moral action (based on the moral imperative
to maximize your pleasure) creating immediately an immoral action, which is the minimization
of pleasure and maximization of pain for another human being.
These are just some examples we can put forward that seem to be consistent. I think that's
good. I think we can come up with things like, this is all radical stuff. When you think
about it, it's absolutely basic, it's totally how you live your life. I don't assume I'm
speaking to a lot of rapists and murderers. It's totally how you live your life.
What we've got is some of the basics. Property rights are valid and there's lots of reasons
why that is the case. Basically, the first property right you have is over your own body.
I can wave my hands, you can't wave my hands for me. Even if you zap me with electricity,
they're just going to jump around, they're not going to do some particular thing. I own
my vocal cords, I can use them to communicate, and so the first ownership that we have is
our own bodies. That's why *** is an invasion and a use of somebody else's property, i.e.
their body, as is ***, sticking a knife into somebody's ribs is a form of trespassing
on their property, which is deleterious to their health, bad for their health.
Property rights exist, because as we mentioned before, if property rights don't exist, then
nobody can eat or drink, or even breathe to some degree, because that is the making of
property your own, which of course would be totally invalid. If some moralist puts forward
the idea that property rights don't exist, then nobody can eat or drink, and therefore,
again, moral behavior (which is not using any property) results in no further morality,
because everybody's dead. It's a self-contradictory statement.
Of course, there is no such thing as *** or *** if you don't own your own body.
If you don't own your body and I need a kidney, then I could just go and saw your kidney out
of our side, because you don't own your body, then that would be perfectly moral in a non-ownership
situation. But, of course in a non-ownership situation, I can't actually use your kidney.
It all becomes very silly and very self-contradictory.
Property rights are valid, as a theory. As a logically consistent theory. We'll get into
proofs through empiricism in the next podcast or two. At the very minimum, property rights
are a logically consistent and valid theory, they don't contradict themselves, they don't
require contradictory principles, they don't have one person doing the exact moral thing
at the same time as he's inflicting the exact immoral thing on another human being. They
can be consistent across time, space, place, etc.
So property rights as a theory are consistent. Thou shalt not kill, ***, initiate force
is logically consistent, valid, does not produce contradictory behavior. People can then be
moral simply by refraining from that, whereas if Thou shalt kill is the imperative, of course
you are creating and destroying moral behavior. Morality is to kill, to be killed is immoral
because you should actually be out killing, so you have these contradictions. The person
being killed is immoral, the person killing is moral, so all of this doesn't really make
any sense. And of course it can't really be universalized, because then everyone would
kill everyone else, and we'd all be dead.
Thou shalt not kill, logically consistent.
Thou shalt not ***, we've already gone over that one. Logically consistent, universal,
etc.
Thou shalt not steal perfectly follows from property rights.
We're starting to build a very useful framework, in my opinion, here that we're saying, Yeah,
UPB has to exist, because it's logically impossible for it not to, or at least it's logically
impossible to make any argument that UPB does not exist. Given that UPB exists, then the
next step in terms of defining a rational morality is to say, Okay, any definition of
UPB, at the very minimum, has to be logically consistent, independent of time and space.
Like any theory of science, it has to be logically consistent and has to be based on valid premises.
It has to not result in ridiculous things. If you have a physics theory that says that
for this physics theory to be true, my hands have to be able to pass through each other
like two ghostly appendages, it's a ridiculous thing. You don't need to test everybody's
hands to find out if that's true.
We've come up with some very useful things: Thou shalt not kill, steal, ***. Property
rights are valid, the ownership of our own bodies is valid, which means that you can't
own other people, which means slavery is not moral. All these sorts of things. This is
the good news. The good news is that you can define the rules that are logically consistent
of UPB.
We're gonna do two things over the next two podcasts:
The first is that we're going to look at some empirical verifications of these sorts of
principles. We're going to look at what happens if the UPB of property rights is not followed
in a society. Are the results good or bad? 'Cause we've got a theory that says Eating
all ice cream is bad, in other words having no property rights is bad, or at least having
property rights though not [universally] is bad. Well, let's have a look at history and
societies that have tried to institute systems with no property rights or few property rights,
and see what happens. We've got a theory that *** is bad, so let's look at societies
that have lots of ***, etc., and see what happens, good or bad.
We're gonna have some empirical tests towards our conceptual theory, which is of course
very, very important. The conceptual theory has to be logically consistent, the behavior
of matter and energy is logically consistent through the evidence of our senses, so we
should be able to validate these theories to some degree.
Somebody who eats nothing but ice cream is probably not going to do so well, but the
degree to which people do badly is going to be different depending on everybody's persons.
Somebody who's lactose-intolerant is gonna get sick a whole lot quicker from eating nothing
but ice cream than somebody who's not. There are variations, but there's a general trend,
which we can work out within the evaluation of the premise that we should only ice cream.
There's gonna be some variations, but we can still see the general trends, and the same
thing will be true when we look at society.
After that, let's say that we then end up with some empirical validation of the premises
that we've put forward, the major ones, the major UPBs (Thou shalt not kill, steal, ***,
Thou shalt respect property rights). Let's say that we can find some empirical validation
for that, then we're going to move forward to the next step, which is to look at the
exceptions that everybody believes for these fundamental moral rules, and the consequences
of those, which I think are the greatest evils that are currently in the world.
So there's quite a carrot at the end of the stick, I hope that you'll stick around for
it. Thank you so so much for listening. I hugely appreciate the attention that this
is getting, and I think that we're doing an enormous amount of good to bring clarity to
a debate that unfortunately is all too often very obscured. Thanks again for listening,
I'll talk to you soon.