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Paul: So good evening... or good afternoon.
♪ Mark: And we're back
at Richmond Beach City Park in Shoreline
talking about informal fallacies this time.
Paul: Ah-huh.
So...so we've already introduced the idea of an informal fallacy,
uh...and distinguished informal fallacies from formal fallacies.
We've also defined
what a fallacy is-- an error in reasoning.
And we've talked about a couple informal fallacies.
We just want to discuss the concept a little further
for a few minutes.
Is that alright?
Mark: Ah-huh.
Paul: So my favorite fallacy is the ad hominem fallacy,
uh...and of course, this is when you attack the person
rather than their argument or their reasoning.
And then, on the basis of that personal attack,
you attempt to convince people that you've attacked...
that you have, uh...defeated
their reasoning or their argument.
And there are many types of ad hominems.
There is...let's discuss a few of the types.
There's circumstantial ad hominem
where we attack someone's circumstances
and then think that that refutes their argument.
Can you give an example?
Mark: Well, oftentimes, the situation
is I am claiming you're being,
um...you have a vested interest in something.
I might say that Senator Jones is advocating
that we all vote for wheat subsidies.
But Senator Jones is from Kansas,
and we all know that if he gets those wheat subsidies
his wheat farmer people are gonna vote for him.
So he just has a vested interest,
so therefore, his position on wheat subsidies is bad.
We should object to it.
Paul: That would be a circumstantial ad hominem.
Good example.
Mark: He may have good reasons for voting for wheat subsidies.
The mere fact that he's gonna gain something from it.
That he's in a circumstance for gains.
It doesn't count against it.
It doesn't count for it either.
What I want to do is find out
what his arguments are for wheat subsidies
and see if those arguments are good or bad.
Paul: Right, so to engage with him
on a rational level is to ignore the circumstantial stuff
and focus on his reasoning.
Does he have a good argument?
Does he have some good reasons for his position?
And that's a rational engagement.
Another example would be to, uh...attack a scientist
who's advocating nuclear power on the grounds
that he's getting paid by the nuclear power industry.
And therefore, his argument's no good,
or it's not even to be trusted.
Mark: We'd want to see
what his arguments are evidence for.
Paul: What is his argument?
Mark: Not the fact that he's being paid by somebody.
That by itself doesn't say his arguments are good or bad.
It may make an alarm go off in my head
to take a close look at his arguments.
Paul: I might be more critical of his reasoning knowing that.
Mark: I'd want to look at his reasons
not the mere fact that he gets his paycheck
from one person or another.
Paul: Someone could be being paid
by the nuclear power industry,
but they still might have a good argument.
Mark: Ah-huh.
Paul: Independent of that.
So again, a rational engagement would involve
listening to the argument and analyzing the reasoning,
independent of any qualms
you might have about the paycheck.
So another form of ad hominem that's kind of a fun
is, uh...the tu quoque.
Tu quoque means...
Mark: That you also, or you too.
Paul: You too, or you're another.
Mark: Yeah.
Paul: And, uh...this is... this happens
when someone gives a reason or an argument for a position,
and then, someone replies to them, well, you too.
For example, a mother is lecturing her daughter...
her teenage daughter on the dangers of drug abuse.
And the daughter replies,
well, you used drugs when you were a teenager,
as if that refutes the mother's argument.
That would be a tu quoque...you too.
Mark: And I often hear this, uh...offered in such a way
where someone says,
well, you're just being hypocritical in saying that,
therefore, your position's false.
You can be a hypocrite
and actually have a good position.
The fact that you're a hypocrite
may count against your personality,
may count against your moral fiber,
but even hypocrites could have a good position.
Uh...I remember in the first Gulf War,
and I'm not gonna be over political on this,
but I remember in the first Gulf War,
some people saying
we shouldn't go to war against Iraq,
because...just because, you know, Iraq's an aggressor.
We can't go to war with Iraq
being they're being an aggressor.
We're not going to war with all the other aggressors.
We're somehow being hypocritical.
We're not being consistent.
Therefore, we shouldn't go to war with Iraq.
Well, whether we should or shouldn't
isn't my issue right here, but it's a lousy argument.
The mere fact even if our government
was being somehow hypocritical in going to war with Iraq
but not these other countries that were aggressors
doesn't count... doesn't say anything
for or against whether we should have.
And it would just be an ad hominem argument.
Paul: You're talking about 1991?
Mark: I'm thinking specifically of the first one.
That's when I really heard that argument a lot,
and I thought, well,
whether we liked that first Gulf War or not,
this line of reasoning is really horrible.
Paul: Ah-huh, sure,
and a...and another analogy would be a smoker.
Mark: Yeah.
Paul: Who smokes three packs a day
giving a lecture on the dangers of smoking.
Um...one might say, well, you too.
In other words, well, you're doing it,
so your argument's no good.
Mark: Right.
Paul: But actually, his argument might be very good.
The fact that he's smoking
simply means that he's not living
in accord with his position,
but that doesn't mean his argument isn't any good.
Mark: Right.
Paul: So his argument has to be examined on its merits
and not on these irrelevant...
logically irrelevant considerations,
such as the fact that he's being hypocritical.
Mark: And this seems to be
the favored fallacy of talk radio,
on both left and right side of the dial.
Paul: The tu quoque?
Mark: Yeah, both...both sides... both liberal and conservatives,
either side, seem to be just loving
using this kind of fallacy from time to time.
On...it's...it's a shame.
Paul: Well, you know, the ad hominem fallacy
seems almost ubiquitous in politics, doesn't it?
Mark: Yeah...yeah.
Paul: It's just everywhere.
Um...well, what fallacy would you call this one?
Mark: Okay.
Paul: Okay, suppose, uh...a doctor, um...operates
on a patient and, uh...does a terrible job,
and the patient dies.
Mark: Okay.
Paul: And so, now, the family's quite upset,
and they're gonna sue the doctor.
And, uh...the doctor says, you know, my wife's sick,
and my dog just died.
And I just heard that my grandpa has cancer,
and they just repossessed my car and towed it away.
And I just found out our house has termites,
and I was just diagnosed with tennis elbow.
And on top of all that, our cat has feline ***.
Now, what...there's some type... something's goin' on there,
but can you think of an argument?
Mark: He concludes on that basis that...
Paul: You shouldn't sue him.
Mark: He's not responsible for the death of the patient.
Paul: Or he shouldn't be sued.
Mark: Shouldn't be sued.
Well, this is a real common argument,
particularly with some of my students.
Uh...we call it appeal to pity.
And what... what's happening here
is we appeal to this very pitiable
and perhaps tragic set of circumstances I might be in
and conclude because I'm in this pitiable, tragic state,
therefore, such and such should be the case.
Now, if my pitiable state is irrelevant
to whether such and such should be the case,
it's a fallacy.
Just it's a fallacy for irrelevance.
There are times
when my pitiable state might be relevant.
If I say, hey, I'm...I'm dying.
I just got in a car wreck.
Therefore, you as a doctor
should take a look at me very quickly...
Paul: That wouldn't be a fallacy.
Mark: That's not a fallacy,
because my situation is relevant to the conclusion.
But, uh...this doctor
who has these horrible things happen to him,
that's irrelevant to whether he should
or should not be responsible for the death of his patient.
Paul: So in other words,
in the ad misericordiam argument, uh...uh...fallacy--
the appeal to pity--
if someone is trying to use the feeling of pity--
the emotion of pity-- to move you to a conclusion
when the pitiable state doesn't justify the conclusion...
Mark: Right, yeah.
Paul: Logically speaking,
and that makes it a fallacy-- an error in reasoning.
So these are...these are some of the interesting fallacies
that you'll read about if you study the logical fallacies--
the informal fallacies.
There are so many websites on these.
There are websites that have hundreds of these cataloged--
these informal fallacies.
♪ Again, they're informal,
because the fallacy cannot be defined purely in terms
of the abstract form of the reasoning
or the case, uh...independent of content.
Rather, we have to refer to the content--
what's being said-- and not pure abstract form.
So we call these the informal fallacies.
The formal fallacies, of course, are different.
These are fallacies in reasoning that can be defined in terms
of pure abstract form or structure
without reference to content.
Mark: Okay.
Paul: So thank you for listening.