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>>Nicholas Thompson: That was a super presentation, one that segues into our next one.
I'm Nicholas Thompson. I'm an editor at "The New Yorker" magazine. David described me as
working at the "New York Times," which is close but not quite right. A little bit like
me describing David as English. [ Laughter ]
>>Nicholas Thompson: In any case, I run the Web site at "The New Yorker" and oversee its
tablet and I also helped found a software publishing startup called The Atavist.
But I'm here to moderate a panel on what's happening in Syria and I would like to bring
onto stage Mazen Asbahi who is the President of the Syrian Support Group. It is a licensed
NGO that works with the Department of Defense to provide non-lethal aid to the Free Syrian
Army, so communications equipment, trucks. So he is a moderate man providing moderate
stuff to the moderates in this war. He is also a lawyer by training. He has worked
at Kirkland & Ellis. And he is an honors graduate from the Northwestern School of Law. So, Mazen,
please come on stage. [ Applause ]
>>Nicholas Thompson: Let's have a segue from our previous presentation. So in March of
2011, protests start in Syria and they are non-violent. They begin with a day of dignity.
They appear to be following on what we saw in Tunisia. They appear to be non-violent
resistance against Assad. Social media is being used to name the protest. It is everything
that the people in this room like and want. Within two months, we have war. And then we
have a war that's gone on for -- ever since then, since May of 2011. And A hundred thousand
people are dead. What went wrong?
>>Mazen Asbahi: What went wrong was the reaction of the Assad regime to the peaceful protests.
They brought under snipers. They went on a campaign of mass arrest. They instituted a
campaign of *** violence against men and women. They ordered their military units to
fire on the peaceful protests. And I'm all for the non-violent movement,
and I only wish and pray that the uprising in Syria would have followed on that course.
But when the orders were given to shoot at the protesters, you started to see a trend
of soldiers who simply said, I won't shoot my own people. And they defected at risks
to their lives and to their families. And they went on and formed the Free Syrian Army.
And this isn't just one, two, ten. These are thousands of Syrian National Army officers
at various ranks. >>Nicholas Thompson: So we are going to have
a chance with what's happened in the war with our next guest.
But let me ask of you about the last three weeks which have been a period of intense
interest. So August 21st, there is a chemical weapons attack. Fairly clear from the beginning
that it is Assad. Obama says that we will go in with strikes.
And then suddenly, will the British turn on us? Maybe we won't go in with strikes. Maybe
we will go to Congress. And then, actually, no, we are not going to strike.
And then yesterday in the paper one of the men from the Syrian Army said, "The revolution
is dead. It is sold. Assad is now a hero who saved the country."
Tell me about your emotions over the past two weeks.
>>Mazen Asbahi: Wow. The last couple weeks have been a roller coaster ride both emotionally
and intellectually. We were a hundred percent sure that the strikes were going to happen.
And I think everyone else was, too. And the commanders on the ground from the
Free Syrian Army were in communications with parties within the U.S. government regarding
targets and how to react to the strikes. And I remember I was driving on my way to
a wedding of two Syrian-Americans in Chicago and I was thinking, Okay, I'm going to keep
the radio on so when the hits hit I'll know. And I wonder how that's going to affect the
wedding. Will everybody be extremely, extremely happy? Or will it be somewhat subdued? Because
even the notion of strikes in Syria is something that's difficult for Syrians to come to terms
with, but I think that the vast majority were actually favorable towards it as a means of
keeping Assad accountable for his war crimes. So, yeah, I think now with the agreement in
Russia, there is a significant deflation with the Free Syrian Army and the moderate forces,
both the political and the armed opposition groups. They feel like Assad is getting off
scot-free. And even the agreement between Russia and the United States does not include
a clear mechanism for accountability for those that launched this heinous chemical weapons
attack. >>Nicholas Thompson: Okay. Thank you.
Our special guest is ready. We have a special guest joining us in a Hangout from an undisclosed
location. We have Major Isam El-Rayyes. He is a defector from the Syrian National Army
and now a senior official with the Supreme Military Council, which is the umbrella leadership
structure of the Free Syrian Army. He is also a 1998 graduate of the Aleppo Military Academy
with a degree in electrical engineering. So please welcome Major Isam El-Rayyes.
[ Applause ] >>Nicholas Thompson: Major El-Rayyes, you
served under Assad for quite a while. Tell me about when you decided to defect and why.
>>Isam El-Rayyes: Actually I have been outside -- (no audio).
As you said, I graduated in 1998 and worked in the Assad Army. And many of my friends
agreed with me the same and defected before me. I defected in June 2011.
I decided it was time to defend the people. I agree with Mr. Mazen, that the revolution
never killed. And it was (indiscernible) even the political situation changed.
>>Nicholas Thompson: So you were given an order in June of 2011 to shoot protesters.
You said, No, I'm leaving. You join your colleagues. You move geographically and you begin leading
the resistance. >>Isam El-Rayyes: Yes.
>>Nicholas Thompson: Now, tell me about the situation on the ground right now. As Mazen
said, there has been a lot of deflation among the Free Syrian Army. Tell me about your mood,
and tell me about what exactly is happening. >>Isam El-Rayyes: Okay. I will tell you in
the last two weeks, the situation is growing so fast because of the political situation.
But everything on the ground is staying on. You can add some soldiers (indiscernible).
They don't care. They are fighting to pull down the Assad regime.
At first we feel when Assad will attack, he will attack the Assad regime. Nobody likes
to attack his country, of course. We are talking about Assad regime, exactly.
As (indiscernible) said, he is going to attack just the Assad Army at some points, limited
points, and that's what we want exactly. Everything on the ground is going on. We are
now better than first (indiscernible) and soldiers. Now we are (indiscernible). At least
we are 200 working just in the Military Council command.
And we are now -- we are feeling it is improving on the ground.
>>Nicholas Thompson: In June of this year, there was a very controversial debate in this
country about whether to send you arms. Eventually the Obama Administration decided, through
the CIA, not through Mazen, to send you weapons. But reports are that they did not arrive or
have not arrived. Have you received any? >>Isam El-Rayyes: If I hear your question
good, I know that's -- from the first we know that Assad will use everything. When he is
caught snipering the people, we know he is going to transport the tanks inside the city.
We know the aircraft will start working. And the next step will be the chemical weapons.
We were sure 100% that the chemical weapons used by the regime. And we know that it's
going to use another time. Even if Assad tells us he is going to deliver all his chemical
weapons because, you know, we believe that it's just a trick and just to change the view
from people about what Assad is doing and killing his people.
He just make this deal to have much time to kill more people. And, you know, as much as
the time is going on, the problem is getting larger.
>>Nicholas Thompson: Why do you think it took Assad so long in the conflict to carry out
a major attack with those chemical weapons? >>Isam El-Rayyes: Can you repeat the question?
>>Nicholas Thompson: The question is, you were very confident from the beginning that
Assad would eventually use the chemical weapons stockpiled that he even denied having. Yet,
he didn't for quite a long time or used it in only small-scale attacks and it wasn't
until a year and a half into the conflict that he carried out a major attack. Why then?
>>Isam El-Rayyes: I didn't hear the question. Sorry.
>>Mazen Asbahi: Can I try? I think what we saw with the Ghouta attacks or the attacks
in East Damascus where there was a significant increase in the scale of the use of chemical
weapons was perhaps a dumb decision by Assad in the sense that it finally did generate
a type of concern that we've been calling upon the international community to show and
advocating for, as you know, the principle of responsibility to protect civilians.
Why did he do it? The areas that he attacked are opposition held and they are very close
to the center of Damascus, within six miles of where the U.N. inspectors were actually
staying. And I think that he had been trying through
conventional means to push out the Free Syrian Army from those areas but had been unsuccessful.
>>Nicholas Thompson: All right. Major El-Rayyes, I want to come back to you
to ask a question from the Free Syrian Army and its composition.
So, one of the great fears in this country is we don't know whether the people we're
supporting are really our allies. So the FSA, which you are part of, is fighting alongside
Al-Nusra that has sworn allegiance to Al-Qaeda which has sworn to destroy the United States.
There are a number of other radical Islamic organizations working towards the same goals
of eliminating the Assad regime. How can we in the United States have confidence
that by supporting you we're not also supporting our sworn enemies?
>>Isam El-Rayyes: Okay. First of all, I heard the question, what you talk, Mr. Mazen. I
agree with him. This is back to the chemical weapons. (indiscernible)
many times. He tried to attack more than 20 times, and he failed in that. So it was the
only possible way to attack with chemical weapons, and he tried after many times and
tried to attack soldiers. About other questions, I want just to give
you a view. You know, we are Syrian. (indiscernible). Everybody (indiscernible).
We relate together in a very social diversity (indiscernible) religion and (indiscernible)
points of view. This is the situation. Because (indiscernible)
take the time and nobody held the City of (indiscernible), of course, we lost the borders
and the regime lost the borders and a lot of people enter Syria and now they are inside.
But I want to tell you that until now, there are just not more than 5,000. All (indiscernible),
I mean. There are not more than 5,000. So we are sure that it will be easy for all the
people who said no and shot in other places with any other groups, I believe that the
Syrians don't like to keep the (indiscernible) and also other fighters from other countries
inside Syria. >>Nicholas Thompson: So I have heard the argument
from people in the FSA or people in Syria that Obama's decision not to launch missile
strikes will help Al-Nusra recruit more people and will actually hurt your ability to recruit
because the United States, this great powerful country which was supposed to be aligned with
you has not done the strikes that many people thought were forthcoming.
Is that helping Al-Nusra's recruitment? Is it going to lead to Al-Nusra growing to more
than 5,000 fighters, Al-Nusra and its other Islamic allies?
>>Isam El-Rayyes: Really, Let me explain two things about Al-Nusra themselves. Yes, Al-Nusra
is the branch of al-Qaeda, that's true. But, you know, we are not worried from Al-Nusra
who is Syrian who joined Al-Nusra. They joined Al-Nusra just because they need support. They
need some help. They need some (indiscernible) to fight against Assad. And at the end, they
are Syrians. And I explain to you what the meaning of (indiscernible) from Syria and
the history tell you that. But about Obama, Obama strikes, we don't reserve
to strike anyone else. We can manage ourselves. Again fighters, they are not going to fight
them. They will agree as the people about what they want. And also we just ask for the
regime places to be bombed, not more than this.
>>Nicholas Thompson: Now -- >>Mazen Asbahi: Can I add to a couple of points.
There were a couple of things that you said that I want to address for clarification.
One is the notion that we don't know who we're supporting in Syria.
We've been working for two years directly with our friends at the Department of State
and other agencies within the U.S. government to connect them with fighters at every level,
from the senior generals who have defected to the local community neighborhood defense
committees, and Ambassador Ford and other key figures in the U.S. administration have
been in communication. There's an active CIA effort, covert effort, to train Free Syrian
Army soldiers in the north and in the south, in Jordan, which has been reported in the
Wall Street Journal and other newspapers. So I don't believe in that notion that we
don't know. We do know. Number two, the idea that the Free Syrian
Army coordinates or collaborates with the extremists.
Now, on the tactical level on the ground, it is true over the prior period that you
can't stop a group coming and joining you while you're fighting the regime and being
attacked and trying to defend neighborhoods, but the division between the extremists and
the moderate fighters has become more pronounced in the last few weeks and the last few months,
especially as U.S. support to the Free Syrian Army has become more robust.
Why? Because they fear. They fear U.S. support
to the moderate element within the opposition. And they've actually killed now two or three
senior FSA commanders, and in public areas like Ar-Raqqah, which is in the east, the
community there has had protests against these extremists saying, "We don't want to exchange
one dictator for another just to get this Talibanesque version of Islam, which is so
foreign to Syria." And for those who may not know, Syria is an extremely diverse country
in the Arab world. Only 70% of Syrians are orthodox or Sunni Muslims. You have almost
10% of the population Christian. Some of the oldest churches in the world are in Syria,
and they've continued to this day to be vibrant communities.
And many in the Christian community -- we were talking about this earlier -- are on
the sidelines. They're fearful of what might happen. But there are also Christians in large
numbers as the leadership of the political opposition, and there are Christians who fight
with the Free Syrian Army as well. So it isn't -- you know, Assad has tried to
play the sectarian game because he comes from a sect call the Alawites and the Alawites
are predominant in the security sector and in the military and he's made the argument
to them that, "If I go down, you will go down," and General Salim Idris, who is the elected
leader of the Free Syrian Army, as well as all of the political leaders, have made it
clear to the Alawites that this isn't a sectarian fight, even if Assad's tactics have been to
fan those flames. >>Nicholas Thompson: Excellent. Major El-Rayyes,
I want to return to chemical weapons. There are some people who make the argument
that killing somebody with a chemical weapon is no different from killing them with a gun,
and in fact, the massacre in late August was slightly -- it wasn't larger, but not in kind
worse than the previous massacres that Assad had carried out.
If you were to capture a Syrian military base and defeat the Army and discover a large stockpile
of chemical weapons, what would you do with them? Would you use them in the conflict?
Would you turn them over? >>Isam El-Rayyes: Actually, there's no difference
kill with chemical weapons (indiscernible). This is (indiscernible) weapons and especially
when you use it against civil people. Also (indiscernible) world. It's (indiscernible),
you know, it's one of the (indiscernible). If I'd been in this situation, I would not
of course agree to use it, and if I understand the question very well, if I'd been a commander
in this military station and you mean I have an order to use these chemical weapons, I
will not use, of course. We know chemical weapons used by special forces from the Assad
Army, not everybody accept to use it. Also even the soldiers inside the Army (indiscernible)
Assad Army, they will not agree to use these chemical weapons but there are just a few
people who have these chemical weapons and have been ordered to use it and have -- I
mean, they are responsible to use such weapons inside the Army. Nobody know (indiscernible)
about chemical weapons. Even if I seen an officer in the Army, that don't mean I know
(indiscernible) about the chemical weapons. That's a fear of everybody. And just a few
people (indiscernible) and Bashar al-Assad is the only one who can give the order to
use these weapons. That is all. >>Nicholas Thompson: Right. Tell me what you
hope the endgame is. Do you hope to see power sharing? Do you hope to see Assad in prison?
Tell me a likely plausible scenario for two years that is encouraging to you.
>>Isam El-Rayyes: Of course I'd like to see Assad in prison because he's a killer. But
for me the (indiscernible) is to (indiscernible) I'm not talking about all the government.
I want Syria stay as it is and we are going to build again, even because of the long (indiscernible)
two years it takes a lot of programs and a lot of (indiscernible) inside. We can manage
-- we can manage (indiscernible)). I want (indiscernible) Mr. Mazen talk about this.
We don't -- actually we don't know they are supported. I mean the fighting inside Syria.
And if you don't support the Free Syrian Army -- I mean America -- that will make a lot
of people fighting inside the Army to go and fight and fight these groups, (indiscernible)
because I told you before they go just to have some support, some weapons. They don't
believe in how they think and they are not connected with their commander (indiscernible).
They are just a fighter from the ground as it strikes you when you are fighting the regime
and somebody tells you to fight, you will not -- you will not fight them, of course.
You will (indiscernible) that's what's happening with the Syrian soldiers. The Syrian soldiers
(indiscernible) Army, if they don't find enough support, if they don't find enough (indiscernible)
they will be forced to go and find (indiscernible) and that's what we don't want to do.
>>Nicholas Thompson: Last question quickly. We're speaking with a room full of very powerful
technology executives. This is a conflict that has played out in some ways over social
media. We all watched the chemical weapons attacks on YouTube. What would you say to
them? What technology could they create? What should they do that would help your cause?
>>Isam El-Rayyes: Of course it was (indiscernible) on YouTube and all of us saw (indiscernible).
I want to say to the whole (indiscernible) world, please help the Syrians. Assad will
use chemical weapons again. (Indiscernible) and other (indiscernible) use it again. I
am sure he will use it again because we said that many times. We said that Assad would
use aircraft and nobody believe us and he did it. And now we are telling everybody,
"We told you that Assad is going," and there's no doubt because (indiscernible) Assad used
the chemical weapons and it was also positioned (indiscernible). It's under control of Assad
regime. (indiscernible) Assad regime. So we are telling the people please help the people,
the Syrian people (indiscernible) Assad not to use the chemical weapons (indiscernible)
killing the Syrian people. That's what I want to tell the world.
>>Nicholas Thompson: All right. Thank you very much, Major El-Rayyes. Thank you, Mazen.
Thank you, Google, for organizing this Hangout. Thank you.
[ Applause ]