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[APPLAUSE]
ERIC SCHMIDT: It is a pleasure to welcome you back, Dr.
Kissinger, to Google.
You were here a few years ago to a
sellout crowd of Googlers.
Dr. Kissinger is back, having already met with some of the
key members of our search and legal team.
And he's come for his demo of Google Glass and a few other
things like that.
For those of you who don't know why Dr. Kissinger
matters, it's worth understanding the life that he
has led and the impact that he has had.
For those of you that have not followed it, this is the man
who, in many ways, made globalization
happen in the world.
This is the man who settled the war that
would have killed me.
This is the man who drove American foreign policy not
just in one presidency, but I would say for decades in terms
of an impact and role.
It'd be fair to say that it's great to see someone of your
intellect, educated, professor at Harvard, in politics and
governance.
Because he understands the consequences of what he did
and the impact he had.
But more importantly, he understands it with the
historic context.
So welcome to Google, Dr. Kissinger.
HENRY KISSINGER: Thank you.
[APPLAUSE]
HENRY KISSINGER: Eric is leaving me in the position I
was in at a reception once, where a lady came up to me and
said, I understand you are a fascinating man.
She said, fascinate me.
[LAUGHTER]
HENRY KISSINGER: It was not one of the best conversations
I ever had.
[LAUGHTER]
HENRY KISSINGER: But I appreciate what
have you have said.
And I'm a great admirer of what Google is doing, even
though I have thought about the long-term impact, as we
have discussed.
ERIC SCHMIDT: So what I thought we would do is, we
have some Dory questions that you all have submitted.
But I thought I'd use the privilege of the moderator to
ask some questions about what's going on in the globe
today, with the benefit of your perspective and
experience.
And let's start with some hard current problems.
Let's start with Iran, Syria, the Middle East.
You actually drove the peace process 40 years ago.
You actually made peace in the Middle East 40 years ago.
Not much has happened since, and a lot of bad things have
happened since--
nuclear bomb possibility in Tehran, the Syrian civil war,
which is horrific.
From your perspective, two questions--
what do you think will happen, just using your judgment, and
also, what should America do, if anything, about each of
these issues?
HENRY KISSINGER: In the next 10 minutes?
ERIC SCHMIDT: Yes.
[LAUGHTER]
ERIC SCHMIDT: It's Google, right?
Things are done quickly.
[LAUGHTER]
HENRY KISSINGER: I come from a generation that
learned from books.
I approach foreign policy as a history, in the sense that I
ask myself what comparable situations have existed.
And I was in office in a period of domestic discord
even more intense, in some respects,
than the current one.
Because it was when the America lost its innocence in
foreign policy and began to learn its limits.
So let me talk about the peace process in the
Middle East at the time.
When I got into office, it had been
stalemated for a long period.
And the attempt was to break the deadlock with making
proposals on the theory that somewhere out there there was
some formula that would permit the parties--
we made a different analysis.
And in the way I think of foreign policy, which I'm not
insisting everybody has to, you have to start with
analyzing the problem.
What is the issue you are trying to solve?
And what is it you're trying to get to?
So we made what you may consider a
simple-minded analysis.
We said, the Soviet Union is supplying arms to all of the
Arab countries, and we're trying to make peace between
Israel and the Arab countries.
And The Arab countries have no incentive to make any
concessions because they believe that the Soviet arms
will always give them the possibility to
insist on their demands.
And the Israelis won't make concessions because they think
it's just the prelude to a showdown.
Some of that exists today in a different form.
So we decided that be would block any initiative that was
backed by Soviet arms.
And we had to fight our own bureaucracy, which wanted to
do the traditional thing.
So we were waiting.
We were betting on the fact that some Arab leader along
the way would change.
And it was a long wait.
It took about four years.
But when the Arab-Israeli board started in '73, we sent
a message to Sadat, and said to him, you're now making war
with Soviet arms.
But remember, you have to make peace with American diplomacy.
So then he switched and began to work
with American diplomacy.
That was the essence.
We don't have a comparable situation today.
Because if you take Iran, we know that the acquisition of
nuclear weapons by Iran will have huge consequences for
[INAUDIBLE].
But Iran is under no pressure to do anything.
And if you look at the negotiating record, and
compare the American position today from what it was at the
beginning of the negotiation about 10 years ago, you will
see that with every negotiation, we have made a
new offer on the theory that somewhere there is something.
And so in a way, we are negotiating with ourselves.
So you asked me what will happen.
Absent some significant additional pressure on Iran,
Iran will get nuclear weapons.
ERIC SCHMIDT: And then what happens?
HENRY KISSINGER: And the addition of pressure now is
much harder to organize than it would have been.
Because it would have to be the threat of force by us or
the threat of force by Israel.
And we have moved from--
the original American position was Iran could not have any
principle and any facilities to produce fissionable
material, no reprocessing.
We have now moved to agreeing that there are certain types
of reprocessing and enrichment they could do, and that the
only thing that's a red line is the
acquisition of nuclear weapons.
Which if you have enough fissionable material, it's
relatively easy to do.
So I would say the probability is that Iran
will get nuclear weapons.
Or, as Netanyahu said last weekend, that Israel may go to
war to prevent that.
And then we will have--
ERIC SCHMIDT: A real mess.
HENRY KISSINGER: --quite a mess.
ERIC SCHMIDT: Well, you lived through '67, '73 wars in the
government and in the campaign.
In a situation where Iran actually gets a nuclear
weapon, and Israel is now on a war footing, the Sunni will
then also get nuclear weapons.
And then we'll have a nuclearized
Arab-Israeli world.
Is that roughly correct?
HENRY KISSINGER: Yes.
I would think that if Iran gets nuclear weapons, the
Sunni world will acquire nuclear weapons.
And then nuclear weapons will have spread into countries
that are not as technically able or rich enough to
safeguard them the way they were safeguarded in the
two-power world.
And when I think back to my experience, we lived,
essentially, in a two-power nuclear world.
And people sometimes ask me what was my biggest worry.
I wasn't in a fret.
I can't say I wasn't worried.
But the day to day activities, I felt, I was there to handle.
The question I could never answer for
myself fully was this--
what if we reach a point where the only
recourse is nuclear weapons?
Would I be prepared to recommend to the
president to use it?
And the issue was that the casualties that could be
produced in a matter of hours was so vast that and would
live in a new world.
And it raised the question of if anybody had the moral right
to do that.
Luckily, we never got to the point where I had to give a
final answer.
But probably I wouldn't have recommended it.
But I'm not arguing that.
But now you have countries that don't have these systems
and some countries that have a ideology according to which a
lot of human life makes you more eligible
for heavenly bliss.
So then I think if they do spread, generally, nuclear war
will become more likely.
People say, yes, we can always deter them.
But this isn't like Russia.
Russia had comparable risks as we did, as between religious
Islam and countries, the assessment of risk is not
homogeneous.
ERIC SCHMIDT: Your history, of course, was that you were a
professor at Harvard and worked on the Richard Nixon
campaign, and when he became president, became national
security adviser, secretary of state, and eventually held all
of those jobs.
HENRY KISSINGER: No, I didn't work on the Nixon campaign.
I worked on the Rockefeller campaign against Nixon.
ERIC SCHMIDT: Oh.
[LAUGHTER]
HENRY KISSINGER: No, it was strange.
Could never happen today, that a principle advisor of one
candidate gets invited by the other candidate to be his
security advisor.
It was very courageous of Nixon.
ERIC SCHMIDT: So for those of you who--
I was a teenager at the time.
And when this grand bargain between Dr. Kissinger and the
president came together, it was a subject of extraordinary
interest in the press.
And Dr. Kissinger was followed everywhere, and was seen as
this incredibly powerful role.
And in history, people talk a lot about the relationship
between yourself and President Nixon.
I am extremely grateful to you because I would have been
drafted, sent to Vietnam, and, in my view, killed.
And because you managed to settle the
war, I am here today.
And for those of you who are not my age, which is the vast
majority of you, it's very difficult to describe what it
feels like to have a draft card and have your friends
being drafted.
And this really was the reality, which, of course,
tore the country apart.
What was the nature of the relationship with you and
President Nixon that allowed you two together to do
something extraordinary in China, do something
extraordinary in the Israeli world, and the Vietnam War.
What was the nature of it?
HENRY KISSINGER: I had never met Nixon when he asked me to
be his security advisor.
Nixon was personally so insecure in his personal
relationships that when he asked me to be his security
adviser, I didn't know what he wanted.
I knew he wanted something.
But he didn't want to be rebuffed.
So we had a two-hour conversation.
And I left knowing he wanted something, but not knowing
what it was.
A week later, John Mitchell called me up and said, well,
are you going to take the job or not?
And I said, what job?
[LAUGHTER]
HENRY KISSINGER: And Mitchell said, oh my God, he screwed
this up again.
[LAUGHTER]
HENRY KISSINGER: So now I go to Nixon again.
This time he offers me the job unambiguously.
And again, this was a different age, and so you have
to consider a Harvard professor's arrogance.
I said to Nixon, I've opposed you for 15 years, and I want
to spend a week asking my friends, because I don't want
to lose my friends.
[LAUGHTER]
HENRY KISSINGER: And he should have said get lost.
He said take a week.
On the second day of that week, Nelson Rockefeller, who
had been in Venezuela and unreachable--
different period--
called me--
came back.
And I told him what had happened.
And he said, has it ever occurred to you that Nixon is
taking a bigger chance on you than you on him?
Which was absolutely true.
So I accepted.
So the question is, what brought us together?
The way the relationship worked was not--
on a personal basis, we were not great friends.
We saw each other socially relatively daily, considering
that we spent many days together.
But I had studied the making of peace, the creation of
international order.
I was going to write a series of books on that subject.
He was [INAUDIBLE], and therefore he had also done a
lot of reading.
So strangely, unexpectedly, both of us liked to begin with
the question I put to you before, which is analyzing
where are we.
What are we to try to do?
And on that basis--
not on the basis of personal friendship--
we came to a very parallel conclusions.
And for example, take the opening to China.
There had been 163 meetings of American ambassador and the
Chinese ambassador in Warsaw to discuss
the opening of relations.
And there was a well defined agenda, which had to do with
Taiwan, claims and assets, various immunity claims.
It was a long list, and not one of them had been settled.
So when Nixon sent me to China, there were no
communications between China and the United States.
But it was also technically not possible for me.
I couldn't pick up the phone and call them and say, it's
going this way.
So we decided--
we hadn't even met the Chinese yet--
that I would scrap the entire program, and that I would say
to the Chinese, before we go back to a program, let's first
try to understand where each of us is going.
And so if you read the transcripts of my so-called
secret visit, you will see that Chou and I talked like
two college professors, explaining to each other what
our country is trying to do.
On my second visit, before Nixon got there--
and the way Nixon and I operated on these things was
we never wanted to be in a position where everything
depended on Nixon's conversations
with the other leader.
Because if you get to that point among heads of state,
there's nothing to have recourse to.
So I was sent to China a second time to work out what
later became known as the Shanghai Communique.
And I arrived with a communique approved by Nixon
that was a very traditional communique.
And Chou and I first accepted it.
Then Mao saw it.
And Mao said, this is ***.
It pretends that we agree on everything.
And we don't.
So why don't we do something different.
Why don't we put all our disagreements into this
communique, and put a few agreements at the end.
Then the agreements will be taken seriously.
So I was stuck in Beijing.
I couldn't call Nixon and say, we've just reversed everything
you've already approved.
But I felt absolutely confident that he would
approve it.
So I'm saying this not to prove anything about myself,
but to show what was the nature of the relationship.
So on the one hand, it was personally friendly but aloof,
but substantively very intense.
ERIC SCHMIDT: Today, when you go to Beijing, there the three
major terminals.
You've been many times since.
And there is the little terminal where your airplane
landed for the first visit that you opened up.
Whenever I go by that, I see that terminal.
And I imagine you in the early 1970s doing that, and a
country full of bicycles and gray uniforms.
What was Mao like, and what was the culture like as you
engaged it?
How did it feel when you landed and when
you spoke with them?
HENRY KISSINGER: Before we get to this, let
me explain to you--
a few months ago, the Chinese gave a dinner for me.
And they found everybody who had ever met me, especially on
the secret trip.
And they all told me the troubles they went through
preparing the jet for travel.
There had never been a 707 land in China.
So they didn't have a game plan for it.
And they couldn't order one, because they didn't want to
put out the word that a 707 was coming.
So they constructed one from pictures.
And they weren't sure what would actually happen, but it
would fit properly.
So then a lady was in charge of preparing the guest house
where I was going to stay.
And she got it into her head that Americans like lawns.
But unfortunately, the space in front of the guest house,
because of the Cultural Revolution, had been planted
with spinach.
So she had four weeks to get a lawn down.
[LAUGHTER]
HENRY KISSINGER: Those were the problems the Chinese had.
What was Mao like, was the question.
Also, to give you a flavor of how these relationships were,
on my first visit, my so-called secret visit, I was
probably the only visitor to China who made heroic efforts
to avoid meeting Mao.
And the belief was that with all the friendship [INAUDIBLE]
between Nixon and me, I knew he wanted to be the first
American to meet Mao.
And I knew it was a risk to my relationship with him.
So Mao had given orders, we now know, he didn't want to
ask for a meeting.
So as soon as I asked for a meeting, I was to
be brought to him.
ERIC SCHMIDT: And you don't ask.
HENRY KISSINGER: And I didn't ask.
[LAUGHTER]
HENRY KISSINGER: And so my whole secret visit was spent
talking to Chou Enlai, which was no hardship.
But what was Mao like?
I met him five times.
And of course, he's responsible for the killing of
tens of millions of people.
The Mao I met was not the killer Mao.
It was a acting like a Chinese saint.
He was extremely intelligent.
He conducted the conversations.
Almost all leading statesmen that I've met say, I've got
five points I have to make to you, and
they make their points.
He wouldn't do that.
He would begin by saying, what is your consideration of--
give you a topic.
Then you'd say whatever you said.
And he'd keep that dialogue going.
So you really engaged in a Socratic dialogue with him.
I had one meeting that lasted four hours.
And it lasted four hours because he had decided to
replace Chou Enlai, which we didn't know.
But he wanted a Bible in which he had commented on every
aspect of foreign policy so it could be used as a reference
statement for the Chinese bureaucracy after Chou Enlai
disappeared.
And David [INAUDIBLE]
was with me, who had met de Gaulle.
And he said that was one of the most astonishing
intellectual performances.
And he would make sarcastic comments.
He was always polite, but he'd say such things as, you
Americans remind me of swallows.
He stopped and turned to the interpreter and said, should I
have said sparrows?
No, they decided to say swallows.
of swallows that fly up into the air when a storm
approaches and flap your wings.
But you, professor, and I know that the flapping of the wings
does not affect the coming of the storm.
So he'd make these comments, but it would
always get to a point.
So he was a personality that really dominated any room,
with a really superb strategic grasp.
Now, he would kill anybody who got in his way.
That's another side of him.
Which I didn't see.
But we all know about it, unchallenged.
ERIC SCHMIDT: So after my trip to North Korea, you and I
spoke a little bit about North Korea.
What do you think will happen in the relationship between
China and North Korea?
You told me, at the time, that the only thing that matters is
China's support for North Korea at this point.
HENRY KISSINGER: I think--
as a general proposition--
we are now at the point where, partly because of Chinese
internal necessities, and partly because its new
leadership has a different life experience than some of
the previous ones-- new leadership in China--
that it's a possibility of recasting the Sino-American
relationship.
And a new Chinese leader has put it in this question, is it
possible for two countries that are normally adversaries
to move into a cooperative relationship?
And he made that as a challenge.
I believe that he has every incentive to answer this
constructively because of the enormous consequences of the
changes that he's thinking of making.
If that is true, a good test case will be Korea.
Because that is an issue that can only be solved between
China the United States initially.
And I'm beginning think it may be possible.
And if that happens, some of the proliferation issues that
I mentioned to you before will be dramatically changed.
If some country is actually giving up nuclear weapons
because of the collaboration of two
major nuclear countries.
And the North Korea you saw I thought had very little
likelihood.
And I probably said that to you.
And now I think it's conceivable to me that it
could happen, say, in the next two years.
ERIC SCHMIDT: I'd like to move to some of the Dory questions
that our employees have submitted.
And as you can imagine, there are quite a few questions
about a young man who's name is Edward Snowden, who is
currently in temporary residence at
the airport in Russia.
One of the questions is, "How do you feel that Edward
Snowden's current political limbo will play out?
If you were advising either the US or Russia on the
situation, what advice would you offer either the US or
Russia?" And I do know that you give advice to both the US
and Russia.
There's another question from an employee.
"Do you still believe, as was reported around the Pentagon
Papers, that people who leak government misdeeds should be
prosecuted?
Why shouldn't we prosecute the officials who committed the
misdeeds first?" What is your view of Snowden, PRISM, NSA
spying, Russia, the US?
What will happen?
HENRY KISSINGER: My view of--
I find Snowden despicable.
The acquisition by any one institution of such a monopoly
of information that cannot be checked by any institutional
process in the hands of a few people I find worrisome.
And so I am not at ease about the NSA collection.
But I recognize the problem with which they were dealing.
And I don't know enough about it and I don't know enough
technology to know whether it could have been done in a more
discriminating way.
But if somebody said to me, should we take another look at
this vast collection?
I would say, yes, we should take another look at this.
Should one man assume the right to pass out that level
of information, doing such enormous damage to our
intelligence capabilities?
Because once the other side knows what you are capable of
collecting, it will force you into
another totally new field.
Of course, if somebody's aware of an individual misdeed, he
may fulfill a moral necessity to be a whistleblower.
But when somebody arrogates to himself the right to do such
enormous damage to his society without any attempt to
understand where it comes from, I think it's just a form
of, I think, a kind of self-regard that
I find quite repulsive.
Now, on the Pentagon Papers, it's not correct that I
advocated the prosecution of it.
I recommended nothing in particular.
But the Pentagon Papers raised, again, the issue.
They were released while I was preparing the secret trip to
China, in the same months, and while we were conducting
negotiations with Vietnam on ending the war.
And I thought that if you dump out 15,000 papers, it says
something about the ability of your government to conduct any
meaningful direct secret negotiation, that the effort
there had to be resisted.
And you also understand this about the Pentagon Papers.
These were papers collected in the Johnson Administration
about the leaker's perception of misdeeds in the Kennedy and
Johnson Administration.
Not one of them touched the Nixon Administration.
And if one had played it as a straight political thing, it
would have been possible for us to say, now
you see what we inherited.
It's a pity they're out, but you now understand.
We were defending Nixon and Kennedy papers--
Johnson and Kennedy papers, not Nixon papers.
But the magnitude of the Pentagon Papers were
children's game.
Because most of them, it turned out, were really quite
irrelevant.
Because they were second-level papers.
They came about because McNamara had ordered a study
when he was secretary of defense of what went wrong.
And they were all connected in one place, and
so they were leaked.
So I can respect people who leak about
a particular misdeed.
I do not respect people who endanger the national security
the way Snowden has.
ERIC SCHMIDT: So you and I have talked some about your
view of democracy and your view of history and how the
globe is changing.
And I wanted to talk a little bit about that, a little bit
about leadership, and then I want to talk a little bit
about your view of Google and the things Google should do
and should not do as we conclude.
When I interviewed you for my book, and thank you very much
for that, you indicated that true great leaders are
extremely rare.
And I inferred from that that it's even harder today to
become a great leader-- to be found, to be
elected, to be appointed.
You mentioned in our conversation that de Gaulle
was one of these great leaders who
managed to unify a society.
I know you're thinking about this in
terms of global structure.
What do you think will happen with the next
generation of leaders?
Are you optimistic, in this new world, highly connected,
very short-term focused, that we'll end up with eventually
better leaders?
Worse leaders?
Different leaders?
HENRY KISSINGER: Of course, you all understand that I come
from a different world.
And I see that when I deal with my grandchildren.
And I don't deplore this.
But the task of a leader is to take its society, or his
organization, from where it is to where it has never been.
And that means, inevitably, that he will face opposition
from the world as it is, to some extent.
Now, that, of course, requires great insight.
But it also requires enormous moral courage.
Because you have to rely on your own convictions until
your society has caught up with you.
Churchill had this quality.
De Gaulle had this quality.
I would argue Franklin Roosevelt had this quality.
Now, in the modern technological world, I see a
lot of leaders in the technology side that would
meet these requirements.
But in the political side, the world is presented, if you'll
forgive me, by Google through fragmented excerpts from a
wide range of sources.
There's more information available than anybody ever
dreamed of.
But how to translate that information into knowledge
that is relevant to a historical process and into
wisdom, into the next step, that cannot be met.
At least, I don't think it has been met by existing search
engines approach.
When I look at my own life, when I first started meeting
political leaders, they asked me what to think.
Then they now ask me what to say.
It's a different problem.
And now they don't even ask that anymore, because they go
to search engines to tell them what the dominant view is.
I read somewhere that Obama had 48 million card files,
which told him who the friends of people were.
And I know Romney had 10 million [INAUDIBLE].
But next time, they both will have 48 million.
And I'm worried about the future of democracy.
If you don't have debates about issues that are
generated out of the gut of the leaders, but where instead
the leaders go to technical experts to tell them what the
mood is, well, I think that the requirement of a leader is
to say where you ought to go, not where you are.
And that's my concern with the long-term social impact of a
great institution that I admire, like Google.
ERIC SCHMIDT: So you have expressed privately some
concerns that Google actually needs to think about our role,
that because so many people are using Google, that we're
actually shaping the discussion.
Can you express what should we do differently, if anything?
HENRY KISSINGER: As I've said innumerable times here, I know
I'm from a different world.
I am not attacking this world.
This is the world in which we're going to live.
I think that my concern about Google results from its
excellence, not from its failures.
ERIC SCHMIDT: OK, we'll take that.
HENRY KISSINGER: No, if I could say you're cooking the
result deliberately--
ERIC SCHMIDT: Which we are not.
[LAUGHTER]
ERIC SCHMIDT: So we're clear.
HENRY KISSINGER: No.
No, if I could say that, then that's one problem.
That's very relatively easily fixable.
But when you are the best engine for producing facts--
but when sometimes the issue is, in terms of long-range
thinking, not what is a fact but what's a relevant fact,
then it creates a concern.
I don't know what you should do.
I talked to you about setting up an internal system of
checks and balances, which indicates how much confidence
I have in you.
No, I'm not saying the government should do this.
But I'm talking about a 50-year perspective.
I'm not talking about the next year or two.
And I don't know whether there is an answer.
And this grows out of my respect for Eric, so that I
occasionally tell him a concern I have.
This is not something I'm taking
public or arguing about.
But it's on my mind.
ERIC SCHMIDT: I do think one of your criticisms is that
we've gone from reading books to five word sentences, that
there is a change in your lifetime, which you're very
worried about, about information.
Is that roughly correct?
HENRY KISSINGER: When I look at, say, the Lincoln debate,
or the Gladstone-Disraeli Debate, you had political
leaders who absorbed a lot of facts, and then presented them
in two hour [INAUDIBLE]
to an interested public so that they internalize.
When you learn things in fragments from a search
machine, you don't necessarily internalize it.
Because look at it and you absorb it for the moment.
But you don't have to internalize it because you can
always get the answer again when you need it.
But some things you ought to internalize even if you don't
need it at the moment.
But on the other hand, you make available a range of
information that is so far superior to anything previous
generations had.
I look at it from the point of view that when societies run
up against problems that they cannot solve, that some
demagogue, Caesar, emerges somewhere along the line.
ERIC SCHMIDT: I'm sorry-- meaning that the person just
sort of captures the conversation as a demagogue?
HENRY KISSINGER: Captures the conversation as a demagogue.
And when 250 million card files are debating each other,
or printouts, or whatever you call them--
ERIC SCHMIDT: In our case, it's called big data.
HENRY KISSINGER: That's what worries me, the fact that
there are a lot of things that worry me in the world that I
can't do anything about.
And I didn't think we would take the conversation public,
but that is my view.
ERIC SCHMIDT: But one answer to your question, which is why
I wanted to ask you directly, would be if Google could
invent technology that could take the information that's
currently arranged and construct something of the
quality of a Lincoln debate, or an Israeli debate.
If that worked, that would be a big improvement?
HENRY KISSINGER: Yes.
Or some way to get different interpretations that people
can reflect about as they're forming their own opinions.
Because in the political world, you finally meet people
who are willing to stand up against what seems to be the
conventional wisdom from time to time.
ERIC SCHMIDT: One of the things that Google is in fact
working on is the ability to more deeply understand subject
area, that information.
And there are research projects inside the company,
some people here in the room, who are in fact trying to
solve the problem that you laid out.
And I'm really glad that you were able to come to state it
as clearly as possible.
We've reached the end of our time.
I wanted to tell you all that, for me,
great strategy matters.
When I look at politics--
I spend a lot of time in these worlds now--
the greatest strategies start from a principle of, what are
we trying to accomplish?
and figuring out a way to get there.
The man to my right has had a series of extraordinary
strategies.
And I wanted you to hear how he approached them, and how he
actually dealt with the reality of the time.
And I would say that the world is a far, far better place
because of the opening up of the world that I think you
properly deserve the credit for.
It is a great honor to have you here
at Google, Dr. Kissinger.
Thank you very much.
HENRY KISSINGER: Thank you.
[APPLAUSE]