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Week in review
I am Tomasz Kempski, welcome to the "Week in review".
Today's subject is Ukraine in Europe.
Are protests in Ukraine exclusively political
or is it more than that? Perhaps a struggle
to make a civilisational choice with no alternatives available?
My today's guest is professor Marek Cichocki
A historian of ideas, philosopher, political scientist and
the editor of the "Teologia Polityczna" journal.
When you observe the situation in Ukraine, do you think
it is a pro-European, pro-EU protest or simply an anti-government protest?
I think all these attitudes combine in these protests, because
Yanukovych turned out to be a big disappointment, especially for
the pro-European part of Ukraine. There is also a feeling of necessity
of a runoff after the unsucessful Orange Revolution
which collapsed or negated itself in a certain sense.
Certainly there are also honest aspirations to make Ukraine's development
head towards Europe. These people are trying to express their inner beliefs
that they are part of Europe and not signing the Association Agreement
is an effort to divert this development, which is something they strongly oppose.
As members of the EU and as part of Europe we observe mostly protests
against this European project, moreso than movements supporting it.
So is it a struggle for the EU or a struggle for the sake of being
a member of the Western civilisation, which Europe is part of?
No, I'd say it is a struggle for the sake of Ukraine
which defines itself as an integral part of Europe.
The EU in this case is a certain symbol, a certain point of reference
a certain reality, which this European development is associated with.
But I think it's not just a struggle for the possibility of using EU funds
in the future nor is it just about the convinction that
it is necessary to embrace all solutions suggested by European insitutions.
It's above all a struggle for the European civilisation
and against the "other" Eurasian civilisation.
I asked this because media have been paying a lot of attention to Ukraine
without emphasizing Europe as more than a legal and political or national entity
but Europe as a deeper dimension of some sort.
I was reading John Paul II's texts from his visit to Ukraine.
He said that Ukraine's objective is to be come a member of Europe.
He put Europe in a broader context.
I don't notice that context in discussions about Ukraine now.
It is necessary to see that broader context for sure.
But then we refer to a civilisational, historic and symbolic choice of identity.
Maybe because of that Russia's reactions have been so strong.
as it attempts at all costs not to allow this
symbolic civilisational and historic gesture to happen.
When we mention the Association Agreement we think about technical details
and legal solutions with financial implications.
They don't really add up to a serious turnover in Ukraine's functionality.
As someone correctly pointed out recently, it is an Association Agreement
that is expanded but comparable with the EU's agreement with Chile, for example.
With these solutions Ukraine won't cross the Rubicon by signing the Agreement.
For that reason no one imagined Russia's reaction would be so negative.
But precisely because of the broader context the reaction is so strong
because symbolically Ukraine's identity might cross the Rubicon.
The Maidan protesters are aware of the symbolic significance of the situation.
Sławomir Sierakowski in New York Times said that "it seems Brussels believes less
in the chances of democracy in Ukraine than the United States did in distant Iraq.
Does it show that the EU 's foundations are completely different than the USA's?
There is one basic difference: the EU is not as united politically as the US.
The USA is an united entity in matters of foreign affairs.
Therefore it is able to define its priorities and objectives.
So the US can decide that changes in Iraq or potentially Iran
significant to the American politics.
The EU is different. It consists of various countries with various
outlooks on Eastern Europe, Ukraine included.
We shouldn't fool ourselves that all of the EU countries are interested
in Ukraine's situation and have an agenda in pulling Ukraine towards the EU.
Some countries are simply scared of Russia or worry their deals with
Russia might be harmed. This attitude is ambiguous and contrary to itself.
The priorities you mentioned seem crucial to me.
If that Association Agreement was signed between Ukraine and the EU
Ukraine would lose the Russian market.
How would the divided EU react then as a united community?
Would we only see reaction from particular countries?
I don't think Ukraine would lose the Russian market by signing the Agreement.
"Lose" symbolically.
Ukraine could lose the Russian market only if Russia decided so
by imposing sanctions and barriers as a punishment.
Just as it happened with new member states after 2004.
We've experienced and still experience this sort of treatment from Russia.
As a punishment the import of Polish products to the Russian market
has been banned. Russia also has threatened to cut off gas supplies.
It's surely a very important factor that allows us to examine
how much the internal mechanism of solidarity between the member states
and the neighbouring states which the EU should care for.
Just how well this solidarity factor really works.
Herein lies a certain problem. Ukrainians have reasons to be afraid of Russia
but they also should feel the EU countries will support them
or the EU as a whole. It's a matter of facilitating visa-free traffic
which is very important to the Ukrainian people
as well as an assurance that if Russia really used the gas blackmail
the Ukrainians wouldn't be left alone with that problem
but would receive support. The EU of course isn't able to cover all needs
of a country that massive. But symbolically and psychologically
it would be of great significance.
But can they be sure to expect that solidarity now?
No, they can't. Because of that ambiguity in the EU's politics toward
Ukraine, Russia managed to play its fear, doubt and lack of trust
cards very successfully and beneficially to its interests.
So perhaps the EU's politics is too pragmatic, while it should
also embrace merits that Ukraine aspires to?
It's not complicated. The scale of Ukraine's situation was too big
and it overwhelmed the EU institutions' ability to react quickly.
On a smaller scale, for example in Moldova, which experienced
exactly the same thing from Russia, that is various types of blackmail.
On that smaller scale the EU was able to react.
With delay, but nevertheless it did react.
When Russians imposed a Moldovan wine embargo
the EU was able to make the decision to open its market to these products.
In the case of lifting visa requirements
the EU was able to discuss practical solutions to this problem.
I think that if Moldova had been blackmailed by Russia over gas
there would be ways of helping its people with keeping warm in winter.
Even via an airlift that would deliver gas supplies in cylinders
with an EU sticker on it. That solution would be possible.
Ukrainie is surely a bigger problem.
There is also a bigger fear in the EU of what Russia might do
in the case of Ukraine. Also many people in Europe consider it to be
simply an infrangible part of Russia's domain of influences so we
shouldn't intefere with its business.
Professor Marek Cichocki, the editor of the
"Teologia Polityczna" journal, was today's guest of the "Week in Review".
Thank you very much, professor.
Thank you.
Thank you for very much for watching.