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Shamil Sultanov, president of the Center for Strategic Studies Russia - Islamic World
The Arab world is in a systemic crisis. The simplest notion of what a systemic crisis is: in the Arab world, you will not find any area of life in which there would not be a huge key unsolvable problem.
Therefore, in 2011, the revolution did not happen, it just started. This is my next thesis.
Because the life-cycle of every revolution as a phenomenon lasts for about 20-25 years.
So it began, and it will end, let's hope, somewhere in 2030.
Every revolution has seven, and some researchers say, eight stages.
In Egypt, the revolution has now moved into the third stage, these stages are cyclical in nature, the nature of recovery, reducing the trend, etc.
A characteristic feature of each of the revolutions, including the Arab revolution, is that it involves millions and tens of millions of people.
This distinguishes it from coups, rebellions, etc. Therefore, in 2011 the revolution began, and in 1952 there was a coup.
Not because it shifted Morsi, but because Egypt, in the first place, the heart of the Arab world, is a key country.
It provides an example of what will happen in another country, in many other countries.
A second point is that one of the most important, perhaps, the most important trend of the Islamic world and the Arab world over the past decade has found its place in Egypt.
I mean the strengthening of the Islamic trend.
The problem for the "Muslim Brotherhood" is the following, it also correlates with the general principles of the revolution -
you should always, especially in the beginning, as the leader of the process, take into account the fundamental interests of the basic requirements of the social groups and the classes that have supported you.
What was supported in terms of foreign policy by the tens of millions of Egyptians in 2011? The three main points.
The breaking of the Camp David Agreement, an exit from the sphere of influence of the U.S., and huge support for the Palestinians.
None of these three points were not observed by Morsi.
What did the supporters of the "Ikhwan" demand in the economic sphere? They demanded even a minimal improvement, even if in the form of hope of improving the socio-economic status.
In one year, a year and a half, the number of Egyptians who live on $2 a day, has increased by 20%.
If in 2011 it was 40% of Egyptians, by the end of 2012 it is almost 50%.
The fight here between the military coup plotters and the supporters of Morsi is just beginning.
Now, they timed it well just before Ramadan, but still, tens of thousands of people are in the four main squares in Egypt and in other cities some clashes occur.
And there is, of course, one very important point. The fact is that those who will stimulate a civil war will lose.
So here, I repeat, a very important point is that uncertainty, I would say, the strategic uncertainty of the Egyptian situation has worsened.
Yes, they are momentarily united in a war with the left, socialists, liberals, secular circles.
Immediately after July 3, this united front began to split. El Baradei was appointed vice-president.
But on the other hand, the National Salvation Front, which brings together dozens of liberal parties and the secular section, they opposed the declaration made by the interim President Mansour.
This split in Egyptian society will grow in the next few months.
Usually, again, the background shows that, unless there is a brutal military coup that would claim tens of thousands of lives, and as a result, establish a dictatorship,
if this does not happen, then the Islamists, "the Muslim Brotherhood" will go on the offensive.