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bjbj Naftali: how the Congressman's views of President Nixon shaped the way that you
handled this? Brien: No, I don't think so. I think clearly he's a Democrat and clearly
he would vote for a democratic Presidential candidate, but when this obligation was thrust
upon him, his view was the institution of the Presidency and being who he was he had
just extraordinary respect and awe for the Presidency. This was the center of everything
that he believed in as a patriot. So Nixon in a sense was just a holder of that institution,
but he felt what he was being asked to do and what his Committee and the House was being
asked to do, what Congress was being asked to do is to view a holder of this institution,
but he felt the institution above all had to be protected. He didn't have the visceral
feelings about Nixon, I think, as I said earlier I think there was some disappointment when
he heard the tapes, but those are personal disappointments about his language and that
he felt wasn't very Presidential, but he didn't have that partisan anger that was so prevalent
amongst many sort of anti-war or very liberal members of the Democratic Party. He never
voiced that kind of view this was before or after, but he voiced with great disappointment
that he felt that this individual would abuse the office. That was more of a disappointment
in President Nixon than anything else. Naftali: How important was the fact that he was an
immigrant? Brien: Extremely important. I think it formed his whole view that here was an
opportunity as a young man to be an immigrant to come to this country. It's all the clich
s. He embodied all the clich s of you could grow up to be anything. He worked really hard
at this. As a young man, the stories are that he would go out and practice speech making.
He would put marbles in his mouth as I think probably something the Greeks or Aristophanes
or somebody did , but to be able to enunciate, he wanted to be American. That's what he wanted.
He wanted to be an American. He wanted to sound, talk and be an American and be a patriot.
Long before it meant anything, always wore a little flag in his lapel. It wasn't like
a signal whether you were liberal or conservative. It was a patriot. I think that, again, became
very important historically acts of history. Here he was always like groomed; he was groomed
for this for this task. Naftali: Thank you. Tell us about the decision to put cameras
in. Brien: He always said to me that I wound up have to deal with all the I never met a
press person in my life until I got to the office. I had no contact with press people.
Every day out in front of the office would be 25 or 30 press people every day following
the case. They'd follow Rodino. They'd follow Doar, just everybody else, but I must say,
just the quality of the press corps was extraordinary at this time, extraordinary human beings in
their own right. Some of the great reporters of our time covered this story. He always
said to me and that sort of was left to me that all the press contacts, press conversations,
once in a while you would get a conversation with the Chairman and John Doar. Let's say
and all the press would make fun of it because they had no information, but we'd do it and
once in a while. We'd have a little press gathering, but it was important because the
Congressman kept saying, Remember you have to explain to the public what we're doing.
This is how you explain it you don't get leaks or anything like that, so on a regular basis,
we had to let the public know what's going on, what the process is, very important, the
process, why this is being done. As this was going on, I just sort of thought in my mind,
well, this is going to be televised, obviously. I mean when the hearings actually take place,
the American public has to view it. It was very interesting. I was very formed by the
Watergate Hearings. If you remember, during the hearings, it was very chaotic cameras
and all that kind of stuff. I had this vision, eventually by the way, I went in the movie
business. I got this visual idea that I wanted the public and I talked to the Congressman
a lot about this, too, that when we as citizens came in to view this. I wanted them to feel
intimacy that they and their members were in a conversation in a sense. That they were
talking to them. I wanted everything that remotely looked like a television or a cable,
I want it gone. I had this very clean view. You can imagine doing this today. I went to
the networks and I went to New York met with all the network Presidents and I said, This
is my vision. This is some kid from Ohio. I had a vision, so I had a vision. I said,
This is my vision. I want this. I don't want any cameras. They said, What do you mean?
I said, I want no cameras. They proceeded, of course. I was taken to task for this because
I had not asked for the Speaker's approval. The Committee Room was on the first floor,
so I had them build behind the Committee because I would not allow cameras I did not want any
cameras behind the members where you and I could see them. They had to build a room outside
the building where they would place the cameras and all the equipment. Then there were little
curtains behind the members and then they would have little holes and there would be
none of these wires. Then in that back of the room there would be a stand built which
then you'd get the view of the Committee. They bought all this at their own expense.
They said, Absolutely. If you look at it, if you look at the hearings on television,
I doubt if you'll see any cameras, television cameras, but that was sort of the idea, but
that's sort of the mechanics of how it was done. The important thing is they re televised.
Once this had already been cast, I know John was very nervous about this decision. That
it just made him very nervous that he thought this was going to be televised. That I remember.
Congressman was less I mean this is his world. This is what he had dealt with, what else
are you going to do? This is the age we live in, but then the decision was made we would
televise and, of course, the rest is the rest. There was some discussion around that, but
it was all after it was all done. Naftali: Francis, got to ask you this. You told us
about the role that the Congressman plays as the Chairman. Did the Chairman want it
to be televised? Brien: I can't recall. Naftali: It fits because you're smiling. Brien: He
wanted the public to understand, but he came from an era before television. So I guess
if he had his sort of wishes, I suppose he may have chosen something else, but Naftali:
Francis, are you telling us that you went to New York and met with network executives
without already having permission to even televise these things? Brien: There was a
lot of pressure. There was a lot of pressure. No decisions were made. I did go to New York.
I did meet with all the executives. I did meet with the correspondents and all that
kind of thing and had this, yes I did, but it was a fact gathering undertaking. Naftali:
That was a pretty gutsy thing to do. Brien: Again, yeah, but this came out of a relationship,
I think, with the Congressman. In other words, in my role as a staffer, never, ever would
I have done anything that was not, I think, without his approval in the sense of understanding
what his core was and, though, I think because he constantly said to me, This is a public.
This must be approved by the country, by the citizens of the country. I just don't think
he ever carried it to that. In other words, I felt very strongly that I was carrying out
his wishes. I just don't think he understood the technology how to do that. I just closed
that gap. Naftali: Was this an O'Brien Brothers idea? Brien: No, I can't blame my brother
for this. This was my idea. I can't believe the networks did this, but Naftali: Well,
what I wondered because when you describe the Doar selection process, when you describe
the Doar selection process, it's a little improvised. There's something very professional
about this vision for the room. Where did you get it? I mean was something you wanted?
Had you been interested in production before? Brien: No, no and I think back and now you
reach a certain age, I think some things you're just good at and some things you're not. I
think I was lucky enough to be I was born with certain I don't know how you wind up
with certain skills. They re not intellectual skills, but I have good people skills. Not
that I'm a good communicator, but I have people skills even at that age. I think I had a great
mentor in the Congressman. I've learned so much that I carried it the rest of my life.
I don't know why. In other words, I look back and I don't think I'd have made the same decisions
today. I don't think I would have done the things and maybe it's youth. So looking back
you say, Wow, that was a good decision, but the answer is I don't know how it winds up
that way why you re good at things or not good or that. I wasn't interested in production
or anything. I just knew what bothered me about the Watergate Hearings were all these
cameras and I just felt it was a little circusy for me. That was all. I thought it was a common
sense. Again, it's not my hearing. It sort of fit his demeanor. I always had to put myself
in his and I think I'm pretty good at that. I'm very good at putting myself into other
people s place and I think that's what I represented. I thought that's what he is. In other words,
it reflected him. It reflected the institution, again, his great respect for the institution
that's how and why would he know how to do that. I didn't know how to do it, but Naftali:
Now, you brought up this issue of televising of the proceedings when I asked you about
the Congressman showing emotion. I mean, that's how you brought it up Brien: Did I? I don't
remember. Naftali: Yeah. My point is that did he show emotion when Brien: Yeah, they
were pretty upset. He and John were very upset with me when I told them. I got yelled at.
Did you get taken to the woodshed? John took me to the woodshed, if you can imagine, and
the Congressman took me to the woodshed. Naftali: For talking to the executives? Brien: For
making this decision. It's already done. Naftali: Wait a second, I thought it was a fact finding
mission. Brien: It was being built, okay. Naftali: I'm sorry, I shouldn't Brien: Oh
yeah. I got yelled at there's no doubt about it I got yelled at, okay. I got really yelled
at. Naftali: What did the Committee members think? Brien: We never asked them. Naftali:
They didn't know they were going to be on TV? Brien: I have no idea. I can't remember.
Naftali: We have to tell the audience because they won't know this. This is a C-span world.
Congress wasn't televised. Brien: No, there was nothing on television ever. Watergate,
the Watergate Hearings were on, right. Again, all the Congressman kept saying to me all
year and he said it to everybody; it wasn't like he said it to me was this decision, whatever
it may be, had to be approved by the American citizens. I'm thinking how else would you
do this? There had to be a sense of openness. There had to be a sense. I mean he had me
going out every day to meet with all these press people and keeping them informed without
talking about the proceedings. There has to be some extraordinary trust that I had to
build up with this generation of reporters, number one. Clearly, things were said that
never got You had to give people context so and there were important institutional papers
the New York Times and all these papers. You had to deal with them and you had to give
them context constantly so that the great reporters like Jim Naughton, Bill Kovach,
there were a whole actually, it's interesting The Post was not one of the major they were
the major paper on the Watergate, but they didn't quite understand this wasn't an investigation.
In other words, they sort of missed reporting on the impeachment because it wasn't an investigation.
It wasn't a Bob Woodward, Bernstein kind of an investigation. We were not uncovering facts.
It was a process so the reporters and organizations that stepped forward were people who understood
process much better, but again, you had the Congressman kept saying, You can't leave people
in the dark. You have to, in proper time, keep people informed. I had to keep the members
informed. In other words, you had to move everybody along at the same time. My job sort
of wound up sort of dealing with the outside world and his job was to deal with the inside
world. Naftali: Did you deal with Woodward or Bernstein? Brien: No, very rarely, two
or three times. Bob Woodward came and told me, whispered those things in my ear. I said
I have no idea what he's talking about and so he went away. Naftali: By the way, was
Elizabeth Drew, one of the people that you asked for a recommendation for Brien: I don't
remember. It could have been. She's still a very close friend. Mary McGrory, I might
have asked Mary. She was a great reporter in her time. Naftali: Daniel Schorr? Brien:
No, he was too investigative reporter for that. I grew to like Dan Schorr a lot, but
he was. No, there was a whole group of Jack Nelson who was a great civil rights reporter.
It wound up there was a generation of reporters and that's when John Doar became so important.
There was a whole generation of reporters Bill Kovach, Jack Nelson and others who went
south in those early 60 s and covered the civil rights movement. Who then became bureau
chiefs and senior reporters and those are the people, we had a great rapport with them,
but the point is that's irrelevant. What's relevant is you had to keep the public informed
as you moved along. Naftali: I'm going to move to some things that might have not been
O'Brien decisions. Brien: Thank God. Naftali: The decision not to investigate, to actually
base the whole proceeding on the work done by the Watergate Special Prosecution Force,
the Senate Watergate Committee. Brien: I don't know how. I remember that that was a decision
made, but that was a decision made and I was sitting there, but sort of that was way above
me kind of thing. I didn't understand, but that was the decision made within the Committee,
within the leadership of the House and with the staff. They came to that conclusion, but
I think they thought they had everything. First, I don't think they had the manpower.
I don't think we had the wherewithal to do an original investigation I believe, but that's
Naftali: But you could have hired more people. Brien: Could have, I just don't remember now.
You'd have to ask others that were in a better position than I was. Naftali: The decision
to issue a subpoena, at least one, that must have been hard. There were some people who
did not want Brien: Very hard. I remember, again, I would be an observer in a situation
like that. When those discussions took place, extremely intense I think some of the members
and the lawyers that you will interview or have interviewed will talk about that. Just
very intense, again, not arguing, but just you didn't know what to do. These are and
that's how Rodino treated everything. Everything was momentous. I mean, again, you had to respect
the Presidency. You had to respect the institution and you had to respect the person that held
that job was President Nixon. So everything was dealt with in that context. He set the
tone. So you just don't willy-nilly send a letter to the President or subpoenas or whatever.
You just don't do that without a lot of thought, a lot of forethought. Naftali: Do you think
he was reluctant? Brien: Sure, he was reluctant. He was very reluctant. I mean, yes, he was
reluctant to do it because it was precedent setting. It was a large decision. He was very
reluctant. Naftali: Do you think that Mr. Doar had to convince him? Brien: Yes. I think
John had to present the case. He had to, as a good lawyer will, he had to present why
this was critical. Yes, absolutely. Naftali: Do you remember the decision to re-transcribe
some of the tapes because the transcripts weren't very good or it was felt they weren't
good? Brien: Yeah, I remember that, but I just remember, that it happened. Naftali:
Since you did not know how process would go, tell us about the effect of the Supreme Court
decision, the unanimous decision against the President to release the tapes. Brien: I think
it was a jolt to the Committee. This is more of a member issue. In other words, I think
that was like a moment. Wow, W-O-W, wow. I mean it just and I think it had a powerful
impact on the Republicans. That's all I remember. Naftali: Do you remember ever playing the
smoking gun tape? Brien: Naftali: Do you remember the effect of the transcript of the smoking
gun tape? Brien: Yes. Naftali: Do you remember the effect on the Chairman? Brien: Nothing.
I mean he absorbed it. I remember we talked about it one evening and just it was a rather
matter of fact conversation. I remember that kind of thing. I was like sort of flabbergasted.
I can remember myself. I was sitting there thinking, man, wow, because they just reported
this and it was all I can remember, my vague memory. It was all very matter of fact. There
was John and I think a couple of the other lawyers were there. It was a matter of fact
conversation. That s all I remember, but in my mind I'm thinking, wow, this is really
important. Naftali: Nobody knew the President was going to resign, so you had to think about
presenting to the House. What was the next step supposed to be? Brien: Actually, I had
already started. I went over and met with Mr. Mansfield what does this mean; what's
the process? He sent me off just to meet with Naftali: You meant to talk with the Senate.
Brien: Yeah, to talk about the Senate. I went over there a couple of times. I think there
was preparation. I know there was preparation. I was not involved in those conversations.
For some reason he wanted me to go start talking to the Senate before his staff did or the
Committee. I remember I had a couple of conversations with Mr. Mansfield's staff. Naftali: Can you
recall any? Brien: Just procedural, again, what's the process. I was sent on sort of
a fact finding how are you going to go about this; if this comes here, what does it mean,
that kind of thing. I think he didn't want any sort of connection from the staff because
he didn't want to give the impression that all of a sudden it was a done deal and it
was going over to the Senate. He wanted some very informal conversation. I think he was
just looking for knowledge. Naftali: This was before the votes? Brien: Yeah. Naftali:
Was there a time table when was the House supposed to vote, again, it never happened
because the President resigned? Brien: Sometime that fall. Naftali: There were going to be
a few months because, of course, your votes were at the end of July so you were going
to go into an August recess Brien: Come out in the fall. Naftali: Oh my goodness, this
would have been a drawn out process. Brien: Well, we didn't know in other words, we just
assumed that, again, nobody had been through this before so we don't know what the House
would have done. In other words, if once it left our hands, it's like that. It leaves
your hands. In other words, this goes to the full House then and other people start taking
control. Now this is now that time table is no longer the Chairman's time table. So we
just had to start making assumptions and preparing, but what conversations did play and there
was a lot of conversations, by the way, with the Speaker and with Mr. O'Neil about I mean
they had to start preparing for this if this was going to happen, but I sort of mentally
thought I guess there would have been an August break and then you just didn't know. So we
thought it would be pretty soon after the vote, but we always thought September. Naftali:
Then it would go to the Senate. Brien: Yeah, at the end of the year. What conversations
we had, he always thought this would be done by that year. Naftali: You mean the trial
would occur in the Senate by the end of the year? Brien: If in fact if in fact it the
steps to move forward, he was found charged and then tried that the process he thought
would be over. He guessed that was just random conversations, no one knew. Naftali: Did anyone
know if the inquiry, your staff, would play a role? Brien: Don't know. I don't remember
those conversations. You'd have to ask the staff. Naftali: Did the Congressman edit the
Statements of Information? Did he actually go through and make suggestions to Brien:
Uh-mm, you mean on the charges? I mean on the Naftali: First of all, I meant just the
material. Did he edit the Articles of Impeachment? Brien: Uh-mm, he did and I can't because I
don't know, but yes, they would bring over and they'd talk and he would talk about this
and this wording and that wording, what does this mean and that kind of. Yeah, there was
editing and other members, too. It was not Naftali: Did he want to get rid of a few of
these Articles because he thought that they wouldn't Brien: He thought some were, again,
he put it through the political prism of the process. I thought he and I can't remember.
I mean he was stronger about some than others. Naftali: I'm referring to the one about the
secret bombing of Cambodia, which was the Fourth Article. The Fifth was the taxes. Brien:
He thought that was too political. Naftali: The Cambodia one. Brien: Yeah. Naftali: What
about the taxes that the President set up? Brien: I don't remember. I remember the Cambodia
thing came up. We thought we'd play right into a partisan kind of anti-war. It doesn't
matter what we were or the members of the Committee, he just thought that was outside.
He wasn't comfortable. Naftali: But he couldn't prevent it. Brien: No, he couldn't, but you
asked me what he thought. Naftali: So do you think it was something he did to appease the
more liberal? Brien: Yeah, he had to. Put it to a vote, his judgment would be not to
do it, but that wasn't his call. Naftali: Part of the pressure on him and you mentioned
this to me off camera, but we didn't talk about it. You said that the White House tried
to mob him up. What did you mean? Brien: Right, Italian American from Newark, New Jersey,
it's the clich that Italians are mob connected political people. There was a lot of corruption
out of Newark. His roommate now, let me be correct, it was Congressman Addonizio that
was a Congressman and became Mayor, went to prison. There were a lot of politicians out
of the wards of Newark and surrounding area who went to prison and were found to have
connections with organized crime. The White House immediately upon once the process began
started putting stories out that he was influenced or in some way connected to the families,
the crime families of New Jersey. We had to answer this on a regular basis. We had to
deal with this issue almost every day in the early days. Papers put major investigations
on this. I do believe it was finally the Wall Street Journal came forward with a story just
ending this. There actually was a tape. There was a series of tapes. There was a tape they
uncovered, must have been FBI tape or some tape that they uncovered that where he is
brought up in the tape and I don't remember exactly, but the clear implication of the
tape is that he's not one of us. That was it. There was a story in the Wall Street Journal
and others, but very, very, intense from sort of summer started back with Vice President
Agnew right through the fall into the winter we had to deal with these constant stories
of his reported connections to organized crime. Naftali: How did you become convinced that
the White House was behind some of it? Brien: I don't know. Who else would be? I mean, it's
sort of logic. I mean who else? Where would these stories and reporters would come to
you and say, We just heard this. We knew where it was coming from. There was nothing you
could do about it you just had to stand up and say here this is who he is. This is his
record. These are his finances. You had to put your palms up, as we say. Naftali: One
of the other decisions that the Chairman had to make was whether to call witnesses to be
interrogated or interviewed. Nine people were interviewed. Chuck Colson. Do you remember
how that came about? What role the Chairman played besides making the call? Brien: Well,
he made the call to do it. There was a strong staff feeling, I think, that they had to call
these people. I never partook in any of those because that was a Committee issue. I wasn't
permitted to be in those there is no reason to be in those. I don't remember any of the
meetings themselves. Naftali: Where were you when you found out that President Nixon was
going to resign? Brien: We were sitting in our office in the Rayburn Building with the
Congressman, had a little TV set right there. We got a call, could have been from St. Clair.
We got a call from someone that the President was going to go on television. I'm trying
to remember nine o'clock; I forget and resign. We were just in utter shock. I guess we were
sitting there that night, nobody said anything. We were just in shock. It never entered our
minds, ever. At least none of the people I Naftali: You thought the President would fight
right to the trial. Brien: Why wouldn't he? He didn't show any signs I mean, there was
just nothing. It sort of took our breath away. hc\h [Content_Types].xml Iw}, $yi} _rels/.rels
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