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Welcome to this session. In this session, we will discuss Abhava or non-existences as
the seventh category of Vaisesika philosophy. As you know that Vaisesika system was propounded
by Kanada, then after Kanada there are many developments happened in Vaisesika philosophy.
So, in total there are many scholars contributing their opinion, their intellectual resources
for the development of this system. Kanada said there are six categories or padarthas.
In later period, Sivadithya is another thinker or scholar in Vaisesika philosophy; he added
another category in the list of six categories. So, therefore, we find seven categories in
Vaisesika philosophy. The seven categories are dravya, guna, action,
samanya, samavaya, visesa and abhava. The last category abhava or non-existences is
added by Sivadithya in the later period but the first six categories are mentioned by
Kanada. We have already discussed all the six categories which are having positive in
character or positive in nature. The last category remains and it is also an equally
important category according to Vaisesika philosophy.
Vaisesika philosophy or the explanation of the Vaisesika philosophy cannot be completed
without the discussion of abhava or non-existence. According to some of the Vaisesika scholars,
they said that abhava is an independent category or is an independent padartha as like dravya,
guna and so on and so forth. The reason they have given by stating that,
that abhava also satisfies the three features. What are those? First one is gyatya, avidhyatya
and astitva. So, these three features we find in case of abhava or padartha. Therefore,
they claim that abhava is an independent padartha among other padarthas.
Today, we will discuss how vaisesika scholars explained the concept abhava and what they
mean when they talk about abhava. For our general understanding, before going to the
vaisesika philosophy, let have a common understanding what we mean by abhava.
Abhava means something is empty, something is void. That is abhava. Suppose, you say
that there is no air in this room, you imply that there is no oxygen in this room because
you are feeling suffocation in this room. So, therefore abhava means something is not
there. If you say that there is no chair in this room that means, the chair that you are
referring that may exist in other room or in some other places. However, that particular
chair does not exist in that particular time in that room but we can identify the non-existences
of chair in that room. Therefore, here non-existence became an astitva.
It has its own identity and further, it can be knowable. We can know about it, we can
think about it. How we can understand the concept non-existence of something in a particular
place and in a particular time? Now, further we can give a name to that particular
chair which does not exist in this room, may be available in that room or may be available
in some other places. Therefore, according to vaisesika philosophy, abhava is an independent
category. Now, I believe you might have very common understanding what abhava means.
Now, let focus very clearly what vaisesika said about abhava. Abhava for them is a non-existence
and it is the seventh category among other category of vaisesika philosophy. As I said,
it is added by Sivadithya and endorsed by many other vaisesika thinkers by claiming
that abhava should not be understood as the negation of existence. No, non- existence
for them also equally has an independent category; it has its own identity.
We can understand this non-existence independently from others. An example they have given. If
I say that there is no tree in front of John’s house, now the non-existence of tree in front
of John’s house is understood by each and every one. The negation over here stands as
an existence for our understanding. What we have understood from this sentence is that
there is a person living in a particular house, the person name is john and in front of his
house there is no tree. Henceforth, abhava becomes an independent category among other
categories. Further, they said that this category conveys
that every experience has its counterpart in the external world. If you say that god
exist, many other thinkers they believe that god does not exist. If one claim that, that
there is neem tree exists, other equally claim that neem tree does not exist.
So, therefore the existence and non-existences depend on the spacious temporal condition.
Whenever one talks about that something exist that means, the thing which exists, it exist
by occupying a particular place in a particular time. Therefore, existence and non-existence
depend on spacious temporal conditions. We cannot say that something exist without occupying
a particular place, without signifying a particular type.
If you say that Alexander the great existed in the past, then you say that in so and so
time, in so and so kingdom. Therefore, we must understand the concept existence and
non-existence in relation to the spacious temporal world which cannot be understood
independent of spacious temporal conditions. Vaisesika thinkers also accepted that the
first six categories which are mentioned by Kanada are positive in character. Why because
if you say that dravya that means, substances they refer to a substances which exist before
the cognizer. There are also they said eternal substances but further they said that eternal
substances can be known by the help of the qualities and actions that they have in it.
Further, they said about guna. As you know that guna cannot exist independently of substances.
That means whenever they try to explain the things, it is in positive in nature but the
last category which is known as abhava mentioned by Sivadithya said that it is a negative character.
It is a negative feature of understanding the non-existence of a substance of having
a particular type in a particular place. Therefore, they say that if we can understand
that a chair exists in a particular room of having a particular time, we can also equally
understand a chair or that particular chair does not exist in that particular room in
a particular time. Therefore, they said categorically saying that this padartha, abhava has a padartha
or category conveys that every experience has its counterpart in the external world.
For example, when you see a particular place without a jar, we experience the absence of
jar in that place. Similarly, when the jar is destroyed, there is the absence of that
jar again. Now, there are two things they are claiming. We can think, we can judge a
situation claiming that this object or a particular object does not exist in that place, in a
particular time that non-existence we have understood.
Now, further non-existence they are talking about that is they said that if there is some
object or some substance exist for all of us, now that substance is destroyed or broken,
then also we find the non-existence of that substance. However, though we find some pieces
of that substance, yet the substance as it was found in its original form that is lost.
Henceforth, they said that there are abhava. In this way, we can understand the concept
abhava. The first thing that we can know the abhava
in relation to the spacious temporal condition. The second is that when a particular substance
is destroyed, we find the non-existence of substance. Now in this context, other scholars
from other schools Buddhism, other the Vedantins and many other schools even Mimasikas schools,
they have asked a question. Is it the case that Kanada did not aware of the concept abhava?
Whenever he talked about six categories, it seems that he does not know or he did not
aware of the concept abhava. Many scholars refused this argument. They said that it is
not so. Kanada was very much aware of the fact abhava.
While establishing the argument stating that Kanada was aware of the fact abhava, they
said that Kanada also discussed about Mukhya. Mukhya means liberation. Liberation means
detach from worldly pain, detach from the physical pain and mental pain that each and
everyone find while living in this earth. If a person can understand the concept of
detachment from something a negation of pain, he or she must understand the concept the
negation of existence as well. Therefore, by referring to the concept, they said that
Kanada was very much aware of the concept Mukhya or liberation which implies the liberation
of pain, the liberation of suffering. It is a negation of pain. Therefore, we cannot claim
that he was not aware of the concept abhava. He was very much aware of the concept abhava
but may be for him abhava is understood in the absence of existence, nothing more or
it is a negation of existence. So, therefore they established that Kanada was also aware
of the concept abhava whenever he mentioned about the six categories.
Further, abhava is of two kinds that we find Samsarga abhava and Anyonya abhava. Samsarga
abhava talks about the relative non-existence and Anyonya abhava talks about the mutual
non-existence. Now, broadly we find two kinds of non-existence, one is a relative non-existences,
another is mutual non-existence. Now, let us discuss what is relative non-existence?
If I say that x is related to y, z is related to b. So, the relation that you can find out,
some sort of relation we find between two elements. To have a relation, we require at
least two elements, two components, two objects, two things or anything at least two in numbers.
Therefore, whenever you talk about relative non-existence, we must aware of the fact that
it has a relation between two things. Two things not necessarily may be different. Whenever
I say that a table is different from chair, here table and chair are two different objects
but in case of relative existences, it may mean something more than that. If you say
that x1 in the morning time and x1 in the evening time, these two are different. See
x in 6am and x in 7am because of the time gap, this x is different from x that we find
in 6am as well as 7am. So, therefore a particular object in relation to its time place also
plays a relative character. Therefore, they said that we find relative non-existence that
is Samsarga abhava. Further, they said Anyonya abhava that means,
mutual non-existences say that a table is not a chair, a computer is not a glass of
water, a camera is not an iron rod. So, therefore two components separately we find here and
one cannot include other. One cannot include in other, so they mutually exclude from each
other. Now, let us focus what is relative non-existence?
According to vaisesika philosophy, Samsarga abhava means the absence of something in something
else. As I said that there are relative non-existent, something is absent in something that is an
ordinarily understanding of the concept relative non-existence.
They said that it is a relative to particular space and time. I said that x at 6am is different
from that same x in 7am because of the time x is different here we find. Now, the place
suppose x as an individual as a being that we find in a particular place say y, certainly
will be different if the x will find in a other place say known as z.
Therefore, the relative non-existence depends on time and space as well. Now, it is based
on the spacious temporal condition. As I said all kinds of samara abhava can be expressed
by a judgment of the general form x is not in p. Here, you must understand though the
expression x is not in p. Here, we are talking about the absence of something in something.
The relative non-existence, if you expressed in a symbolical form, in a logical form, it
appears in this way, s is an object is not in p is another object. So, p and s are related
with each other but however, we do not find s in p that is a relative non-existence.
Many people understood relative means opposite of absolute. Here, we must understand the
concept not in that form. So, let us in the proper spirit we must understand the way vaisesika
philosophy argues the concept relative non-existence. They say that something does not exist in
something. That means, they are related with each other and however, we may not find some
of the component of s. Therefore, we can express the logical form saying that s is not in p.
Now, they said it is of three kinds. The relative non-existence, we find in a three kinds. The
relative non-existence that we are talking about is of three kinds in nature according
to vaisesika philosophy. What are those? One is pragbhava, the second one is dhvamsabhava
and the third one is atyantabhava. The first one pragbhava, it talks about antecedent non-existence.
Dhvamsabhava talks about posterior non-existence and atyantabhava talks about absolute non-existence.
What is antecedent non-existence? Now, let us have a common understanding. For example,
say that a particular chair. Before the creation of that particular chair, we find the absence
of that chair but in the same time we may find different other chairs of that same nature
or the same kind may be but the particular chair before its creation, before its production
we may not find. We may not find its existence in this earth. That is an antecedent non existence.
Then posterior of non-existence talks about that once an object is destroyed, we may find
of its pieces but the object as it such in its earlier form we may not find and we do
not find because it is broken. Therefore, we say that posterior non-existence, a thing
or an object exists before us. Now, it is broken therefore that objects never find.
Further, after the distraction of that object, the object not remain as same. Therefore,
we find the absence of that same object in the broken pieces.
The third one talking about the absolute-non existence, that non-existence, we find all
the time. It is an eternal non-existence. For example, if I say a barren women’s child,
you may say that I am contradicting myself and here if a women is barren, she cannot
biologically gives birth to a child. On the other hand, if a woman gives birth to a child,
then she cannot be termed as a barren woman. Therefore, two things you can find in one
side. There is a women who gives birth to a child that women cannot be treated as a
barren women and on other side, the women who is barren cannot biologically gives birth
to a child. Therefore, see barren women’s child this is we could say absolute non-existence.
A barren woman cannot give birth to a child. So, the child and barren women, they are absolute
non-existence. Another example, let us I will give hares
horn. Hares cannot have horn, therefore the horn in the hare it is an absolute non-existence.
It was in the past, it is in the present and it will be in the future. So, here the non-existence
we can understand. Further, they said that there are many kind
of concept that also we need to understand in that form. Say for example, dharma karma
it is a non-existence. We cannot refer to particular object. Now, let us discuss one
after another. What they mean by pragbhava? Pragbhava according to vaisesika philosophy,
it is the non-existence of a thing before its production. A jar was non-existence before
it was produced. There might be other jars but that particular jar did not exist before
it was produced by the potter, clearly said that let take an example let us take an example
of jar.
Here, vaisesika philosophy categorically said that before the production of that jar, we
find the absence of that jar. In the same time, they claim that there may be other kinds
of jar of those same sorts will be available in this earth. However, that particular jar
which was not produced, here we find the absence of that jar and once it is produced, we find
its existence there to be no further absence in it.
Therefore, they said that this kind of non-existence or absence has no beginning but it has an
end. Why it is so? Because before the production we may not know that whether that jar can
be produced or not by the potter but once it is produced, we find its existence. That
means there is an end in it. In this way, we can understand the concept pragbhava. Before
the creation, before the production of that jar, the jar was not there. We find the absence
of jar once it is produced; we find the existence of jar.
Therefore, they said that it has no beginning, but certainly it has an end. Explaining further,
they said that before the jar was produced, its absence existed but its absence ends when
it is produced. It is a very lucid way. Vaisesika philosophy argued the concept absence, the
pragbhava. They said that before the jar was produced, its absence existed but its absences
end when it is produced. We never find further absence of that jar after its production.
So, this is all about pragbhava. Now, we can understand the concept absence of a particular
substance before its production. Now, in the similar fashion they said that
once a substance is broken, we find the non-existence of that substance that is called Dhvamsabhava.
Dhvamsabhava means posterior non-existence. Here, they said that dhvamsabhava is a non-existence
or absence states that destruction of existences is creation of non-existence.
Now, must understand the concept. Destruction of existence is the creation of non-existence.
One something is destroyed, then we find the non-existence of it one something is destroyed
once something is broken. We may not find the same object in future because that object
is destroyed, that object is no more serve its purposes.
Let take the same example, say jar. A jar is made of say glass. Once the jar is broken,
we find different pieces of glasses but here after it is broken, the jar we may not find,
the jar we cannot find, the same jar would not be available at all because it is broken.
That is why after its destruction, the creation of absence we find in it. In the same fashion,
dhvamsabhava clearly stated that destruction of existence is creation of non-existence.
It is the absence of the non-existence of a thing after its destruction.
Continuing further, the same example I have written here. A jar becomes non-existence
when it is broken or destroyed. The broken pieces may remain exist but not the same jar
after its destruction. This kind of absence has a beginning but not an end. Say in pragbhava
they said that this kind of absence has no beginning but an end because there is an absence
we find before the production of the jar in case of pragbhava. Therefore, they said that
it has no beginning but has an end. In case of dhvamsabhava, since the object
exist before us. Since, the object occupies a particular place in a particular time, we
say that it has a beginning but it has no end because after its destruction we find
the absence of it. Therefore, they said that this kind of absence has a beginning but not
an end. Has a beginning means we know the object we refer to the object that object
serve some purposes. It has a beginning; it does not have any end because after destruction
that objects not remain as same that we had seen before its destruction.
Therefore, two kinds of abhavas that you can see, pragbhava in one hand and dhvamsabhava
on the other hand and both are relatively relative non-existence. Both are talking about
relative non-existence. In a relation to the second one, there are two other points that
I need to inform you the absence of that jar starts when it is destroyed and it became
non-existence. After its destruction, it is a self explanatory. After its destruction,
we cannot get the same jar but we may get other jars of same kind.
Now, moving to the third one Atyantabhava, it is the absolute non-existence between two
things for all time. The third one also talks about the relative non-existence. Here, they
are saying that the two things or the absence over here, we find between two things for
all time. It is an eternal. Therefore, they said it is the absolute non-existence between
two things for all the time. These two components cannot put together.
The absence over here we find all the time, both in past, present and future. They said
that this is an eternal hare’s horn. I have also discussed this concept to you. Hare’s
horn is the non-existence in the past, present and future. Hare’s cannot have horn. If
some animals have a horn, then that animal cannot be called hare.
Therefore the hare in the one hand and other side its horn. Here, we find the two objects
are having the absolute non-existence that is what they said that any animals of having
horn cannot be called as hare and if hare is an animal that animal cannot have horn.
Therefore, the non-existence of horn in hare we find both in past, present and future.
Therefore, it is an eternal non-existence, eternal absolute non-existence. Thus, I have
said here hare’s horn is the non-existence in the past, present and future. This kind
of absence has neither a beginning nor an end.
If we say that something has a beginning that means that something must exist like in dhvamsabhava.
We said that it has a beginning but it does not have end. In case of pragbhava, we said
that it does not have a beginning but it has an end.
Here, since it is an absolute non-existence we said that it has neither beginning nor
an end. It is absolute and eternal absence. It also implies such options like barren women’s
child. Now, I hope you have understood the relative non-existence stated by vaisesika
philosophy. Now, the second kind of non-existence that
we are going to discuss that is Anyonya abhava or mutual non-existence. What is mutual non-existence?
Mutual non-existence talks about or a mutual non-existence expresses about two things or
having mutually absent from each other, for example if I say that a table is not a chair.
We cannot say that a table is a chair because the chair cannot find in table neither the
table can find in chair. Therefore, they said it means one thing is
not another thing. A table is not a chair. Mutual non-existence, it is expressed in a
judgment form like s is not p. Now, remember what I said in relative non-existence. I said
that relative non-existence is of three types’ pragbhava, dhvamsabhava and atyantabhava.
In these three forms, we find these two objects are related with each other in some non-existence
form. Therefore, the symbolical expression of samsargbhava or relative existence is expressed
in this way, s is not in p but here if you find that s is not p, s and p are two different
objects may be in the same object but are they are not equal.
You said that s is not p or p is not s. A table is not chair and a chair is not a table.
Therefore, they said that it underlines the difference of one thing from another thing.
When one thing is different from another thing, they mutually exclude with each other. When
one thing is different from another thing, when a table is different from chair they
are mutually excluded with each other. Now, I believe that you have understood the concept
what is mutual non-existence? You say that a tree is not a snake, a snake is not a rope
and a rope is not an umbrella so on and so forth, mutually exclude with each other.
On the other hand, if you talk about samsargbhava here is saying that things are absent in relative
in character. It depends on spacio temporal condition but here in case of mutual non-existence,
it does not require any spacio temporal condition. You say that table wherever it exist, whatever
it form may be certainly, it is different form a chair. Thus, they said only one thing
is different from another thing. They mutual exclude with each other negating one from
the other is called mutual non-existence. Further explaining, they said that negating
one from the other is called mutual non-existence. An example they said a table is not a chair,
it has a neither beginning nor an end. Therefore, it is eternal.
What is commonality we find between atyantabhava and anyonyabhava is that both are eternal
in character, the absence that we find in both the cases anyonyabhava and atyantabhava.
Atyantabhava is a part or a kind of samsargbhava and anyonyabhava is a different kind of abhava.
In both the cases, we find one communality that is the eternal absence in both objects.
In case of atyantabhava, we find that the two objects cannot find together in a particular
place like barrens women’s child, a hare’s horn but here in case of mutual non-existence,
we find the absence that x is different from y, y is different from z in this form.
Therefore, two symbolical forms we find here in while explaining the concept absence or
non-existences. One is samsargbhava or relative existence. When the symbolical form is s is
not in p but in case of anyonyabhava which talks about mutual non-existence, here the
symbolical expression we find s is not p. Thus, it is also eternal in character which
one is a mutual non-existence.
Now continuing further, there are few questions people argued to vaisesika philosophy. They
said that what is the Pramana we need to employee to understand the concept abhava. In the other
words, what is the Pramana through which one can understand the non-existence of existence
in a particular place? This question raised now. Kumarila Bhatt and Advaita vedantins,
they said that the absence of cognition is to be understood by help of Anupalabdhi. Anupalabdhi
is a pramana. Here, Kumarila Bhatt and Advaita vedantins,
they talk about that absence of the cognition is known through the method of Anupalabdhi.
What is Anupalabdhi? As you know that Nyaya-Vaisesika talks about four pramanas that is perception,
inference, comparison and verbal testimony but in Mimasikas philosophy, they have added
two more pramana. One is Anupalabdhi and the second one is Arthapati postulation.
We will discuss about these two in detail whenever we discuss Mimasikas philosophy or
the epistemology of Mimasikas philosophy but for the present purpose we must elaborate
the concept Anupalabdhi. Here, Advaita vedantins is known as Uttara Mimasikas and Purva Mimasikas
is known as Mimasikas. These both Mimasikas agreed that the absence of cognition is to
be known by the help of Anupalabdhi. Anupalabdhi means something that is absent. That absence,
the concept of the absence is to be understood in relation to a particular object which may
find in other places. For example, if I say that there is no pen
on the table. That means I know that there is some object known as pen and it exists
elsewhere. Therefore, the absence of that same pain we find on the table and this absence
cannot be reduced to any other Pramanas, according to Mimasikas philosophy because here it cannot
be perceived because once we say that the absence of that pen on the table. We cannot
see that there is no pen in this table. What you see is an empty space, we cannot see the
cognition of absence of that pen neither it can be inferred.
For having an inference, we need a vyapti relation but here to cognize the absence of
a particular object on a particular place in a particular time. All the time we may
not find a vyapti relation, therefore according to Mimasikas, the absence of cognition can
be identified or recognized by the help of the pramana Anupalabdhi. So, this is stated
by Purva Mimasikas and Advaita Vedantins. Now, some other scholars in Mimasikas they
said that the absence of the cognition can also be recognized by the help of Arthapati
postulation. What is Arthapati postulation? That means there is a particular fact presented
before the cogniser and that particular fact cannot sustain itself because of many other
conditions. Therefore, the cogniser has to postulate another fact which substitutes to
that fact for its existence. An example let I will give say Devadatta is
a person whose fact by fasting in the day time. Now, I say Devadatta is a person is
fat by fasting in the day time. So, if a person is fasting cannot be fat, cannot be a fat
man and a fat man cannot be remain as a fat man until unless he is not eating so much
food. Here, we find there are two counter fact, a person is a fat but fasting in the
day time. Now, to understand the concept, how can a
person who is fat, in the same time fasting in the day time. So, there is another assumption
that here we create here, the cogniser assert a different fact in relation to that fact
for establishing the concept or the fact that some person is fat by fasting in the day time.
Here, the cogniser what he or she postulates is that Devadatta is a person may not be eating
in the day time but certainly eating in the night time heavy foods and because of that
he remains fat. Here, the absence of the fact is postulated
or is assumed by the cogniser. So, therefore the negation of the fact on a particular place
can be understood in relation to its existence in some other places. That means if I say
that there is no pen on my table that concept can be understood in relation to saying that
pen may be existed some other places. Say that pen may be existed in my drawer, in my
computer drawer. Therefore, now coming back that after listening
to the explanation, after understanding the explanation of vaisesika system that how abhava
can be considered as an independent category. There is a question whereas by other schools
said that what is the pramana from which, one can understand the non-existence of existence
in a particular place. Responding to this question, Kumarila Bhatt, Kumarila Bhatt belongs
to Assam. He is a scholar from Assam. He and Advaita vedantins, they said that the absence
of the cognition is known through by the help of a pramana known as Anupalabdhi
Now, further some other thinkers from Mimasikas, they said that it is due to the Arthapati
postulation which means contradiction of facts presented to us. What is contradiction of
fact that Devadatta is a fat man in the same time fasting in the day time? These are both
contradiction in terms and how this contradiction can be reserved by assuming, by postulating
a different fact. In relation to that fact, then only that fact that is presented before
us in a contradiction form would not remain as a contradiction.
It will assert some fact positively, it will establish itself in this way they say that
by the help of Arthapati postulation and by the help of Anupalabdhi, we can able to explain
the concept of sense or the concept of non-existence. Further, nyayakans said non-existence is a
matter of perception and what kind of perception? It is not an ordinary perception as we percept
table, chair, tree, leaves, color so and so forth. He says that this perception is a special
kind of perception. It is a matter of qualified perception which is known through specific
sense object contact termed as visesa-visesana abhava. According to Nyaya-Vaisesika, the
absence can be cognised through visesa-visesana abhava.
What is visesa? Visesa talks about the particularity and to understand the qualification of that
abhava in a particular place helps us to cognise a non-existence of an object on a particular
place. I repeat according to nyaya-vaisesika, it is because of the visesa-visesana abhava
we could able to cognise the absence of an object on a particular place in a particular
time. What is visesa-visesana abhava for them? They
said that visesa stands for particularity. That means to understand the particular absence
on a particular place of having a particular time; it is a qualified perception of that
object which may present in some other place in some other form. I hope you have understood.
It is not that so critical. Visesa-visesana we have to talk about that the absence of
a particular substance on a particular time, in a particular place may be qualified by
its existence which is available in some other places of having in a particular time.
So, in this way we can understand an absence of a particular object. Therefore, since we
can cognise the absence of a particular object of having its own identity, we can claim that
abhava is an independent category.
Now, moving further they also talk about the creation of the universe. While talking about
the creation of the universe, they said that all composite objects that we find in this
earth chair, table, tree so on and so forth, both living and non-living creatures are created
because of the atoms. There are four atoms responsible for creation of the different
objects in this earth. These are known as earth, water, air and fire.
Further, they said that there are also many eternal substances exist and they are beyond
creation and destruction, they never come. Another purview of creation and destruction
they are eternal, their views regarding creation of the world is known as atomism because every
object that we see in this earth are created by atom.
Further, they said that atoms cannot move automatically. There will be some person responsible
for moving the atom and mixing up the atoms in a different proportional because we find
different objects in this earth and different objects because of the different proportionate
of atoms in it and who is that person who really moves that atom to mix up in a different
proportionate? In that context, they said that it is Ishwara or god who is almighty
is responsible for moving the atoms and mixing up atoms in a different proportionate, so
that they could able to generate different products in this earth.
Therefore, they said that the vaisesika atomism is spiritual. Why it is spiritual because
for them, god is the guiding principal, controlling the motion of atoms creation and destruction
of the universe takes place in agreement with the wishes of god. They said that if there
is no super natural being, the atom cannot move automatically. So, therefore we find
that the super natural being who really moves the atoms and make the atoms mix up in a different
proportionate and therefore, we get different objects in this earth. The last they said
that it is the Maheswara instead of Brahma, Vishnu or anything. They said that it is Maheswara
with a particular name is the ruler of the entire universe.
So, it is the Maheswara who really creates the universe, who really functions the universe
and who is responsible even for the destruction of the objects in this universe. I hope you
have understood now the complete explanation of Vaisesika padarthas and the issues they
raised in their philosophy. Thank you.