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Welcome to this session viewers. In this session, we will discuss, in continuation with last
class; to recap what we had discussed in the last class - we spoke about a little bit background
of Mimamsa philosophy, then we spoke about who are those thinkers or scholars who contributed
to development and establishment of the school known as Mimamsa philosophy.
Then, we said that although there are many scholars who contributed to the development
of Mimamsa philosophy they have their differences of opinion on many of the issues that we had
discussed; apart from that, we said that that, they also consider that valid knowledge can
be acquired through pramana - pramana means valid source of knowledge.
Here also, they had a difference of opinion - Kumarila Bhatta said that we need 6 pramana,
whereas Prabhakara Mimamsa said that we need 5 pramanas; according to Prabhakara Mimamsa,
Anupalabdhi or non perception cannot be considered as an independent pramana.
Further, we find some of the differences of opinion on substances, on categories so on
and so forth; moving further, we had discussed what they mean when they talk about the fact
that we need two extra pramanas by adding to the list of pramanas stated by Nyaya philosophy.
In this regard, we had discussed what is Anupalabdhi or non perception, also we had discussed Arthapatti
or postulation; while discussing the Arthapatti as an independent pramana we said that that
there are two contradictory facts that we find from a proposition and to resolve that
contradiction the cogniser has to postulate a new fact; as a result the contradictory
will resolve. In this context we had given an example by
stating that Devadatta is a fat man by fasting in the day time; also, we said that Arthapatti
postulation cannot be reduced to any other pramanas; much after that we had discussed
how Anupalabdhi is considered as an independent pramana among other pramanas and how Kumarila
Bhatta establishes that non-perception can be considered as an independent pramana and
why it cannot come under perception. After that, we spoke regarding the theory
of validity of knowledge - that is Pramanyavada; in Pramanyavada, we had discussed that there
are two kinds of Pramanyavada that are discussed in Mimamsa philosophy and even Samkhya philosophy
and many other schools as well. In Mimamsa philosophy, it is stated that we
find two kinds of Pramanyavada - one is Svatah Pramanyavada another is Paratah Pramanyavada;
Svatah Pramanyavada talks about…Svatah here stands for intelligent, Pramanyavada is theory
of valid knowledge; Svatah Pramanyavada states that validity and invalidity of knowledge
exists in the matter which is capable of its production - which is capable to produce many
of the effects; I repeat, the validity and invalidity of knowledge lies in the matter
because the matter is capable of producing many of the effects - that is called Svatah
Pramanyavada; Paratah Pramanyavada means…Paratah is stands for estranging Pramanyavada is validity.
Many of the schools believe that a knowledge will be valid only where there are some external
conditions, which support that; for example, now we can see a chair - now we can perceive
a chair, here we find that there is a contact between the object and our sense organs; here
the cogniser will be able to recognize the object chair if we are able to find some of
the conditions over there; for example, a minimum distance, the cogniser must have a
good vision, then there is sufficient light so on and so forth.
Thus, many of the thinkers in different schools believe that knowledge will be valid or invalid
depending on the external conditions; in continuation to that, in today’s class we will discuss
how the different schools have their own opinions on the Pramanyavada - on the theory of valid
knowledge.
In the last class - in very brief - we had stated about the four schools; but, in today’s
class we will discuss in a very elaborate way about why they said so, what are the reasons
for stating so and whether their argument - their argument means other school’s argument
- differs from Mimamsa’s school; if they do not differ, on which grounds do they have
a commonality; all those things we will discuss in detail.
Coming to the point that Kumarila Bhatta - Kumarila Bhatta is a scholar who belongs to Mimamsa
philosophy - Kumarila Bhatta said there are two kinds of validity: one is Svatah Pramanyavada
another is Paratah Pramanyavada; Samkhya philosophy said Svatah pramanya and Svatah apramanya;
Buddhist philosophy said Paratah pramanya and Svatah apramanya; Nyaya philosophy said
Paratah pramanya and Paratah apramanya. As you know, we have two Pramanyavada - Svatah
pramanyavada and Paratah pramanyavada; on the other hand, we find Svatah apramanyavada
and Paratah apramanyavada; here, Svatah stands for intrinsic and Pramanyavada stands for
validity; it is an intrinsic validity - Svatah pramanyavada; Svatah apramanyavada means intrinsic
invalidity; Paratah pramanyavada means extrinsic validity; Paratah apramanyavada means extrinsic
invalidity; since we have two kinds of pramanyavada, in permutation and combination - if we do
the permutation and combination of these two Pramanyavada - we find that there are four
and those are known as Svatah pramanyavada, Paratah pramanyavada, Svatah apramanyavada
and Paratah apramanyavada. There are four thinkers - Kumarila Bhatta
you find in Mimamsa philosophy, then we have a Samkhya philosophy view, then we have Nyaya
philosophy view and we have a Buddhist philosophy view - there are four schools; they have a
different opinion in relation to the validity and invalidity of knowledge.
Now, why did Kumarila Bhatta say Svatah pramanyavada and Paratah apramanyavada? The reasons are
as follows: Svatah pramanyavada means the validity of knowledge lies in the matter which
is capable of producing effect; Kumarila Bhatta says that a matter which is capable of producing
different objects it must have validity on its own otherwise it will not be able produce
any effects, which have validity in the outside world; therefore, they said that prior to
the production we find the validity in that matter - prior to production of any of the
object - we find the validity lies in the matter which is capable of producing the effect.
Further, they said that Paratah apramanyavada - that means, once the object is produced
we have a knowledge about that object because we perceive that object - our sense organs
are in contact with that object; what happens here… since our sense organs are in contact
to that object, it depends on many of this external conditions which are really causes
for the object not being recognized properly. As I said, if there is no proper light I cannot
perceive a chair; if the chair is kept at a distance from me I cannot perceive the chair
as it can be perceived if it were near to me; thus they said that it is the external
condition that matters to find the invalidity of knowledge; what is validity and invalidity?
You already know that - validity means there is a new knowledge that we acquire about that
object and it certainly should not contradict with any other knowledge and must be free
from other defects; these are the three components stated by Mimamsa philosophy.
Therefore, they said that the validity of knowledge - knowledge about an object - lies
in the matter, which is capable of producing the effects and once it produces the effects
then we have knowledge about that object; here the validity and invalidity come because
of the external conditions; in other words one of the things that is produced - the validity
and invalidity of knowledge about that object - depends on many of the external conditions;
if the external conditions are not supported for a cogniser to cognise that object then
it will turn into invalid knowledge; this is the Kumarila bhatta stand point.
Moving further, the Samkhya philosophy - the Samkhya scholars - believe that Svatah pramanya
and Svatah apramanya - the validity and invalidity of knowledge lies in the matter itself; they
argue that if the matter is not valid then any effort put into it will not be able to
produce any of this valid knowledge or any of this good effect; if the validity does
not lie in the matter, how can we expect that whatever it produces has validity? Therefore,
they said that validity and invalidity lie in the matter which is capable of producing
the effect Svatah pramanyavada - intrinsic validity and
intrinsic invalidity; both validity and invalidity lie in the matter which is capable of producing
the effect; they argue that if the matter is invalid then whatever it produces will
be invalid; if the knowledge about the matter is invalid then whatever effect it produces
will certainly result in invalid knowledge. Now, Buddhist thinkers said Paratah pramanyavada
and Svatah apramanyavada; when they said Paratah pramanyavada they said that validity of an
object - or we can have a validity, we can have a knowledge and that knowledge will be
valid when there is in an external condition that matters - when there is a sufficient
amount of light, it should be in a particular distance and so on and so forth; therefore,
according to Buddhist our knowledge will be valid because it depends on the external conditions.
Whenever we recognize, whenever we identify an object certainly there are external conditions
which matter, because in darkness we cannot identify an object - in darkness we cannot
recognize an object; therefore, validity of knowledge lies or validity of knowledge depends
on the external conditions. They further said that Svatah apramanyavada
- intrinsic invalidity - why did the say that? They said that when we cannot claim that a
knowledge will be valid when it lies in its matter because once it is produced we do not
know it is validity or invalidity because we do not know whether it solves its purpose;
in the first production of an object it cannot be cognised as valid or invalid - the reason
behind that is that once it is produced we do not know what the purpose is, we do not
know whether it fulfills its purpose or not - whether it can be used for the purposes
for which has been produced; all the things we are able to know only when we recognize
that object; we know how it can solve the purpose and so on and so forth; therefore,
validity never lies in the matter, validities can be accessed by the cogniser when there
is a contact between sense organs and that object.
In that way, they said that invalidity lies in the matter - the invalidity of knowledge
that is a Svatah apramanyavada; the invalidity of knowledge lies in the matter; however,
the validity of knowledge can be assessed when there is an external condition present
over there when a cogniser is cognising the particular object.
Now, if we see the Naiyayika’s stand point, Naiyayikas clearly stated that both validity
and invalidity of knowledge depends on the external conditions; they said that we are
not discussing about the matter because we do not know anything as such in the matter;
once it is produced then we have the sense organs that are in contact with that object
and of course, once we recognize that object it is supported by some of the external conditions;
therefore, does the external condition really matter for cognising an object - what it is?
Therefore, they submit the view that both validity and invalidity of knowledge depends
on the external condition; hence, they subscribe the view saying that Paratah pramanya and
Paratah apramanya - both validity and invalidity lie in the external condition; both validity
and invalidity depend on the external condition. Now, let us see how Mimamsas react to those
other opinions given by or stated by Nyaya schools, Buddhist schools and Samkhya school;
Kumarila refutes the view of Samkhya by asking them how the same knowledge can be valid and
invalid, because in Samkhya they said that Svatah pramanya and Svatah apramanya - both
validity and invalidity - lie in the matter which is capable of producing the effect.
Samkhya standpoint is very clear - they said that, if something is not capable of producing
validity then how can it produce validity? If the matter is not valid how can we expect
that it will produce something that is valid knowledge; if the matter is invalid can we
expect valid knowledge out of it? Here, Mimamsa Kumarila Bhatta - specifically - argues about
how Samkhya can say that - that a table is not a table; because, Samkhya argues that
validity and invalidity lies in the matter in the same time; further, Kumarila Bhatta
asks Samkhya - is it not that you are contradicting when you say that both validity and invalidity
lie in the matter itself; this is Kumarila Bhatta’s reaction towards Samkhya view on
pramanyavada. Now, Parthasarathi Misra is another scholar
in Mimamsa philosophy; Parthasarathi Misra said that Buddhist claims cannot be accepted
because they are stating that Paratah pramanya and Svatah apramanya - validity of knowledge
depends on external conditions and invalidity lies in the matter; they said that, if one
thing can be consider as valid knowledge and that valid knowledge is to be established
by the help of other valid knowledge and further that valid knowledge is to be establish by
another valid knowledge, then it will go in a infinity regress; at no point of time can
we claim that these are the external conditions that really matter for assessing whether a
knowledge is valid. Thus, Parthasarathi Misra claims that if the
validity of knowledge is determined by the subsequent knowledge then it leads to the
infinity regress; further, they said if knowledge is not intrinsically valid it cannot be validated
by any other knowledge; because, Buddhists claim that invalidity of knowledge lies in
the matter; how did Parthasarathi misra refute this argument? On the first ground, they said
that if something is invalid at any cost whatever we try - try to get the valid knowledge out
of it - we cannot succeed because it is intrinsically invalid.
Therefore, they said that if knowledge is not intrinsically valid then it cannot be
validated by any other knowledge; if you claim that knowledge is not intrinsically valid
and further you say that it depends on the external conditions for cognising its validity
- it is a contradiction; if the knowledge is not valid how does it matter whether external
conditions are present or not? Because, it is not capable of producing the valid knowledge;
in this way, Parthasarathi Misra refutes the claim made by the Buddhist scholars.
Now, Kumarila also criticizes Nyaya views of Pramanyavada; because, Naiyayikas said
Paratah pramanyavada and Paratah apramanyavada - both validity and invalidity of knowledge
depend on the external conditions; Kumarila Bhatta rejects the Naiyayikas arguments; Kumarila
Bhatta said that if the validity and invalidity of knowledge were due to the external conditions
then prior to the knowledge of its validity and invalidity the knowledge would be either
neutral or devoid of any logical value; it is a logical argument if you can see that
- Naiyayikas said, that validity and invalidity of knowledge depend on the external condition
or external’s condition and Kumarila Bhatta is asking that if the knowledge is not valid
intrinsically how can you claim or on what basis we can derive some valid knowledge out
of that - is it possible? Further, Kumarila Bhatta said that, if you
are claiming that validity and invalidity of knowledge depend on external conditions,
it simply means that prior to its production or prior to the external conditions the matter
is itself in a neutral stand point - it is neither valid nor invalid - can you claim
so? Because, Kumarila Bhatta further argued that
we cannot find any kind of knowledge ar any stage which has a neutral value; at any point
of time we cannot claim that any knowledge has a neutral value; if it is so, then Nyayika’s
stand point cannot be accepted - we cannot accept something that says that validity and
invalidity of knowledge depends on external condition; if it is so, then we have to accept
- we have to logically accept - that prior to the external conditions of validity and
invalidity of knowledge the knowledge was a neutral - it is neither positive nor negative;
at any point of time we cannot claim that a knowledge has a neutral value.
Hence, Naiyayika’s argument cannot be accepted by Kumarila Bhatta; thus, they said that the
fact is that, we can never experience the neutral knowledge about an object; further,
he said the number of extraneous conditions are required to validate knowledge of an object
is not mentioned by Naiyayikas; thus, it is erroneous to accept that the validity and
invalidity of knowledge depend on external conditions.
Further, they said - let us assume, let us accept that according to Naiyayikas the validity
and invalidity of knowledge depends on external conditions; but, he has not mentioned how
many external conditions really matter to cognise the validity and invalidity of knowledge;
if there is no fixed number of external conditions then it varies from person to person, time
to time and place to place. Hence, whatever is valid for a person may
not be acceptable for another person; because, it is not the case that two people agree to
cognise an object having the same external conditions - it is not so; because, two people
may take different accounts of cognising that object. The two people may differ in accepting
the different external conditions for cognising the object; therefore, Kumarila Bhatta strongly
refutes the Naiyayika’s argument that knowledge - or the validity and invalidity of knowledge
- depends on external conditions.
Here, you find knowledge; knowledge means - knowledge about an object. knowledge about
a fact, knowledge about an event - that is knowledge; also we find that whenever we talk
about knowledge there is every possibility that we may encounter illusion; we may think
that we have acquired the knowledge, but that is not the real knowledge - that is an illusion;
how do you know that? Because, when prior knowledge is rectified by other knowledge
or contracted by other knowledge we accept that our prior knowledge was an illusion.
Thus, in Mimamsa philosophy it is stated that, although knowledge and illusions are contradicted
they are inseparably related with each other; that is what we find a very famous statement
- to err is human; it is human beings who cognise the object; it is stated that when…it
is not the case that whenever we cognise the object we know the object as it is at all
times - no; because, there are many times when we cognise snake as a rope, we cognise
shell as silver and many more things; why does it happen? They said that we encounter
an object, we identify that object and whatever knowledge we acquire at that time or whatever
knowledge we acquire in that time it is not valid knowledge, because it is counter-acted
or negated by other kinds of knowledge in later periods.
Once it is counter-acted, once it is contradicted we can know that our previous knowledge was
an illusion - was not valid knowledge; thus knowledge and illusion although they are contradictory
in their nature yet they are inseparably related with each other; many of the scholars accept
that illusion is in itself a knowledge - of course, this is not valid knowledge, however
it is a knowledge; in that way one has to understand what is illusion and what is knowledge
and how illusion differs from knowledge; on the other hand, how knowledge differs from
illusion; as you can see there is a logical relation between knowledge and illusion. We
have knowledge it is - counter-acted in the later period, therefore we accept that our
prior knowledge is an illusion; in this way, knowledge and illusion both are inseparably
related with each other
Now, we will discuss what is the nature of illusion - how can we understand the concept
of illusion; it is philosophy which tells you how to understand the concept of illusion
and no other discipline as such is able to explain what is illusion and why we have an
illusion - this is the beauty of philosophy. Once you understand the philosophy, once you
have an interest in philosophy, then you may be able to explain many of the new concepts
which you may not have focused on or which you may not even have known in your past philosophy;
arguments to understand a particular concept or a thinking in it is true nature - in that
sense Now, Mimamsa philosophy tries to explain what
is illusion; they said that knowledge is itself illuminated and eternally real; according
to Mimamsa philosophy knowledge is itself illuminated and eternally real; once we say
that this is the knowledge - when can we say - when we can claim - that we have acquired
knowledge in our general understanding? When can we claim that we have acquired knowledge?
We can claim that we acquired knowledge only when we know that object, we know what it
is, we identify that object of having its essential and accidental qualities, we know
what are the purposes for which it has been produced and how it can be used for those
purposes so on and so forth. If you add further, you can say how that object is different from
other objects; if you know all these features then you can claim - yes, I know that object,
therefore I have knowledge about that object; hence, we can claim that I have acquired knowledge
about that object. In the same way, when you say that you have
knowledge about a particular concept - that means, you have understood the concept and
it is sure that your understanding should not be a contradicted further by any other
knowledge; on both grounds, we can claim that we acquire the knowledge about the object,
about the concept, about the fact or an event; therefore, once you have a knowledge it is
self-illuminated, it is eternal; because knowledge of the chair - say, knowledge of the illusion
- it remains as it is, it would not change further; however, the cogniser who is cognising
that knowledge may not exist eternally in this earth; because, he may be in the chain
of birth and death, but the concept as such - the knowledge as such - it is eternal, it
is self-illuminated; as I said, the knowledge of a chair, the knowledge of a gain, the knowledge
of water - it remains eternal; it would not change, it does not fall into the cycle of
birth progress and destruction. But it is the cogniser who really falls in
the trap; he or she cognises the object and by the passing of time he may fall in the
trap of birth, growth and death; but, it is true and is eternally true that the concept
remains as it is, eternally; it was in the past, it is in the present, it will be in
the future. The concept of water - how people perceived
water in the past is the same way that they are perceiving it in the present and it will
be in the future - it will not change; but, those who are perceiving the water they may
change, they may be subject to birth and death; therefore, they said that, it is a very clear
statement they made that knowledge itself is self-illuminated, it is eternally true
and it exists for all the time. Moving further, they said that illusion is
the understanding of one thing as another; just few minutes ago I said what is illusion,
but according to Mimamsa philosophy they said that illusion is the understanding of one
thing as another thing; that means, we have a knowledge about an object and we consider
that we have acquired the knowledge about that object; but, later it is counter-acted
or it is contradicted by other knowledge; therefore, our prior knowledge may not be
valid knowledge, hence the prior knowledge will be treated as an illusion - why is it
an illusion? Because, we identify an object as what it is not - we identify a rope as
a snake, we identify a rope not as a rope but as a snake; therefore, the knowledge about
that object - it is a rope - is an illusion.
Now, I believe it is clear to you what knowledge is and what illusion is and how these two
concepts are related with each other and how these two concepts cannot be separated from
each other. An example I gave is identifying a rope as snake is an illusion; in this case,
the contact between the sense organs with the object cannot be ruled out; how really
does it happen? How really does illusion appear for a cogniser? Why a cogniser cognises something
as what it is not. Here, they have explained by giving an example
- they said, a cogniser is cognising a rope as a snake; whenever he or she is cognising
that object there is a sense object contact - there is a sense organs contact between
that object and the sense organs; here, we find there is a contact between sense organs
of the cogniser and the object and that cannot be ruled out; of course, there are some external
conditions which matter to perceive that object; further, they said that the knowledge of snake
is neither due to perception nor due to inference but certainly due to memory - they very clearly
said it, and interestingly they presented; they said whenever there is a illusion it
is not because of perception not because of inferences, but because of memory as well.
They clearly said, that the knowledge of snake is neither due to perception nor due to inference,
but certainly due to the memory - why is it so? Because, whenever the cogniser perceives
the object - let us say rope - in that time, he may find some of the features that are
common to both rope and snake; therefore, he is able to recapitulate the same sort of
object having some of the features - like snake. Therefore, the concept of snake was
remembered by the cogniser and in that time - in the moment when you perceives the object
‘rope’ it reflects in his mind; therefore, it is the memory which compels the cogniser
to cognise the object which is presented before him as a snake, but not as a rope.
Because, he perceives the object and he finds some of the features which our loves even
in a another object - let us say snake; the concept of snake was in his mind at that time
and because that object lies in his mind he or she immediately claims that this is not
a rope, but as a snake; because, if you remember we said that we cognise an object because
of its features, because of its qualities; but, here what happens is that the mind which
immediately reflects the concept of snake - unfortunately, the snake has some of the
features which he finds in the object presented before him; therefore, mind compels him to
have an impression of the object - snake - in his mind; compels the cogniser to claim the
object as a snake instead of a rope. Thus, they said that the knowledge of snake
is neither due to perception, nor due to inference but certainly due to memory; the snake arises
in the cogniser’s mind because of the defects in his or her visual organs, which may occur
due to the extraneous condition. There is a another condition that they have described
- whenever the cogniser tries to perceive the object, because of the external conditions
the cogniser may not be able to cognise the object clearly, however he can cognise some
of the features of it, but he cannot cognise the full object.
On the other hand, the characteristics of snake are remembered by the cogniser; there
are three things which are very clearly and logically stated - these arguments are very
logical in nature; they said that it is an illusion when a cogniser cognises a rope as
a snake - this is an illusion because it is counter-acted in the later period; how does
it happen? Why does this illusion happen? They said, whenever the cogniser tries to
cognise an object some of the external conditions may not be well presented over there or some
of the external conditions may not support the cogniser to cognise the object - the first
argument; the second argument is that whenever he tries to cognise an object he find some
of the features of the object; the third argument is that because of some of the features he
finds and he recapitulates whatever earlier experiences he had.
He found that there is another object known as snake of having so and so features; in
that time, it reflects the object ‘snake’ in his mind of having so and so features which
is presented in the object before him; as a result the impression of that snake in his
mind causes him to identify that object as a snake.
I repeat: there are three claims is made - the first claim is that the cogniser tries to
cognise the object where there are no sufficient support from the external conditions, the
second is that he tries to identify that object which is presented before him of having so
and so features and the third one is that those features he recapitulates whatever he
had in his previous experiences and found that snake has so and so features and now
the concept snake is in his memory and here memory compels the cogniser to cognise the
object a snake and not as a rope.
These are the three conditions, which result in the cogniser to claiming an object as different
from what it is; this is the result where a cogniser cognises a rope as a snake - in
this way illusion appears Rope is the object of vision, while snake is in mind; illusion
results because of the confusion between two types of knowledge - the first knowledge is
that he tries to identify an object which is presented before him - that is due to the
sense organ’s contact directly; further there is another knowledge which he is able
to recapitulate in his memory; thus, they said that illusion results because of the
confusion between two types of knowledge - one is perceptual knowledge which is presented
before him another was memory knowledge which he recapitulated consciously. It is due to
the failure in discriminating one type of knowledge from the other; all illusions are
subjective in nature - any illusion you talk about it is subjective in nature.
For example, you are going in a straight road - you are driving a car - you find that at
a distance it seems that road is going down or the road is going up - it is an illusion;
as you go close to that road you find that the road is very clean - it is straight. it
is neither up nor down; but, from a distance - since the road is very straight - due to
some reason or other you identify that after five minutes the road will be up or down;
during summer time from a long distance if you see, there is a mirage - you find that
there is a water; but, that is not a really water it may be the dust particles which are
called mirage. It is an illusion to identify mirage as water,
to identify a straight road as an up or down road, to identify a snake as silver; in many
cases, due to some of the external conditions we identify a shell as a silver because some
of the features of silver lie in the shell and also we find the inverse relation; in
all the cases, you find these three conditions: the first condition is that the cogniser perceives
the object and because of some of the external conditions the cogniser is not able to perceive
the object as it is; however, he or she tries to cognise the object with the help of some
of the features which you find in that object. At the same time there are some kinds of objects
he will be able to recapitulate with some of these features; because of the compulsion
of the mind he is able to claim the object - what is reflected in his memory but not
what he has perceived. As a result the illusion appears; like illusion
we find error - it is a similar concept; when you cognise X - not as an X, then it is an
error; when we cognise a cow is not a cow then you say error; when you cognise snake
as a rope is also an error; because, what is expected is that we as a cogniser have
to cognise snake as a snake and not snake as a rope; because, of some common features
between snake and rope we are in a confusion as to whether to claim that object which is
presented before us as a snake or a rope; therefore, error is also subjective - why
is it subjective? It is not the case that all cognisers will identify the snake as a
rope all the time while having the same conditions external conditions; so, it differs from person
to person and even place to place. Therefore, they said that like illusions,
errors are also subjective in nature; having a cognition which is not answering the object
is called error; having a cognition…here we are trying to have a cognition on that
object which is presented before us; therefore, they said having a cognition which is not
answering the object or not answering the object is called error or Khyativada; when
they try to explain the concept error they claim that error and illusion…may be these
two concepts are overlapping each other, but one must understand that illusion means there
is an idea or a concept that one believes in and later finds that it is not true - it
is not the valid knowledge. In case of error it is a mistake; it is a
mistake by the individual, the mistake does not lie in the object - it is a mistake because
of the individual; even illusion also illusion because of the individual - individual or
the cogniser believes an object in a different way - what it is not; here, a cogniser understands
or believes an object with a different features - what it is not.
A cogniser tries to cognise an object with different features - what it is not; therefore,
it is the responsibility of a cogniser - he has to or she has to cognise the object correctly;
therefore, both illusions and errors lie in the subject or it depends on the cogniser
and hence it is subjective in nature. Thus, they claim that whenever a cogniser
tries to identify an object and is not able to identify the object as it is, then they
are all lies; thus they said having a cognition, which is not answering the object is called
error or Khyativada. The concept of Khyativada is very clearly known to many of the schools
and many of the schools contributed to the concept of Khyativada - theory of error; because,
they believe that to cognise something not necessarily resulting in valid knowledge…because
of many of the conditions; now some of the conditions you know and some of the conditions
we will discuss. Whenever the situation demands we will discuss,
but broadly if you see Khyativada are of two types: one is Asatkhyativada and another is
Satkhyativada.
Asatkhyativada talks about the Madhyamika schools; Madhyamika school is a school from
Buddhism; a Madhyamika school is also known as Sunyavadins - those who believe that neither
mind nor the composite world is real; according to them nothing is real because everything
is in a momentary process everything is in the process of constant flux.
Thus, they said that neither the mind nor the external world is real - this is their
standpoint; Madhyamika school accept the Asatkhyativada - they said that everything is unreal and
according to them error lies in the cognition of non-existence; it is non-existence where
the error lies, because whenever we try to cognise the object that object may not remain
as it is - it has changed - because every moment things are changing. Therefore, they
said that neither mind nor the object is real in this world; error lies in the cognition
of non-existence - here non-existence is cognised as existence and again cognition of unreal
is apprehended as real - we cognise shell as a silver
There are two things that Madhyamika school highlighted - the first thing they said that
everything is in the process of consant flux nothing remains fixed because they believe
in the momentariness; therefore, they said that neither mind nor the empirical world
is real everything is unreal and we as cognisers try to identify non-existence as an existence;
let say, now I am trying to identify an objects, say, table; whenever we try to identify an
object table immediately it changes; therefore, I as an cogniser or me as an cogniser I identify
the non-existence of table as a table; whenever we try to identify that object the object
may not remain as it is - it changes; an illusion according to him lies when the non-existence
is cognised as an existence and further they said that the cognition of unreal is apprehended
as real. In this way they describe the concept Asatkhyativada
- the example is that we cognise shell as a silver and in this case also illusion appears;
this is the theory of error - Asatkhyativada; in the next class we will discuss Satkhyativada
and how other schools contributed to it. Thank you.