Tip:
Highlight text to annotate it
X
Timing and Targets The conspirators’ selection of both the
date and the targets for the attacks provides another opportunity to examine the plot from
within. Although Atta enjoyed wide discretion as tactical commander, Bin Ladin had strong
opinions regarding both issues. The date of the attacks apparently was not chosen much
more than three weeks before September 11. According to Binalshibh, when he met with
Atta in Spain in mid-July, Atta could do no more than estimate that he would still need
five to six weeks before he could pick a date. Then, in a mid-August phone call to Binalshibh,
Atta conveyed the date for the attacks, which Binalshibh dutifully passed up his chain of
command in a message personally delivered to Afghanistan by Hamburg associate Zakariya
Essabar in late August.
Bin Ladin had been pressuring KSM for months to advance the attack date. According to KSM,
Bin Ladin had even asked that the attacks occur as early as mid-2000, after Israeli
opposition party leader Ariel Sharon caused an outcry in the Middle East by visiting a
sensitive and contested holy site in Jerusalem that is sacred to both Muslims and Jews. Although
Bin Ladin recognized that Atta and the other pilots had only just arrived in the United
States to begin their flight training, the al Qaeda leader wanted to punish the United
States for supporting Israel. He allegedly told KSM it would be sufficient simply to
down the planes and not hit specific targets. KSM withstood this pressure, arguing that
the operation would not be successful unless the pilots were fully trained and the hijacking
teams were larger.
In 2001, Bin Ladin apparently pressured KSM twice more for an earlier date. According
to KSM, Bin Ladin first requested a date of May 12, 2001, the seven-month anniversary
of the Cole bombing. Then, when Bin Ladin learned from the media that Sharon would be
visiting the White House in June or July 2001, he attempted once more to accelerate the operation.
In both instances, KSM insisted that the hijacker teams were not yet ready.
Other al Qaeda detainees also confirm that the 9/11 attacks were delayed during the summer
of 2001, despite Bin Ladin’s wishes. According to one operative, Khalid al Mihdhar disclosed
that attacks had been delayed from May until July, and later from July until September.
According to another al Qaeda member in Kandahar that summer, a general warning—much like
the alert issued in the camps two weeks before the Cole bombing and ten days before the eventual
9/11 attacks—was issued in July or early August of 2001. As a result of this warning,
many al Qaeda members dispersed with their families, internal security was increased,
and Bin Ladin dropped out of sight for about 30 days until the alert was cancelled.
KSM claims he did not inform Atta or the other conspirators that Bin Ladin wanted to advance
the date because he knew they would move forward when they were ready. Atta was very busy organizing
the late arriving operatives, coordinating the flight teams, and finalizing the targets.
In fact, target selection appears to have influenced the timing of the attacks. As revealed
by an Atta-Binalshibh communication at this time, recovered later from a computer captured
with KSM, Atta selected a date after the first week of September so that the United States
Congress would be in session.
According to KSM, the U.S. Capitol was indeed on the preliminary target list he had initially
developed with Bin Ladin and Atef in the spring of 1999. That preliminary list also included
the White House, the Pentagon, and the World Trade Center. KSM claims that while everyone
agreed on the Capitol, he wanted to hit the World Trade Center whereas Bin Ladin favored
the Pentagon and the White House.
Binalshibh confirms that Bin Ladin preferred the White House over the Capitol, a preference
he made sure to convey to Atta when they met in Spain in the summer of 2001. Atta responded
that he believed the White House posed too difficult a target, but that he was waiting
for Hani Hanjour and Nawaf al Hazmi to assess its feasibility. On July 20, Hanjour—likely
accompanied by Hazmi—rented a plane and took a practice flight from Fairfield, New
Jersey to Gaithersburg, Maryland, a route that would have allowed them to fly near Washington,
DC. When Binalshibh pressed Atta to retain the White House as a target during one of
their communications in early August, Atta agreed but said he would hold the Capitol
in reserve as an alternate target, in case the White House proved impossible. Based on
another exchange between Atta and Binalshibh, as late as September 9—two days before the
attacks—the conspirators may still have been uncertain about which Washington target
they would strike.
Dissent Among al Qaeda Leaders The attitude of the al Qaeda leadership toward
the 9/11 plot represents one last area for insight. As Atta made his final preparations
during the summer of 2001, dissent emerged among al Qaeda leaders in Afghanistan over
whether to proceed with the attack. Although access to details of the plot was carefully
guarded, word started to spread during the summer of 2001 that an attack against the
United States was imminent.
According to KSM, he was widely known within al Qaeda to be planning some kind of operation
against the United States. Many were even aware that he had been preparing operatives
to go to the United States, as reported by a CIA source in June 2001. Moreover, that
summer Bin Ladin made several remarks hinting at an upcoming attack, which spawned rumors
throughout the jihadist community worldwide.
For instance, KSM claims that, in a speech at the al Faruq training camp in Afghanistan,
Bin Ladin specifically urged trainees to pray for the success of an upcoming attack involving
20 martyrs.
With news of an impending attack against the United States gaining wider circulation, a
rift developed within al Qaeda’s leadership. Although Bin Ladin wanted the operation to
proceed as soon as possible, several senior al Qaeda figures thought they should follow
the position taken by their Afghan host, Taliban leader Mullah Omar, who opposed attacking
the United States.
According to one al Qaeda member, when Bin Ladin returned after the general alert in
late July, he spoke to his confidants about problems he was having with Omar’s unwillingness
to allow any further attacks against the United States from Afghanistan.
KSM claims that Omar opposed attacking the United States for ideological reasons but
permitted attacks against Jewish targets. KSM denies that Omar’s opposition reflected
concern about U.S. retaliation but notes that the Taliban leader was under pressure from
the Pakistani government to keep al Qaeda from engaging in operations outside Afghanistan.
While some senior al Qaeda figures opposed the 9/11 operation out of deference to Omar,
others reportedly expressed concern that the U.S. would respond militarily.
Bin Ladin, on the other hand, reportedly argued that attacks against the United States needed
to be carried out immediately to support the insurgency in the Israeli occupied territories
and to protest the presence of U.S. military forces in Saudi Arabia. Bin Ladin also thought
that an attack against the United States would reap al Qaeda a recruiting and fundraising
bonanza. In his thinking, the more al Qaeda did, the more support it would gain. Although
he faced opposition from many of his most senior advisers—including Shura council
members Shaykh Saeed, Sayf al Adl, and Abu Hafs the Mauritanian—Bin Ladin effectively
overruled their objections, and the attacks went forward.
Although this testimony was heard in the 9/11 hearings, when it came time for the commissioners
to fulfill their mandate, they intentionally rejected doing so because several references
to Israel were omitted from the final 9/11 Report.
Incredibly, the two top 9/11 commissioners, Thomas Kean and Lee Hamilton, admit commissioners'
concerns over whether the policy of supporting Israel would be reassessed by the American
people influenced what they put in the 9/11 report and what they kept out.
The 9/11 commission betrayed the interests of the American people when they put the final
9/11 Report together because they downplayed the main motive, anger at U.S. support of
Israel's crimes, and omitted several references to key testimony mentioning Israel.