Tip:
Highlight text to annotate it
X
STUDENT: I was just curious if we took Ates's discussion of secular--
anthropology of secularism? Maybe that secularism is not
just a principle, but is
in some kind of formation of cultures and beliefs,
and apply that concept to Professor Gorski's
categories of missionary strategies,
parachurch organizations-- would secularism
not still have a chance to itself have
the ability to apply those kinds of strategies, build up those kinds of
organizations
at the appropriate secular states' relations and
still, perhaps, be able to adapt in the same ways, and maybe make its own resurgence?
GORSKI: It could.
You know, I mean, they'd need to invent a new ideology, because the two big
versions of that, which were
fascism and Communism
are basically, you know, for all--
as far as we know, extinct. I mention them because those are--
you know, those are-- those are movements which really did build,
you know, a complex ritual life,
a kind of fully developed cosmology of one kind or another,
extensive networks of--
of various kinds of
"parachurch organizations"-- you know, papers, et cetera et cetera et cetera.
Interestingly, to some degree in response to-- in response to and interaction
with
particularly Catholic
kind of confessional movements
during the nineteenth century.
There's a lot of interplay and interaction
between those two,
and interestingly,
some of the few places where you actually find Protestants replicating that are
places where they are in direct competition
with both Catholic
and kind of socialist--
socialist movements. Netherlands is the classic example of this, but
you find this
also, to
some extent, in Austria,
Belgium to a
lesser degree,
some parts of Germany.
ALTINORDU: And I think there are
actually these organizations. I mean
that in Turkey, definitely there's this attempt to
organize against Islamists, that there's also, you know,
a foundation to support modern life. That's one, for example,
that's a kind of--
has also charity functions, but definitely they want to propagate, defend
secularism against a kind of
re-Islamization of
public life in Turkey.
I think in Germany, too-- lots of
kind of
immigrant organizations that are based in Turkey are actually
nationalist and secular, and they did actually
experience lots of tension
with the Islamist organizations as they competed
over immigrants
to provide their primary
organizations,
although now that tension has ceased, and
in the German context, the Islamic
organizations were much more successful.
Because they were also organized around mosque communities, whereas the other
organizations didn't have this kind of--
I mean, the religion provides a very kind of
ready-made language
for these organizations
that enables them to
much easily,
much easier attract
immigrants versus let's say
some of these other alternative organizations who are,
let's say, Socialists, and--
so they didn't have the same kind of
connection to the-- to kind of cultural
idioms and
language that this kind of
religious communal language.
And actually the--
these secular organizations gave up, because
they saw that they needed to collaborate with
the Islamic organizations if they want to
claim any kind of
power or representation over--
over immigrants, because
their membership
numbers were really low.
GORSKI: Just one very quick little follow-on, which is that--
there's a way in which
at least liberal secularism
is in some ways at a disadvantage in that kind of a
struggle, in the same way that liberal Protestantism is, and for exactly the same reason. Because of its
extremely intellectualistic
and non-ritualistic character.
And I think that--
you know, I mean, that's both one of the things which is admirable about liberal secularism and liberal Protestantism, but also one of the things
which sort of weakens them politically. STUDENT: Éthe members of the secularist organizations-- do they tend to be born into it
the way that, presumably, members of the religious ones are? Or are they people that come out of the religious ones, or are they sort of-- well, what are they? Where do they usually come from?
ALTINORDU: Actually, I really don't know.
That's an interesting question.
What their family backgrounds are-- what kinds of environments they come from--
it's really kind of difficult to know. It's a really good question.
GORSKI: Certainly what some of this--
so if you look at the late nineteenth century secular societies, you know,
in England in particular--
you know, they do actually try to--
they have
their own Sunday schools,
which are supposed to be a kind of rival to
conventional Sunday schools,
and they to some degree try to replicate this whole menu of different kinds of organizations and so
build up an
associational life, and people--
it is, in that sense, a kind of a creed
into which people are born
and then pass on.
You know, we all kind of know about
the diaper babies, I think--
it may be only my generation knows about that, knows about,
you know, 1930s, 40s activists and the ways in which they kind of passed on their-- you know, their political commitments and so on
to their children. I mean, obviously that can happen. ButÉ that's the best answer I can give you. STUDENT: Do they tend to be international? I mean, right, diaper babies-- they're from Communism, and soÉ it wasn'tÉ but theoretically the AtaturkÉ it's a very specifically nationalistic call to armsÉ
ALTINORDU: I mean, in case of Turkey-- I don't know what you are-- but in the case of Turkey, there was this one generation,
that's the early republican generation
that saw itself
as part of
progress and a new Turkey, and--
and they do come from certain backgrounds-- I don't know what their family
background is, necessarily, but
they come--
for example, teachers. I mean,
this generation of
early republican teachers was
really kind of invested in this secularizing
and Westernizing identity.
And there's definitely,
probably a continuation of thoseÉ