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What I'd thought I'd
do is give a talk for a few moments
about the revolution and then open
it up for any questions you might
have or any remarks. But, let me
start out by saying, as the University
president said that, Ben-Ali ruled
Tunisia with an increasingly iron
fist for 23 years. And, his very
sudden departure on January 14th,
following four weeks of civil strife,
really set the country on a new,
much more hopeful path as far as
seeking greater participation in
the government and also
greater personal freedom.
At the same time, this
set off a wave of democratic protests
throughout the Arab world that has
come to be known as "The Arab Spring."
What I'd like to talk about this
morning - first of all the speed
with which the revolution took place,
the nature of the revolution itself,
the progress that Tunisians have
made since January 14th, which has
been marked by a bit of political
ferment, but at the same time by,
in my opinion, by a surprising degree
of political consensus - their prospects
for successful transition, and what
the US is doing to help and to set
this on the right path.
Let me start out with
the revolution's momentum.
The revolution that toppled Ben-Ali
really began on Friday December 17th
in a small town called Sidi Bouzid
in the interior of the country.
An underemployed, educated but underemployed
fruit and vegetable vendor got into
an altercation with a police woman,
who basically confiscated his cart
because he was selling his wares
without a permit. Reports are -
we'll never know exactly what happened.
Reportedly she slapped him.
Whatever the story was he felt humiliated
by this and marched down to see the
governor, and no one would see him.
And he was so dismayed by this that
he set himself on fire.
As a result of this act of
desperation and civil
disobedience, there was a wave of
demonstrations that began and spread
to other areas in the interior of
the country. They were captured
on Facebook. The Internet was extremely
tightly controlled and blocked -
the previous regime was very sophisticated
unfortunately at doing that, but
Facebook was not blocked. And so,
word of the demonstrations spread
to other towns in the interior.
It was really though, not until the
weekend of January 8th and 9th that
there was a tipping point. That
weekend of the 8th and 9th there
were security forces who fired on
demonstrators. Reports were that
at least 20 or more were shot by
the security forces. As a result
of this, the demonstrations really
spread and took off, and spread to
the coastal areas where the largest
cities in Tunisia are located.
I think there was a transformation
of the demonstrations from being
more economic in nature to political,
because obviously when a government
starts shooting at its own people
it starts to lose legitimacy in the
eyes of the people.
Demonstrations that led
unfortunately to these shootings
- the shootings were over the weekend.
Ben-Ali gave his third and final
speech on Thursday, the 13th of January.
Interestingly, it was the first
speech that he gave in the Tunisian
dialect of Arabic.
Are there any Arabic
students here? Ok, good.
I'm assuming you are learning modern
standard Arabic; that was the language
which Ben-Ali used for his speeches.
He's very formal and not very comfortable
with people. When he gave this
speech in Tunisian dialect, which
was the third of the three speeches
but the first one in the Tunisian
dialect, which is the language that
people speak in their homes - a lot
of Tunisians said it was the first
time they had heard him speak the
Tunisian dialect. For those of you
who aren't in an Arabic class and
aren't studying – might not be studying
Arabic, there are significant differences
between the languages. I don't want
to over-draw the analogy but it's
a bit like Latin and Italian, or
another Romance Language.
Some people say if he had spoken frankly
to the Tunisian people in their own
language earlier that the demonstrations
might not have spread as rapidly
as they did. However, hindsight
is always 20/20 and his speech did
not resonate. And the next day,
Friday, January 14th, he got on a
plane with his family for Saudi Arabia,
where he remains to this day.
There are actually a lot of similarities
between what went on in Tunisia and
what went on in Egypt just a few
weeks afterwards, down to the fact
that Ben-Ali gave three speeches
and Mubarak gave three speeches.
Ben-Ali's third speech was on a
Thursday and Mubarak’s third and
last speech was on a Thursday.
The next day, they each stepped down
from power. There was a joke at
that time that Gadhafi was going
to outlaw Fridays in Libya as a result.
Maybe now he wishes he did,
I don't know about that. Let me
talk now - that gives you a bit of
context about how quickly it spread.
Let me mention the nature of the
revolution. Really, the spark for
the revolution - it was rooted in
economic grievances; it started in
an area that historically has been
disadvantaged. But, I would say
it was neither economic nor political
in nature. There is one member
of civil society that told me shortly
after the revolution - poverty exists
everywhere. What this revolution
was about was about dignity and dialogue.
Specifically, the loss of dignity
and the lack of dialogue in Tunisia.
I think that can probably be applied
to some of the revolutions and some
of the popular movements that we
are seeing in the other Arab countries
that are undergoing a similar transformation.
I'd say that the Tunisian revolution
could be called the first post-modern
revolution. I'd give four reasons
for that. First of all, it was not
ideological in nature. People were
insisting on values; they were protesting
for these values to be adhered to.
Values such as transparency, which
was missing in Tunisia under Ben-Ali,
and human rights - as well as economic
opportunity. Since it wasn't primarily
ideological in nature, unlike a lot
of revolutions that allows for different
groups competing within Tunisian
society the opportunity to cooperate
more than if there was a rigid ideology
that was pushing the revolution forward.
Secondly, it was truly a grass
roots revolution. This was a revolution
conducted outside the capital, mostly
by young people and there were really
no leaders. There's no icon of the
revolution; there's no Mandala or
Lequilles or anyone like that
which Tunisians can point to.
This has certain advantages because no
single group, be it a leftist group
or an Islamist group or whatever,
can claim ownership of the revolution.
The political parties and the leaders
of the political opposition were
really playing catch up on this.
And third, it was a revolution
in which the participants really
weren't seeking to take power.
They werent trying to take power
they were trying to get rid
of Ben-Ali and remove the existing regime.
That provides certain opportunities
and there are also certain risks
in that the challenge is how do you
create political consensus?
I'll talk about political consensus in
a second. And the fourth and final
reason that I think we can describe
this as a post-modern revolution,
if you will, was the role of technology,
particularly more specifically social
media and particularly Facebook.
It was not - the Tunisian revolution
was a Tunisian accomplishment. There
was no foreign hand in it. The Tunisian
people deserve the credit for their
accomplishment. I'm not trying to
fit their revolution into our narrative,
and our narrative these days is very
much Facebook. At the same time,
Facebook was not censored and it
did allow a mechanism for news of
the demonstrations to spread and
to mobilize Tunisians, I think especially
when the demonstrations spread to
the cities which had obviously larger
population centers to mobilize.
Let's shift now to some of the progress
that we've seen since January 14th.
In talking about the nature of the
revolution I touched on political
consensus. And I've been struck
by the fact that the Tunisians have
been able to create a consensus at
three key points thus far in just
the 8 months or so since Ben-Ali fled.
I think this is particularly
interesting because Ben-Ali had such
a strong control of the country through
his security services that there
was really no political space.
There were three legitimate opposition
parties prior to January 14th.
Their platform, if you will, was basically
"no to Ben-Ali." So, we're moving
from a situation where people, through
no fault of their own - the fault
was really Ben-Ali's - really did
not have very much experience in
consensus and coalition building
- all those things we take for granted
in the United States. You have to
remember that in talking about Tunisia,
non-governmental organizations were
not allowed. They did not have
all the things that we take for
or certainly I take for granted.
As far as elements of democracy,
be it the PTA or be it people's involvement
in a kids youth league or something
like that , all of that is,
ya know student council elections
or whatever - all of that is totally
missing, was totally missing in Tunisia.
But the....The three critical points
at which the Tunisians
thus far have been able to create
a consensus - the first one came
at the end of February. The government
that succeeded Ben-Ali - It was democratically it,
it I shouldn't say it wasn't democratically selected,
but it followed the constitution.
The Speaker of the Parliament became
the interim president and he asked
the Prime Minister Benucci to continue
in office. Some ministers stayed
in office and some didn't.
But that grew untenable because for the
Tunisians that had been active in
the demonstrations, they really saw
that there was no - from their perspective
there was no change because they
still had the same Prime Minister,
still had many ministers who were
member of the previously ruling party.
And so, they continued to demonstrate,
demanding a political change.
So, on February 27th, a new Prime Minister,
Beji Caid el Sebsi, is currently
the, remains as Prime Minister,
came into office and he took a
number of steps right away.
First of all he got rid
of all the ministers who had been
hold-overs from the previous regime.
Second of all, he dismissed all
of the ministers who had political
aspirations of their own, even though
many of them were legitimate opposition
leaders. Third and perhaps most
importantly, he set the nation on
the course for the future, which
was to have elections for a constituent
assembly, whose purpose is to write
the constitution and defer having
presidential elections.
This reassured the Tunisian people
for a number of reasons.
First of all there was
a wariness about having a strong
president moving too quickly to presidential
elections. An imperfect analogy
would be the way American colonialists
felt about a government after our
revolution - there were a lot of
things we didn't know, but one thing
we did know was that we didn't want
a repetition of King George III.
Another reason that it reassured
Tunisians is it gave a road map to
the future and people realized that
they wanted to move forward
and the road map gave them the
oppurtunity to look forward rather than
looking to the past. I think that was very
important for Tunisian’s political oppostion.
The second crunch point,
I would say, came in June when the
elections had been announced for
the constituent assembly had been announced
to be held on July 24th. The mechanics
of setting up the elections were proceeding
fairly slowly - part of it was appointing
the right number and the right mix
of people for the Independent Election
Commission and part of it was that
Tunisians just didn't have the experience
for organizing credible elections
because the elections in the past
had been a sham.
The last presidential election
was October of 2009 and
Ali allegedly got 89.62% of the vote,
and allegedly the participation figure
was also 89%. I think the participation
figure was probably the more incredible
of those two figures because people
just didn't vote. The foregone conclusion:
why waste your Sunday on going down
to a polling station?
So, because of these technical problems,
the Independent Elections Commission
called for postponement of the elections
until October. The government at
first said no; they wanted to hold
them on this date, July 24th, but
the Independent Elections Commission
insisted. And so, the elections
will be held on October 23rd.
I had thought, and I'm very happy to
say I was wrong, I had thought that
the postponement of the elections
would lead to some - a bit of political
ferment on people thinking, well,
the government just wants to keep
in power, so that's why they were
delaying the elections - even though
it was the Independent Elections
Commission that was actually making
the decision, but I was wrong.
I mean, there was no,
I thought there would be demonstrations,
there were no demonstrations
Again, this is the second point
I would say at which there was a
consensus on moving ahead.
Those elections - ah those elections
will be held on October 23rd.
There will be independent
observers both from within Tunisian
civil society but also from outside
the country. Carter's Center
is going to be observing, Organization for
Security, Cooperation for Europe
is going to be observing - other
NGOs and other governments will be
observing. We're going to have an
embassy participation in the observation
effort as well. I think the third
illustration of the Tunisian’s ability
to create consensus came about just
a week ago when almost all of the
major political parties - I should
say now there are 110 political parties
registered in Tunisia, which strikes
me as a lot. I think it shows the
thirst of people to participate in
the democratic process and I'm told
this is not inconsistent with what
has happened in other democratic
transitions. I'm told that after
Franco left the scene there were
something like 250 political parties
in Spain. Obviously with 110 political
parties, some are stronger than others.
11 of the most important parties
got together, signed an agreement
that is not legally binding, but
says that they will limit the time
of the constituent assembly, after
they are elected to it, to one year
to write the constitution. This
set out a plan for the next step.
This had been a contentious issue
- some people were saying we need
a referendum on the scope of the
constituent assembly, but again this
was an illustration of the Tunisian’s
ability to work behind the scenes
and create a consensus. I think
that will serve them well when they
move to the constituent’s assembly.
I'm going to take the dangerous
step of getting out my crystal ball
and you can judge further down the
road whether I was accurate or not
when I talk about the prospects for
a successful transition. I'll break
the cardinal rule of diplomacy and
publicly express optimism about something
happening. But in all seriousness,
I am optimistic about the chances
of the Tunisians to have a successful
transition. I guess the first reason
I'm , Im well optimistic is seeing the track
record thus far where there have
been these - at these three possible
turning points, Tunisians have shown
the ability to a - have show the ability to
creat a census to move forward politically.
That's going to be essential during the
writing of the constitution in the
constituent assembly, as we're going
to have 218 people charged with doing
this task. I - As someone who has
worked in the government for a few years,
I can't imagine a committee of 218
people accomplishing anything, but
I'm sure they will be able to do
it and hopefully expeditiously.
There also are a few - more than
a few ingredients or factors when
you look at Tunisia society that
I think suggests that they have the
ingredients for a successful transition.
It is a remarkably homogeneous society.
It is people are fairly moderate and fairly
tolerant. It's not perfect but there
is good equality between males and
females. When the first president,
Bourguiba became president upon Tunisia's
independence, mandated education
for both boys and for girls. So now
women in universities are 60% of
the university population.
It was the first country in which
first Arab country in which polygamy
was outlawed first an only and thus far country, ah
Arab country in which polygamy was
outlawed. Tunisian women got to
vote before Swiss women. So, there
are a number of factors like that.
Also importantly, I think, is there
is a large Middle class in Tunisia.
Home ownership rate is greater in
Tunisia than it is in the United States
as well. That kind of stability
is extremely important for a successful
transition. Tunisians also have
a lot of exposure to Western ideas
of democracy. They very much look
to Turkey as a place where democracy
can thrive in a Muslim country.
And, I would argue that they are
familiar with the institutions of
democracy, even if those were not
democratic institutions under Ben-Ali.
What I mean by that is the idea
of a parliament is well established.
The idea that the judiciary should
be independent is well established idea,
even if it was - in the performance
under Ben-Ali, that wasn't the case.
I think this is very important
because if you compare Tunisia's
transition to the transition that
the Libyans will have to go through,
they are really starting from the
floor. I wish them well, but they
have a lot more institution building
than the Tunisians will have.
I don't want to be “PollyAnn-ish”
about this; there are challenges
out there, no question about it. They -
The Tunisians have a high unemployment
rate that they recognize. It's a
structural problem that's not going
to be solved the day after the elections
or it's not going to be solved the
year after the elections. So there
are challenges to the transition
but in some I think they have all
the necessary conditions for a successful
transition. Whether they - whether those
conditions are sufficient, we'll see.
But, my guess is that they will be a
they will be successful.
Another reason that I'm optimistic
for the prospects for the success
in Tunisia is that they are open
to foreign assistance for this transition
period. That gets me to the point
I want to make about what the United
States is doing in this regard.
There are a number of different sectors
where we can and we are assisting.
I mentioned the election observation
as one, that is very welcome by
the Tunisians. But a - it's not just
election observation There's also -
we are working on making grants to
civil society groups, helping to train political
parties, working to provide technical
assistance to the independent election
commission and the like.
Thus far we have already provided over
30 million dollars in assistance
to civil society groups and we're
trying to make sure that that money
goes to groups throughout the country,
not just to groups in the capital,
so the disadvantaged areas benefit
as much as NGOs, say in the capital.
Security is also obviously very important
for - for the Tunisians especially, they live
in a tough neighborhood with Algeria to
the west and Libya to the east.
Last fiscal year we provided 18 million
dollars in military financing for
basically to sustain their equipment.
We also provided roughly 2 million
dollars through a program called
International Military Education
and Training. I mention this because
the Tunisian military - that basically
brings Tunisian officers to the United
States to study in our military
institutions or at our military forces.
I mention this because the military -
the Tunisian military
played exactly the role that we in
the United States would've hoped
that it would play. It a - historically
it has been political at the time
of the revolution, it did not support
the government during the Ben-Ali
regime, it did not fire on demonstrators.
When the discredited police forces
faded away the military moved in
to provide security. They were very
much welcomed by the people. I saw
people putting bouquets of flowers
on tanks for example in Tunis - things
like that. We're also - United States
is seeking to address Tunisia's economic -
economic problems. We've brought delegations
of senior business leaders to Tunisia.
We are trying to encourage entrepreneurship
through a training program and we
are trying to give technical advice
on banking reform, and the like.
Just to sum up - looking at 2011
and I really address these comments
to the students in the audience,
we will look back at 2011 and what
it means to the Arab world, the same
way that we look back at 1989 and
what that meant for Europe, Eastern
Europe, and Russia. This is a -
really a tremendous opportunity for,
first and foremost for the Tunisian
people, but I think also for friends
of democracy in the Arab world.
We're trying to do our bit. As a
diplomat it's a tremendous privilege
and also a heck of a lot of fun to
be serving in Tunisia at a time like that
Again, for the students
in the audience, especially if you
are studying Arabic, that suggests
a certain number - a certain degree of interest
in foreign countries and cultures.
I'd really encourage you to stick with it.
We have got lots of opportunities
to serve overseas.
The State Department, military,
NGOs - I was a Peace Corps volunteer.
There are all kinds of oppurtuniies
out there. And I really encourage
you to take advantage of them
It's fascinating, it's educational.
- I can't think of anything more
honorable to do than serving your country.
It really gives you the oppurtunity to do that.
I don't want to delay your colleagues
they may want to be delayed - having taught
for two years in the Peace Corps,
I don't want to delay another professor
in another class. Thanks so much
for coming out and for listening.
I very much appreciated your questions.
Like I say, stay engaged. It's
really interesting. Thank you.
[Clapping]