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Vladimir Yevseyev, director of the Center for Public Policy Research
Russia has and will retain its influence.
Many say that Russia is losing everything, that Russia is losing the Middle East.
This is a rising hysteria, under which there is nothing. I could tell you about the Middle East:
Russia is really not losing it. The same is true for Central Asia.
Not everything is so unambiguous, including the positions of the U.S. and of the European Union,
which does not express itself as a political structure in Central Asia.
NATO is present there, but the influence of NATO is also limited.
You understand, they do not want to invest in it.
And if they do not want to invest, how can they get a dividend from this? It is completely unrealistic.
The U.S. does not want to invest. Central Asia is not a priority for the U.S., that's the problem.
The problem is not Russian; this is the problem of those states which are in Central Asia.
From this point of view, not everything is so clear-cut.
There are serious problems, but the problems can largely be solved -
if these are the problems in bilateral relations with Russia.
There are much more difficult problems among the states of Central Asia.
What can be done when, for example, Tajikistan needs light in the winter, and they want to use water,
but it leads to water-logging in Uzbekistan, which needs water in summer, not in winter?
How to solve a problem when they should drain water - in winter or in summer?
And there are also other problems. Uzbek gas, for example - at what price will it be sold by Tajikistan?
One thing follows another.
I think that, in general, if we look at the development of Russia's relations with each state,
it has problems, but we can solve these problems. Unsolvable problems are mostly internal.
And when the Soviet Union existed, it suppressed these problems or solved them.
But now there are no states which could solve problems together,
and a clinch situation appears when, for example, Uzbekistan conducts exercises to capture dams,
and then there is a leak of information, for example, in Kyrgyzstan, that, if it is destroyed,
it will lead to some problems in Uzbekistan.
It is actually a very dangerous game, because it can lead to some clashes,
especially now, when Uzbekistan has left the Collective Security Treaty Organization,
and it turns out that Russia formally should protect, let's say, Kyrgyzstan from Uzbekistan
or, for example, Tajikistan from Uzbekistan.
But I think that the withdrawal of Uzbekistan from the CSTO is temporary.
I believe that it will take some period of time, and Uzbekistan will return.
You see, there are lots of reasons why it should return.
I was considering the development of Russian relations with Uzbekistan in the last 20 years.
I can say that the vector has changed. In the early 1990's there were very close Russian-Uzbek relations.
Then, near the end of the 1990s, Russian-Uzbek relations deteriorated very seriously,
influenced by the Americans.
Then there was 9/11, after which there was a surge of Uzbek-American relations.
Then there was Andijan, after which the relationship turned sour.
Then there was a surge of Russian-Uzbek relations.
Now again we are moving to the next wave of changing the vector. The vector changes,
but I think it will return again.
At one time it was one of the initiators of the Treaty on Collective Security,
and then it did not renew it. After Andijan, it joined the CSTO. Currently, it has withdrawn its membership.
It will take some time, and maybe it will restore its membership; we can observe a certain cycle here.
Why does Uzbekistan behave in such a way? The U.S. promised it weapons, as I understand.
The U.S. promised weapons to Uzbekistan, and it is a good incentive.
But as a result, the free cheese is only in a mousetrap. Suppose the Americans give the weapons.
This can be welcomed in Uzbekistan. But how can these weapons be supported?
This raises the question that Uzbekistan has to pay.
So, they have to pay the Americans to keep the weapons in working order,
and these amounts are quite large. Otherwise, they will not be able to use the weapons.
It turns out that they become dependent on the United States.
I do not think that Uzbekistan really needs this.
From this point of view, I think the supply of arms is not an obvious dividend
that is positive for Uzbekistan, because it falls into the trap of dependence on the U.S.
It will be worse if they go further and, for example, allow them to return to the base in Khanabad.
In this case, the situation will be even worse, because we remember what happened in Andijan,
and Andijan can happen again.
So I think that the base in Khanabad may be a Trojan horse,
so there is no need to create a reason for Americans to intervene,
especially since the transfer of power is difficult
because, as I understand it, Islam Karimov has no successors now.
In Uzbekistan, there are a very large number of clans, the seven major clans are mainly mentioned.
And Karimov can hold them. You know, it is unclear what will happen when he is gone.
I'll give you one example. Assad's father did the same thing in Syria, and he could hold the country,
where there were many nations, all sorts of people who professed different religions.
The father could keep the country, and the son could not.
It is also possible here: a new man can come who cannot hold the clans
or cannot be equidistant from the clans.
In this case the other clans will be in opposition against him, such a development is possible.
And here, if I were Islam Karimov, I would think twice
about whether I need to go very far away from Russia, because help may be necessary.
Among the players in the region you have mentioned Iran.
Is there a conflict between Russia and Iran for influence?
You know, I have watched the degree of influence, if we look at the region of Central Asia.
Three states have a major impact - Russia, China and the U.S.
In fact, they cannot push each other; perhaps someone will unite with someone,
for example, Russia and China against the U.S., but this is not very realistic.
Apparently, the three players remain. All the other players have the following order:
even Iran would still be attributed to the second level of influence.
Iran can actually influence Tajikistan, which is culturally close to it, but even there it is not the only player,
as there is a very strong constraint on the part of China.
China has a very strong presence in Tajikistan now. There is Russia.
Iran is not a unique player even for Tajikistan. If we look at other countries, its impact is even smaller.
There is some influence, such as in Turkmenistan,
because Turkmenistan is using Iranian territory for transit of gas, but there is China again.
If you look at the pipelines, you'll find that here, of course, Iran does not benefit compared to China,
because they are simply incommensurable in power,
the Chinese pipelines are several times more powerful than the ones that go through Iran.
There are other states that have influence.
You might be surprised - Qatar has recently become one such state.
In recent years Qatar has become very active in many of the states of Central Asia.
I'm certainly not saying that it can, for example, have more influence than Iran,
but nevertheless its influence is significant, that is, it has become a significant player.
Through funding?
Yes. It provides funding to those states which are in great need.
If you look at the map, you will immediately understand what I mean - this is Kyrgyzstan.
Kyrgyzstan has a very large external debt, and it would very much like to be financed by someone.
Of course, it does not want to give away anything; it wants to get money for nothing.
Qatar is now giving under such conditions that you'd think that it is for nothing.
We can say that there is the influence of Turkey in Central Asia.
When you talk about Iran, I would probably compare this with the Turkish influence.
The Turks at one time wanted to spread their influence throughout Central Asia.
They did not have the capacity. So now the influence of Turkey can be reduced to two states:
first, Turkmenistan, which is close enough culturally to Turkey,
and here the influence of Turkey is very strong, probably the strongest influence in Turkmenistan.
There is some impact, surprisingly, in Kyrgyzstan, Turkish influence is essential.
Turkish influence on other states is much less.
In general we can say that perhaps the influence of Iran and Turkey is comparable.
This is a small but significant effect.
In general, their influence is not as great as the influence of the first three states I mentioned -
Russia, China and the U.S.
Well, Vladimir, thank you very much for a very interesting and informative discussion.
We congratulate you on the upcoming holiday, and we wish that Russia always be in the first wave!
Thanks a lot! I would also really like to see Russia maintaining a leading position not only in Central Asia,
but also in the whole world.