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I'm joined by Lawrence Wilkerson he is a visiting professor of government and
public policy at the College of William and Mary he also served as chief of
staff to former Secretary of State Colin Powell
and he was responsible for review of information from the CIA that was used
to prepare colin powell
for his February 2003 presentation to the UN Security Council during the
run-up to the war
in Iraq up professor it's a really a pleasure to have you here
since a since your role as I described
I in that position of chief of staff with colin powell you have criticized
the intelligence that was used to make that
case that we are now all intimately familiar for the case for war in Iraq
and you're concerned now
about the intelligence being used in Syria let's start there
I'm concerned about intelligence
a from two points of view with regard to Syria
and they both relate back to the Iraq war
and the occasions you've just you describe the first
concern I am is is the intelligence what we're looking at
that is to say have the intelligence professionals
put forward there be you
use in are those views in them on adulterated way
being presented to the american people into their representatives in the
congress
as the first concern you might call it a concern about politicize the nation
million gallons
is second concern is with the intelligence and sell
any intelligence professional when I've worked with him for over forty year
workers will tell you that any good intelligence service
is probably right or you're right about 60 percent of the time
that's all you can expect so lets a wide margin for error
forty percent of the time arm so those two concerns
relate to Syria as much as they did to iraq with iraq having been a
really egregious case of politicians
cherry picking the intelligence to make it fit their policy
rather than taking all the intelligence and leading inform their policy
so to ask about Syria let me ask a question about iraq
and then we can kind of go from there at the time that you were reviewing
that information from the CIA that secretary Powell
eventually used to make the case for iraq were their candid discussions that
you were involved in are privy to
where the validity of the intelligence was being questioned
or was it after the fact that that came to light mall
they were some very dramatic moments in the preparation we only had five days
and nights out at langley the CIA headquarters and then
one day and night in New York as we got ready to present to the security council
I remember tree in a very dramatic moments all relate a couple to you
secretary Powell had taken me aside and put me into a room and close the door
in the National Intelligence Council spaces in Percy I
headquarters and he had said he used utterly disgusted
with the information in his presentation about
terrorism in about the connections between baghdad
with al Qaeda in particular there didn't seem to be any
and I was very comfortable with that I'd only be did need to get angry with me
I'd be more than willing to take it out one right out and told his speechwriter
who was sitting in front of the computer actually preparing the preparation in
terms of narrative
and told her to take it completely out everything about connections between
baghdad Baghdad and essentially their secret well
police there you go brought and al Qaeda within an hour
george tenet dropped a bombshell
in his conference room where we get reconvene to begin rehearsing again
and said that a high-level al Qaeda operative under interrogation had just
reveal
substantial contacts between them karach and al Qaeda operatives including
training those operatives
in how to use chemical and biological weapons well best
was a bombshell and was so we put that back into the presentation
there were dramatic moments like that about saddam's active nuclear program
with regard to aluminum tubes and so forth and other instances
where we were very skeptical even so skeptical
skeptical as in the case so the mobile biological labs for example
and also the 1i just related to you about
the terrorism context we actually move to eliminate them from his presentation
only
to have the DCI george tenet accompanied by his deputy john mclaughlin
give us some kind of dramatic story that compelled us to put it back in
so based on that then we've we might have a situation now with the case being
made for Syria
where the information intelligence is being presented in good faith and it
might at some future point turn out to have been wrong
but based on what the conversations you're describing
there maybe a case being presented now with information
that is known to be maybe not wrong but certainly not
strong is that a possibility
I think it's fair to say that some of the information may be being presented
as very very strong
because it fits the policy directive it gets the policy objective
and that case your you may be guilty of a little bit more sophisticated
cherry-picking
but it is cherry-picking nonetheless I do think
from what I've heard inside the intelligence community inside the
Pentagon
from beirut from Damascus where I have people who actually email me and talk
are up to me about the Civil War I think chemical weapons have been used
multiple times over the past six to 12 months
there've been small instances clearly I think that 21 always use was the largest
or at least the largest reported
incident and the UN has now concluded its investigations and there's a a
likelihood that someone with him and got
government probably authorized whether it was a Saudi not we do not know
probably authorize this use of chemical weapons
I it still ambiguous to a point where I wouldn't say with certitude
that's the case but I would say that I have a a stronger feeling now after all
these
conversations with people inside and outside the intelligence community
and also with the reports coming from
the UN team that somehow somewhere
the government probably was involved in this used chemical weapons now
it might indeed a better response to somebody's other instances
where the opposition was using chemical weapons
were predominately sarin or watered-down sarin I would say
I'm so it still ambiguous as to exactly what
the ***-for-tat years in Syria with regard to chemical weapons use
in the last couple of minutes we have I want to take this conversation
about the strength have intelligence that used to in these cases are made in
kinda basket different question
back when you were involved in the discussions you talked about earlier
these
are we going to include the connection between al Qaeda and saddam or are we
not in these types of things
were there ever moments where you step back and I don't know if this includes
secretary Powell or not and there's a kind of a candid conversation
about what really might be at the root up wanting to make this case in the
first place like this the term
%uh military-industrial complex urges oil do any of these things come up
candidly when you're sitting in those backroom meetings planning this case
that will be made
or is that kinda understood and not mentioned at all
the latter is more often the case in my experience I've server
three presidents fairly closely and we go back to the first Gulf War where I
was special assistant to colin powell when he was chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff
it to tie I'm Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait um
yes there was mention a boil and yes there was a
putting down on the ground early on the
82nd airborne troops to keep saddam from turning right as a war
and going into Saudi Arabia where for example roster nor I think was pumping
six million barrels per day
while the greatest production capacities in the world course
and we want saddam having control that but you don't hear that
discussed really even at the highest levels
as objectives as reasons
may come up someone may not live someone make bleak someone may not easy it is if
yes I agree and so for but it's clear that those are the reasons that you
doing what you're doing
I was just face it ever since franklin roosevelt in
beginning in saudi arabia talk arm
and Jimmy Carter laid down the gauntlet at the end of his administration and
said that
the Persian Gulf was a vital national interest in the United States of America
we have been using military force diplomacy and other means
in that area to protect oil period
all right we've been speaking with professor laurence Wilkerson he is a
visiting professor of government and public policy at the College of William
and Mary
could not couldn't be more appreciative for your insight i mean this is really
fascinating stuff and I think our audience really enjoys hearing what
these discussions are like behind the scenes
so I hope you'll join us again thank you so much
thanks for having me